Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Centaur, L.L.C. entered into a Master Services Contract (MSC) with United Bulk Terminals Davant, L.L.C. (UBT) in 2015 to build a concrete containment wall at UBT's dock facility. River Ventures, L.L.C. provided vessel transportation for Centaur’s employees working on the project. Centaur employee Devin Barrios was injured while transferring a generator from a River Ventures vessel to a barge leased by Centaur. The district court found River Ventures 100% at fault for the accident and imposed a $3.3 million judgment. River Ventures and its insurer, XL Specialty Insurance Company, satisfied the judgment and subsequently brought breach of contract claims against Centaur under the MSC.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial on the breach of contract claims. The court dismissed the claims, finding an ambiguity in the MSC regarding Centaur’s insurance procurement obligations. Specifically, the court found that requiring Centaur to procure a Protection & Indemnity (P&I) policy with crew/employee coverage would result in an absurd consequence due to potential duplicative coverage with the Worker’s Compensation policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the MSC unambiguously required Centaur to procure a P&I policy that included crew/employee coverage. The court disagreed with the district court’s finding of absurdity, noting that mutually repugnant escape clauses in the Worker’s Compensation and P&I policies would result in both policies being liable on a pro rata basis. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the excess/bumbershoot breach of contract claim, as it was contingent on the P&I claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Centaur v. River Ventures" on Justia Law

A construction company chartered a barge and obtained insurance through a broker. Upon returning the barge, the owner discovered damage and sued the construction company in federal court. The construction company requested its insurer to defend it, but the insurer refused, citing lack of coverage. After the federal court awarded damages to the barge owner, the construction company sued the insurer and broker in state court, alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and negligence.The Superior Court of Alaska denied the construction company's motion for summary judgment against the broker and insurer. The court granted summary judgment to the broker and insurer, finding that the construction company's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the construction company had not relied on any reassurances from the broker that would have delayed the filing of the lawsuit.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the construction company's claims against the broker were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer first denied coverage. The court also held that the construction company's claims against the insurer were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer refused to defend the construction company in the federal lawsuit. The court concluded that the construction company's claims were untimely and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the broker and insurer. View "Swalling Construction Company, Inc. v. Alaska USA Insurance Brokers, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Havana Docks Corporation, which held a 99-year usufructuary concession at the Port of Havana, Cuba. This concession, granted in 1905, allowed Havana Docks to build and operate piers at the port. The Cuban Government expropriated this concession in 1960, and Havana Docks has not received compensation for this expropriation. The concession was set to expire in 2004. Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified its loss at $9.179 million.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of Havana Docks, awarding over $100 million in judgments against four cruise lines—Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises—for trafficking in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court found that the cruise lines had engaged in trafficking by docking their ships at the terminal, using the property to embark and disembark passengers, and using it as a starting and ending point for shore excursions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Havana Docks' limited property interest had expired in 2004, and therefore, the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reversed the judgments against the cruise lines for the 2016-2019 period. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Havana Docks' claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking from 1996 to 2001. View "Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

Ultra Deep Picasso Pte. Limited (Ultra Deep) is a contractor specializing in undersea vessel operations for marine construction. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd. (Dynamic) subcontracted Ultra Deep for a project related to a contract with Saudi Aramco. Ultra Deep completed work worth over ten million dollars but alleged that Dynamic failed to pay, breaching their agreement. Ultra Deep filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas, seeking breach of contract damages and a maritime attachment and garnishment of Dynamic’s funds allegedly held by Riyad Bank.The district court granted Ultra Deep an ex parte order for attachment of Dynamic’s assets at Riyad Bank. Dynamic responded with motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and to compel arbitration, which were denied. Dynamic and Riyad Bank then moved to vacate the attachment order, arguing that Ultra Deep failed to show Dynamic had property in the Southern District of Texas. The magistrate judge held a hearing and found that Ultra Deep did not present evidence that Dynamic’s property was within the district. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, vacated the attachment order, and dismissed the case with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that for a valid Rule B attachment, the property must be found within the district. It concluded that a bank account is located where its funds can be withdrawn. Since Ultra Deep failed to show that Dynamic’s property was within the Southern District of Texas, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate the attachment order and dismiss the case. View "Ultra Deep Picasso v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd." on Justia Law

A longshoreman, Robert Tower, who worked at the Port of Seattle, experienced hearing loss in one ear and bilateral tinnitus due to occupational noise exposure. An audiogram revealed a 9.375% hearing loss in his left ear and 0% in his right ear, with additional tinnitus. Tower sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming benefits for hearing loss in both ears due to the tinnitus.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Tower was only entitled to compensation for hearing loss in one ear under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), rejecting the claim for bilateral hearing loss compensation. The Benefits Review Board vacated this decision, holding that Tower should be compensated for hearing loss in both ears under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) due to the tinnitus, which the AMA Guides suggest should be added to a binaural hearing impairment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Longshore Act does not permit monaural hearing loss to be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) for bilateral hearing loss, even when the claimant also has tinnitus. The court emphasized that the Act distinguishes between monaural and binaural hearing loss and that tinnitus, while a significant condition, does not convert a monaural hearing loss into a binaural one for compensation purposes. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, noting that Tower should be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A) for his monaural hearing loss. The court did not express a view on whether tinnitus might be compensable under the catch-all provision, 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). View "TOTAL TERMINALS INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS" on Justia Law

The case involves Denys Korotkiy, the Chief Engineer of a foreign-flagged ship, who was charged with violating U.S. regulations by failing to maintain accurate records of bilge-water operations in the ship's Oil Record Book. The ship, MV Donald, dumped oily bilge water on the high seas and made misleading entries in the Oil Record Book to cover it up. Upon arriving in the U.S., the Coast Guard inspected the ship and found the records to be inaccurate and incomplete.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied Korotkiy's motion to dismiss the indictment. Korotkiy argued that the regulation did not require accurate records, that Congress and the international community did not intend for such prosecutions, and that only shipmasters, not chief engineers, should be charged. The district court, relying on precedents from other circuits, found that Korotkiy could be charged for failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book while in U.S. waters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 requires ships to maintain accurate records in their Oil Record Books while in U.S. waters. The court joined other circuits in interpreting the regulation to impose a duty on foreign-flagged vessels to ensure the accuracy of their records upon entering U.S. territorial waters. The court also rejected Korotkiy's argument that only shipmasters could be charged, noting that chief engineers can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the failure to maintain accurate records. The court concluded that the regulation's plain language and the legislative purpose of preventing oceanic pollution supported the prosecution. View "USA V. KOROTKIY" on Justia Law

John Moore, Jr., and Tanner Mansell, who worked as boat crew for a shark encounter company in Jupiter, Florida, were involved in an incident on August 10, 2020. During a trip with the Kuehl family, they found a long fishing line attached to a buoy, which they believed was illegal. They hauled the line into the boat, cut sharks free from the hooks, and reported the incident to a Florida Fish and Wildlife Officer. However, the line was legally placed by Scott Taylor, who had the proper permits for shark research. Moore and Mansell were later indicted for theft of property within special maritime jurisdiction, as the line and gear belonged to Taylor.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Moore and Mansell requested a jury instruction that required the jury to find they stole the property for their own use or benefit to convict them under 18 U.S.C. § 661. The district court rejected this request, instead instructing the jury that to steal means to wrongfully take property with the intent to deprive the owner of its use. The jury found both defendants guilty, and they were sentenced to one year of probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed jury instruction. The appellate court found that the term "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 661 does not require the intent to convert the property for personal use, aligning with the broader interpretation of theft under federal law. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2020, Milos Product Tanker Corporation transported approximately 40,000 tons of jet fuel belonging to Valero Marketing and Supply Company. Milos had a maritime transportation contract (Charter Party) with GP Global PTE Ltd., which arranged the voyage. Valero purchased the fuel from Koch Refining International PTE Ltd. on "cost and freight" terms, meaning Koch paid for the transportation. Upon delivery, Valero refused to pay Milos, arguing it had already paid Koch. GP Global, facing financial difficulties, also did not pay Milos, leading Milos to sue Valero for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Milos, concluding that Valero breached an express or implied contract to pay Milos for the transportation. The court reasoned that Valero's conduct showed its consent to be bound by the Charter Party between Milos and GP Global. The court also found that Valero was alternatively liable under an implied promise to pay, based on its acceptance of the fuel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that under maritime law, the shipper (GP Global) is primarily liable for freight charges, even if a bill of lading suggests otherwise. The court found no express contract between Milos and Valero that would rebut this presumption. The Charter Party specifically stated that GP Global would pay the freight. The court also determined that Valero's conduct did not imply an agreement to be bound by the bills of lading or to pay freight. Additionally, the court found no basis for an implied obligation for Valero to pay under the principles established in States Marine International, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank. The court concluded that Valero was not unjustly enriched, as it had paid Koch for the freight charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MILOS PRODUCT TANKER CORPORATION V. VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY" on Justia Law

A maintenance diver, Eduardo Loaiza, suffered severe injuries while servicing the sailboat Allora in Marina Del Rey, California. Loaiza was injured when the propeller was activated, causing significant harm to his hands. The shipowners, Live Life Bella Vita LLC, Gary Dordick, and Nava Dordick, sought to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act by filing an action in the Central District of California. The district court enjoined all related suits, including those in state courts.Loaiza filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court and counterclaims in the federal limitation proceeding. He also filed a third-party complaint against several entities, including S and K Dive Service, Inc. The district court granted Loaiza's motion to stay the limitation proceeding, allowing him to pursue his claims in state court under the "single claimant" exception, despite the Vessel Owners' argument that multiple claims were likely. Subsequently, S and K Dive filed counterclaims in federal court for indemnity, contribution, and attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that parties seeking indemnity or contribution are separate claimants under the Limitation Act, creating a multiple claimant situation. The court also held that claims for attorney’s fees constitute separate claims. The court vacated the district court’s dissolution of the injunction, reinstating the injunction against all related suits. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to resume the limitation proceeding and review all claims and stipulations to ensure the shipowners' right to limit liability is protected. View "LIVE LIFE BELLA VITA, LLC V. CRUISING YACHTS, INC." on Justia Law

Catherine Berry sued her employer, Air Force Central Welfare Fund, and its insurer, Air Force Insurance Fund, to enforce administrative default orders for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. After Berry filed her lawsuit, the defendants voluntarily paid her the full amount owed, including penalties and interest. Berry then sought attorneys’ fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), arguing that her case was not moot due to her pending fee request.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Berry’s motion for attorneys’ fees and dismissed her complaint as moot. The court held that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim under § 928(a) because the defendants’ voluntary payment mooted the case, and Berry obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Berry appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Berry’s claim was moot because she received the full amount owed and sought no other compensation. The court also rejected Berry’s argument that her lawsuit was the catalyst for the defendants’ payment, stating that the catalyst theory is unavailable under § 928(a). The court concluded that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim in the district court, as she obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Therefore, Berry was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 928(a). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case as moot. View "BERRY V. AIR FORCE CENTRAL WELFARE FUND" on Justia Law