Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries
Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) sought a letter ruling from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the application of the Jones Act to its offshore wind farm project. CBP's initial ruling required Jones Act-qualified vessels for transporting scour protection rock from U.S. points to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, a modified ruling stated that the first delivery of rock to the OCS did not require a Jones Act-qualified vessel, but subsequent deliveries did. Great Lakes appealed this modified ruling, which CBP denied.Great Lakes then filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, claiming the modified ruling was contrary to law and would expose its planned Jones Act-compliant vessel to unlawful competition. The American Petroleum Institute (API) intervened, arguing that Great Lakes lacked standing as it had no actual or imminent injury. The district court agreed with API and dismissed the case, finding Great Lakes' injury hypothetical since it did not have a vessel capable of handling the Vineyard Project and no current contract for the project.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Great Lakes argued it had competitor standing due to the potential for increased competition from foreign vessels. However, the court found no evidence of actual or imminent increased competition, as the Vineyard Project was completed and there was no indication that future projects would source rock from U.S. points. The court also rejected CBP's argument that the ruling applied to identical future projects, as there was no record evidence of such projects involving U.S.-sourced rock.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Great Lakes lacked standing to challenge the CBP's modified ruling. View "Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus" on Justia Law
Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
Tim Daniels, a commercial fisherman in Florida, challenged the constitutionality of regulations by Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) that restrict where and how Florida-registered vessels can harvest Florida pompano in federal waters. Daniels argued that federal law preempts state regulations affecting fishing in federal waters and that Florida’s regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by only restricting Florida-registered vessels.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the FWC, concluding that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court also determined that Daniels lacked standing to sue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Daniels has standing to sue because he faces a credible threat of prosecution under Florida’s regulations, which affects his commercial fishing activities. The court found that Daniels’s injury is directly traceable to Florida’s regulations and can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act does not preempt Florida’s regulations. The court reasoned that the Act allows states to regulate fishing vessels registered under their laws in federal waters when there is no federal fishery management plan or regulations in place. The court also held that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving and managing pompano stock, and the regulations only apply to Florida-registered vessels, which are within the state’s jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, upholding Florida’s pompano regulations. View "Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission" on Justia Law
A&T Maritime Logistics v. RLI Insurance Co.
A&T Maritime Logistics, Inc. had an insurance contract with RLI Insurance Company and a bareboat charter agreement with Alexis Marine, L.L.C. While operating the M/V Uncle John, a vessel owned by Alexis Marine, A&T Maritime caused the ship to allide with an embankment. Believing the damage to be minimal, A&T Maritime did not take immediate action. After a lawsuit was filed, RLI was notified of the claim. A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine sought defense and indemnification from RLI, which denied coverage under the insurance contract. The district court upheld RLI's denial of coverage on summary judgment, finding that RLI was prejudiced by the delayed notice.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially denied A&T Maritime's and Alexis Marine's motions for partial summary judgment seeking reimbursement for defense costs, noting that the policy did not include a duty to defend. The Champagnes, who had purchased the damaged property, settled their claims for $200,000, funded solely by Alexis Marine. RLI then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Uncle John was not covered under the policy. The district court disagreed but granted partial summary judgment to RLI, holding that the prompt notice requirements were breached and RLI was prejudiced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that RLI was actually prejudiced by the delayed notice from both A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine, as the damage worsened over time and the opportunity to settle for a lower amount was lost. Consequently, the denial of coverage for both A&T Maritime and Alexis Marine was appropriate. The court also concluded that RLI had no duty to reimburse defense costs, as indemnification depended on coverage, which was voided due to the breach of the prompt notice requirement. View "A&T Maritime Logistics v. RLI Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Delmarva Fisheries Association, Inc. v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission
Plaintiffs, a group of charter-boat operators and trade associations in Maryland, sued the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to enjoin the Commission’s striped-bass plan. The Commission, formed in 1942, recommends fishery management plans to its member states. Plaintiffs argued that the plan, which included a one-fish limit for charter boats, would significantly harm their businesses. They sought an injunction to prevent the implementation of the plan.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that Plaintiffs likely lacked standing because they were regulated by Maryland, not the Commission. The court noted that even if the Commission’s plan were enjoined, it was unlikely that Maryland would rescind its own regulations, which were stricter than the Commission’s recommendations. The court also found that Plaintiffs did not plausibly state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the Commission is not a “person” under the statute and does not act under “color of state law.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Maryland would likely rescind its regulations if the Commission’s plan were enjoined. The court emphasized that Maryland voluntarily adopted the regulations and had the authority to impose stricter measures than those recommended by the Commission. As a result, the court vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Delmarva Fisheries Association, Inc. v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission" on Justia Law
Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law
Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington
Adam P. Harrington was injured on February 15, 2018, while using a swing rope to transfer from an offshore gas platform to a transport vessel. Harrington, employed by Skelton's Fire Equipment, Inc., was inspecting fire-suppression equipment on Exxon's platform. Due to rough seas, Harrington mistimed his swing and fractured his leg. His medical expenses were covered by Skelton's workers' compensation insurer.Harrington sued Exxon for maritime negligence and wantonness in the Mobile Circuit Court. Before trial, the court granted Harrington's motion to exclude evidence of his medical expenses being paid by the workers' compensation insurer. The jury found Exxon liable for $1,500,000 in damages, reduced by 10% for Harrington's fault, resulting in a $1,350,000 judgment. Exxon's postjudgment motion for a new trial, arguing the exclusion of evidence was erroneous, was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Exxon argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the workers' compensation payments, citing Alabama Code § 12-21-45. However, the court held that substantive maritime law, which includes the collateral-source rule, applied. This rule prevents the reduction of damages by amounts received from third parties, such as insurance. The court found that applying § 12-21-45 would conflict with maritime law.Exxon also claimed that Harrington's expert witness opened the door to admitting evidence of the workers' compensation payments. The court disagreed, stating that the expert's testimony did not justify introducing such evidence under the doctrine of curative admissibility.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Harrington and dismissed Harrington's conditional cross-appeal as moot. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington" on Justia Law
ANCHORAGE v. US
The case involves a dispute between the municipality of Anchorage and the United States regarding two agreements related to the improvement of the Port of Alaska. In 2003, Anchorage and the United States, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (2003 Memorandum) to upgrade and expand the port. In 2011, they signed a Memorandum of Agreement (2011 Memorandum) to address issues that arose during the project, including large-scale damage discovered in 2010.The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the United States breached the 2003 Memorandum by failing to deliver a defect-free port and the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without consulting Anchorage. The court awarded Anchorage $367,446,809 in damages, including $11,279,059 related to the settlement of subcontractor claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2003 Memorandum did not require the United States to deliver a defect-free port, as it lacked specific terms such as what was to be built, where, dimensions, deadlines, and costs. The court vacated the Court of Federal Claims' decision regarding the 2003 Memorandum and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' decision that the United States breached the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without conferring with Anchorage. The court upheld the award of $11,279,059 in damages to Anchorage for this breach. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further consideration consistent with the Federal Circuit's opinion. View "ANCHORAGE v. US " on Justia Law
Barry Graham Oil v. Shamrock Mgmt
Jon Willis, an employee of Shamrock Management, L.L.C., was injured while working on an offshore oil platform operated by Fieldwood Energy, L.L.C. The injury occurred when a tag line slipped off a grocery box being delivered by a vessel operated by Barry Graham Oil Service, L.L.C. Willis sued Barry Graham for negligence. Barry Graham then sought indemnification, defense, and insurance coverage from Shamrock and its insurer, Aspen, based on a series of contracts linking the parties.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Barry Graham's motion for summary judgment and granted Shamrock and Aspen's motion, ruling that Barry Graham was not covered under the defense, indemnification, and insurance provisions of the Shamrock-Fieldwood Master Services Contract (MSC). Willis's case was settled, and Barry Graham appealed the district court's decision on its third-party complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the MSC required Shamrock to defend, indemnify, and insure Barry Graham because Barry Graham was part of a "Third Party Contractor Group" under the MSC. The court also determined that the cross-indemnification provisions in the contracts were satisfied, and that the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (LOAIA) did not void Shamrock's obligations because Fieldwood had paid the insurance premium to cover Shamrock's indemnities, thus meeting the Marcel exception.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Barry Graham Oil v. Shamrock Mgmt" on Justia Law
Centaur v. River Ventures
Centaur, L.L.C. entered into a Master Services Contract (MSC) with United Bulk Terminals Davant, L.L.C. (UBT) in 2015 to build a concrete containment wall at UBT's dock facility. River Ventures, L.L.C. provided vessel transportation for Centaur’s employees working on the project. Centaur employee Devin Barrios was injured while transferring a generator from a River Ventures vessel to a barge leased by Centaur. The district court found River Ventures 100% at fault for the accident and imposed a $3.3 million judgment. River Ventures and its insurer, XL Specialty Insurance Company, satisfied the judgment and subsequently brought breach of contract claims against Centaur under the MSC.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial on the breach of contract claims. The court dismissed the claims, finding an ambiguity in the MSC regarding Centaur’s insurance procurement obligations. Specifically, the court found that requiring Centaur to procure a Protection & Indemnity (P&I) policy with crew/employee coverage would result in an absurd consequence due to potential duplicative coverage with the Worker’s Compensation policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the MSC unambiguously required Centaur to procure a P&I policy that included crew/employee coverage. The court disagreed with the district court’s finding of absurdity, noting that mutually repugnant escape clauses in the Worker’s Compensation and P&I policies would result in both policies being liable on a pro rata basis. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the excess/bumbershoot breach of contract claim, as it was contingent on the P&I claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Centaur v. River Ventures" on Justia Law
Swalling Construction Company, Inc. v. Alaska USA Insurance Brokers, LLC
A construction company chartered a barge and obtained insurance through a broker. Upon returning the barge, the owner discovered damage and sued the construction company in federal court. The construction company requested its insurer to defend it, but the insurer refused, citing lack of coverage. After the federal court awarded damages to the barge owner, the construction company sued the insurer and broker in state court, alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and negligence.The Superior Court of Alaska denied the construction company's motion for summary judgment against the broker and insurer. The court granted summary judgment to the broker and insurer, finding that the construction company's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the construction company had not relied on any reassurances from the broker that would have delayed the filing of the lawsuit.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the construction company's claims against the broker were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer first denied coverage. The court also held that the construction company's claims against the insurer were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer refused to defend the construction company in the federal lawsuit. The court concluded that the construction company's claims were untimely and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the broker and insurer. View "Swalling Construction Company, Inc. v. Alaska USA Insurance Brokers, LLC" on Justia Law