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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the vessel owner in an action alleging that the vessel owner breached its duties under the Jones Act to provide plaintiff with prompt and adequate medical care after he suffered a stroke while working aboard the vessel. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the vessel owner acted negligently by calling 911. Furthermore, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the vessel owner was vicariously liable for the Teche Regional Medical Center physicians' alleged malpractice. View "Randle v. Crosby Tugs, LLC" on Justia Law

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The borrowed employee doctrine applies to employees under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. A maritime worker who has collected statutory workers' compensation for her injuries may not further recover against a borrowed employer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for a general contractor in an admiralty action brought by an injured maritime worker. The panel held that the general contractor was immune from suit under the one recovery policy at the heart of the workers' compensation law. In this case, the maritime worker was the general contractor's borrowed employee where her work was subject to its direction and control at all times. Therefore, the maritime worker was barred from bringing tort claims against the general contractor. View "Cruz v. National Steel and Shipbuilding Co." on Justia Law

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An interpleader defendant, NuStar, appealed the district court's partial final judgment rejecting its claims of entitlement to maritime liens against two chartered vessels. The district court ruled that NuStar was not entitled to maritime liens under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (CIMLA). The Second Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not err in interpreting the CIMLA or ruling that maritime liens may not properly be granted based on principles of equity. The court held that NuStar's contentions as to the proper interpretation of the CIMLA was foreclosed by the court's recent decision in ING Bank N.V. v. M/V TEMARA, 892 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 2018). Furthermore, the district court did not err by concluding that the exception to the general rule against a subcontractor's entitlement to a maritime lien did not apply to NuStar. View "Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd. v. NuStar Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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USOT appealed the district court's orders and partial final judgments rejecting USOT's claims that it was entitled to assert maritime liens against vessels owned or chartered by Hapag. The district court ruled that USOT's claims were governed by the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act and that physical suppliers who were subcontractors were not entitled to maritime liens. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it concluded that USOT did not adduce evidence that it was ordered to provide the bunkers by Hapag or by an agent authorized by Hapag to order bunkers; affirmed the district court's conclusion that maritime liens cannot properly be conferred on the basis of equitable principles such as unjust enrichment; and vacated and remanded the district court judgment on the issue of whether Hapag directed that USOT be the physical supplier pursuant to the exception to the subcontractor rule. View "U.S. Oil Trading LLC v. M/V VIENNA EXPRESS" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against NCL, the owner and operator of a cruise ship, alleging negligence claims after he fell down an emergency-exit hatch in an area designated for crew members only. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff as a Canadian citizen and NCL as a Bermuda company, with its principal place of business in Florida, did not support the exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2). However, the district court validly exercised admiralty jurisdiction over the case under section 1333(1). On the merits, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim that the cruise line was negligent in over-serving him alcohol, holding that the claim was time-barred and the claim did not relate back. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that the cruise line was negligent for letting him fall down the hatch where NCL's uncontroverted record showed that no injuries similar to plaintiff's had been reported on any of NCL's ships in the last five years, and plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of NCL's crew. View "Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd." on Justia Law

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In 2014, Vesuvius and ACBL entered into a shipping contract to transport olivine sand from New Orleans to Vesuvius’s Wurtland, Kentucky facility by river barge. The January 2015 shipment arrived at the discharge port on February 20. Vesuvius’s employees inspected the cargo, found it damaged by excess moisture, and notified ACBL. ACBL arranged for a surveyor to perform an inspection that same day. The surveyor found no structural defect in the barge and concluded that the sand was wet when it was loaded. In transit, some of that water evaporated, condensed on the overhead portion of the cargo space, and dripped back onto the sand. The surveyor filed his report with ACBL on February 23. ACBL promptly contacted Vesuvius to disclaim any liability. On February 1, 2017, Vesuvius filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case. The contract contained a clear limitations provision requiring the parties to bring disputes within four months of an incident. Standing on its own, the limitations provision might be ambiguous, but read in context with the rest of the contract, there is no question that Vesuvius was required to file suit no later than four months after it discovered the damage. View "Vesuvius USA, Corp. v. American Commercial Lines, LLC" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in an action brought under 33 U.S.C. 1904(h). In section 1904(h), Congress gave a ship unreasonably detained or delayed, on suspicion of intentionally discharging oil and other contaminants into the sea, a cause of action to recover any loss or damage suffered thereby. The court held that the Coast Guard acted reasonably in detaining a vessel for nearly six months pending a criminal trial after its owner and operator failed to meet the government's security bond demands. The court measured the reasonableness of the Coast Guard's actions by an objective standard and found that the Coast Guard set a reasonable monetary bond, and that the nonmonetary components of the bond demand contributed nothing to the owner's losses. View "Angelex, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Under 46 U.S.C. 31342(a), the bunker supplier would be entitled to a maritime lien if it provided necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Bunker Holdings, a supplier of bunkers (marine fuel) in the supplier's in rem action for a maritime lien against a container ship. The panel held that, under United States law, Bunker Holdings was not entitled to a maritime lien, because it did not provide the bunkers on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner of the vessel. View "Bunker Holdings, Ltd. v. Yang Ming Liberia Corp." on Justia Law

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After an underwater sonar device (towfish) used by Tesla struck the mooring line of an offshore drilling rig owned by Shell, Shell filed suit against Tesla and International, the company who chartered a vessel for Tesla to pull the towfish, seeking damages arising from the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Shell and apportioned 75% of the liability to Tesla and 25% to International. Tesla and International appealed, and while the appeal was pending, Tesla and Shell entered into a settlement agreement. The district court subsequently determined that Tesla was entitled to contribution from International toward the settlement amount. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that International's vessel was a towing vessel and subject to towing regulations. The court also affirmed the jury's allocation of fault and the district court's calculation of the contribution owed by International. View "Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Tesla Offshore, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment determination that Nature's Way, as the owner of a tugboat, was also "operating" an oil barge that the tugboat was moving at the time of a collision, as the term was used in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The court held that the ordinary and natural meaning of "operating" under the statute would apply to the exclusive navigational control that Nature's Way exercised over the barge at the time of the collision. Therefore, the National Pollution Funds Center violated the Administrative Procedures Act by determining that Nature's Way was an operator of the barge and thus denying reimbursement on the grounds that its liability should be limited by the tonnage of the tugboat and not the tonnage of the barges. View "United States v. Nature's Way Marine, LLC" on Justia Law