Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

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A longshoreman, Robert Tower, who worked at the Port of Seattle, experienced hearing loss in one ear and bilateral tinnitus due to occupational noise exposure. An audiogram revealed a 9.375% hearing loss in his left ear and 0% in his right ear, with additional tinnitus. Tower sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming benefits for hearing loss in both ears due to the tinnitus.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Tower was only entitled to compensation for hearing loss in one ear under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), rejecting the claim for bilateral hearing loss compensation. The Benefits Review Board vacated this decision, holding that Tower should be compensated for hearing loss in both ears under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) due to the tinnitus, which the AMA Guides suggest should be added to a binaural hearing impairment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Longshore Act does not permit monaural hearing loss to be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) for bilateral hearing loss, even when the claimant also has tinnitus. The court emphasized that the Act distinguishes between monaural and binaural hearing loss and that tinnitus, while a significant condition, does not convert a monaural hearing loss into a binaural one for compensation purposes. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, noting that Tower should be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A) for his monaural hearing loss. The court did not express a view on whether tinnitus might be compensable under the catch-all provision, 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). View "TOTAL TERMINALS INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS" on Justia Law

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The case involves Denys Korotkiy, the Chief Engineer of a foreign-flagged ship, who was charged with violating U.S. regulations by failing to maintain accurate records of bilge-water operations in the ship's Oil Record Book. The ship, MV Donald, dumped oily bilge water on the high seas and made misleading entries in the Oil Record Book to cover it up. Upon arriving in the U.S., the Coast Guard inspected the ship and found the records to be inaccurate and incomplete.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied Korotkiy's motion to dismiss the indictment. Korotkiy argued that the regulation did not require accurate records, that Congress and the international community did not intend for such prosecutions, and that only shipmasters, not chief engineers, should be charged. The district court, relying on precedents from other circuits, found that Korotkiy could be charged for failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book while in U.S. waters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 requires ships to maintain accurate records in their Oil Record Books while in U.S. waters. The court joined other circuits in interpreting the regulation to impose a duty on foreign-flagged vessels to ensure the accuracy of their records upon entering U.S. territorial waters. The court also rejected Korotkiy's argument that only shipmasters could be charged, noting that chief engineers can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the failure to maintain accurate records. The court concluded that the regulation's plain language and the legislative purpose of preventing oceanic pollution supported the prosecution. View "USA V. KOROTKIY" on Justia Law

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John Moore, Jr., and Tanner Mansell, who worked as boat crew for a shark encounter company in Jupiter, Florida, were involved in an incident on August 10, 2020. During a trip with the Kuehl family, they found a long fishing line attached to a buoy, which they believed was illegal. They hauled the line into the boat, cut sharks free from the hooks, and reported the incident to a Florida Fish and Wildlife Officer. However, the line was legally placed by Scott Taylor, who had the proper permits for shark research. Moore and Mansell were later indicted for theft of property within special maritime jurisdiction, as the line and gear belonged to Taylor.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Moore and Mansell requested a jury instruction that required the jury to find they stole the property for their own use or benefit to convict them under 18 U.S.C. § 661. The district court rejected this request, instead instructing the jury that to steal means to wrongfully take property with the intent to deprive the owner of its use. The jury found both defendants guilty, and they were sentenced to one year of probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed jury instruction. The appellate court found that the term "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 661 does not require the intent to convert the property for personal use, aligning with the broader interpretation of theft under federal law. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

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In 2020, Milos Product Tanker Corporation transported approximately 40,000 tons of jet fuel belonging to Valero Marketing and Supply Company. Milos had a maritime transportation contract (Charter Party) with GP Global PTE Ltd., which arranged the voyage. Valero purchased the fuel from Koch Refining International PTE Ltd. on "cost and freight" terms, meaning Koch paid for the transportation. Upon delivery, Valero refused to pay Milos, arguing it had already paid Koch. GP Global, facing financial difficulties, also did not pay Milos, leading Milos to sue Valero for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Milos, concluding that Valero breached an express or implied contract to pay Milos for the transportation. The court reasoned that Valero's conduct showed its consent to be bound by the Charter Party between Milos and GP Global. The court also found that Valero was alternatively liable under an implied promise to pay, based on its acceptance of the fuel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that under maritime law, the shipper (GP Global) is primarily liable for freight charges, even if a bill of lading suggests otherwise. The court found no express contract between Milos and Valero that would rebut this presumption. The Charter Party specifically stated that GP Global would pay the freight. The court also determined that Valero's conduct did not imply an agreement to be bound by the bills of lading or to pay freight. Additionally, the court found no basis for an implied obligation for Valero to pay under the principles established in States Marine International, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank. The court concluded that Valero was not unjustly enriched, as it had paid Koch for the freight charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MILOS PRODUCT TANKER CORPORATION V. VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY" on Justia Law

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A maintenance diver, Eduardo Loaiza, suffered severe injuries while servicing the sailboat Allora in Marina Del Rey, California. Loaiza was injured when the propeller was activated, causing significant harm to his hands. The shipowners, Live Life Bella Vita LLC, Gary Dordick, and Nava Dordick, sought to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act by filing an action in the Central District of California. The district court enjoined all related suits, including those in state courts.Loaiza filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court and counterclaims in the federal limitation proceeding. He also filed a third-party complaint against several entities, including S and K Dive Service, Inc. The district court granted Loaiza's motion to stay the limitation proceeding, allowing him to pursue his claims in state court under the "single claimant" exception, despite the Vessel Owners' argument that multiple claims were likely. Subsequently, S and K Dive filed counterclaims in federal court for indemnity, contribution, and attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that parties seeking indemnity or contribution are separate claimants under the Limitation Act, creating a multiple claimant situation. The court also held that claims for attorney’s fees constitute separate claims. The court vacated the district court’s dissolution of the injunction, reinstating the injunction against all related suits. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to resume the limitation proceeding and review all claims and stipulations to ensure the shipowners' right to limit liability is protected. View "LIVE LIFE BELLA VITA, LLC V. CRUISING YACHTS, INC." on Justia Law

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Catherine Berry sued her employer, Air Force Central Welfare Fund, and its insurer, Air Force Insurance Fund, to enforce administrative default orders for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. After Berry filed her lawsuit, the defendants voluntarily paid her the full amount owed, including penalties and interest. Berry then sought attorneys’ fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), arguing that her case was not moot due to her pending fee request.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Berry’s motion for attorneys’ fees and dismissed her complaint as moot. The court held that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim under § 928(a) because the defendants’ voluntary payment mooted the case, and Berry obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Berry appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Berry’s claim was moot because she received the full amount owed and sought no other compensation. The court also rejected Berry’s argument that her lawsuit was the catalyst for the defendants’ payment, stating that the catalyst theory is unavailable under § 928(a). The court concluded that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim in the district court, as she obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Therefore, Berry was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 928(a). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case as moot. View "BERRY V. AIR FORCE CENTRAL WELFARE FUND" on Justia Law

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A sub-subcontractor, Diamond Services Corporation, entered into a contract with Harbor Dredging, a subcontractor, to perform dredging work in the Houston Ship Channel. The prime contract for the project was awarded to RLB Contracting by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and RLB obtained a surety bond from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America. During the project, unexpected site conditions, including the presence of tires, caused delays and increased costs. Diamond continued working based on an alleged agreement that it would be compensated through a measured-mile calculation in a request for equitable adjustment (REA) submitted by RLB to the Corps. However, RLB later settled the REA for $6,000,000 without directly involving Diamond in the negotiations and issued a joint check to Harbor and Diamond for $950,000.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed some of Diamond's claims, including those for unjust enrichment and express contractual claims against RLB, but allowed Diamond's quantum meruit claim to proceed. The court also denied Travelers' motion to dismiss Diamond's Miller Act claims but required Diamond to amend its complaint to include proper Miller Act notice, which Diamond failed to do timely. Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of RLB and Harbor, dismissing Diamond's remaining claims and striking Diamond's untimely second amended complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment against Diamond's quantum meruit claims, holding that the express sub-subcontract covered the damages Diamond sought and that Diamond failed to provide evidence of the reasonable value of the work performed. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Diamond's Miller Act claim, as the damages sought were not recoverable under the Act. The court dismissed Diamond's appeal regarding the tug-expenses claim due to untimeliness. View "Diamond Services v. RLB Contracting" on Justia Law

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In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence. View "USA V. CHICHANDE" on Justia Law

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The case involves the crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610, a Boeing 737 MAX, which took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, and crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018, killing all on board. The plaintiffs are family members and representatives of the estates of two passengers, Liu Chandra and Andrea Manfredi. They filed lawsuits against Boeing and other defendants, seeking damages under various legal theories, including the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), state law, and other federal statutes.The Chandra case was initially filed in Illinois state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Manfredi case was filed directly in the same federal court. Both sets of plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and asserted claims under DOHSA, state law, and other federal statutes. Boeing filed motions to limit the plaintiffs' claims to DOHSA and to preclude a jury trial. The district court ruled in favor of Boeing, holding that DOHSA was the exclusive remedy and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The court dismissed all non-DOHSA claims and certified the jury trial issue for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, holding that DOHSA preempts all other claims and mandates a bench trial. The court reasoned that DOHSA's language and legislative history indicate that claims under the statute must be brought in admiralty, which does not carry the right to a jury trial. The court also noted that Congress has not amended DOHSA to allow for jury trials in federal court, despite longstanding judicial interpretations to the contrary. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims must proceed without a jury. The court's decision was to affirm the district court's rulings. View "Buehler v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

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In the early hours of August 21, 2017, the M/V ALNIC, a Liberian-flagged oil-and-chemical tanker, collided with the U.S.S. JOHN S. MCCAIN, a Navy destroyer, in the Singapore Strait. The collision resulted in the deaths of ten Navy sailors and injuries to dozens more. Both vessels sustained significant damage. Energetic Tank, Inc., the owner of ALNIC, sought exoneration from or limitation of liability for the collision. Forty-one Navy sailors or their representatives, along with the United States, filed claims for damages against Energetic. Energetic counterclaimed against the United States. The parties agreed on the monetary value of the damages to ALNIC and MCCAIN as $442,445 and $185 million, respectively.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that Singapore law would govern the determination of liability and the calculation of damages. After a Phase 1 bench trial, the district court denied Energetic’s petition for exoneration or limitation of liability, allocating 80% of the fault to the United States and 20% to Energetic. The court indicated it would proceed to a Phase 2 trial to determine damages to the Sailor-Claimants. Energetic appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the district court dismissed Energetic’s claims for contribution or indemnity against the United States for any damages awarded to the Sailor-Claimants, citing sovereign immunity. Energetic also appealed this order. The district court retroactively certified its earlier opinion on the apportionment of liability as a final judgment as to the United States. Several Sailor-Claimants cross-appealed, challenging the application of Singapore law to the calculation of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no error in the district court’s apportionment of liability under Singapore law or its sovereign immunity ruling, affirming the district court’s judgment and order on Energetic’s appeals. However, the court dismissed the Sailor-Claimants’ cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction, as the choice-of-law ruling was a non-appealable collateral order. View "In the Matter of Energetic Tank, Inc." on Justia Law