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Plaintiffs within the zone of danger may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the general maritime law. Plaintiffs brought this maritime action against Defendant, which they hired to ferry three construction vehicles and their drivers from Rockland, Maine to North Haven, Maine, after two of the vehicles tipped over onto the vessel’s port bulwark during rough seas. Plaintiffs claimed that the ship captain was negligent and seeking damages for property loss and emotional distress. The district court found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded $257,154 in damages, including $100,000 for emotional distress. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in substantial part, vacating only one element of the damages award, holding (1) the district court properly found that the weather conditions that caused the incident were foreseeable; (2) the district court’s award for damaged plywood panels rested on a clearly erroneous view of the facts, but the remainder of the damages award was not in error; (3) maritime plaintiffs within the “zone of danger” can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the First Circuit; and (4) the district court did not clearly err in determining that Plaintiffs were within the zone of danger and that they experienced physical consequences of emotional distress. View "Sawyer Brothers, Inc. v. Island Transporter, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2004, after traveling from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey, Frescati’s single-hulled oil tanker, Athos, came within 900 feet of its intended berth and struck an abandoned anchor in the Delaware River, causing 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill. The shipment was intended for CARCO. Frescati paid $143 million for the cleanup and was reimbursed $88 million by the government, under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2701. The Third Circuit held that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CARCO’s warranty that CARCO’s berth would be safe if the ship had a draft of 37 feet or less and that CARCO had an unspecified tort duty of care. On remand, the district court held that CARCO was liable to Frescati and the government as Frescati’s subrogee, for breach of contract because the Athos had a draft of 36′7″ and exercised good seamanship; CARCO had a duty to use sonar to locate unknown obstructions in the berth approach and to remove obstructions or warn invited ships. CARCO argued that the conduct of the Coast Guard, NOAA, and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CARCO into believing that the government was maintaining the anchorage. The court awarded Frescati $55,497,375.958 for breach of contract and negligence, plus prejudgment interest. The government, after the court’s 50% reduction, was awarded $43,994,578.66 on its subrogated breach of contract claim. The Third Circuit affirmed in favor of Frescati on the breach of contract claim but vacated as to negligence. The court affirmed the government’s judgment with respect to its subrogated breach of contract claim but, because CARCO’s equitable recoupment defense failed, remanded for recalculation of damages and prejudgment interest. View "Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Citgo Asphalt Refining Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit seeking enforcement of an English judgment against defendant for failure to tender payment under a freight-derivative contract and asserted admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333(1). The Second Circuit vacated the district court's holding that admiralty jurisdiction did not exist. The court held that, considering plaintiff's identity as a shipping business together with the substance of the agreement, the agreement's principal objective was to further plaintiff's shipping business. Therefore, the court held that the agreement was a maritime contract subject to federal‐court jurisdiction under section 1333(1). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "d'Amico Dry Ltd. v. Primera Maritime (Hellas) Ltd." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a seaman's claims in admiralty against a vessel in rem. The panel held that the district court erred by denying the seaman's maintenance requests in full, staying the action, and dismissing the vessel; the district court obtained jurisdiction over the vessel when the seaman filed a verified complaint and defendants appeared generally and litigated without contesting in rem jurisdiction; the district court did not lose in rem jurisdiction while the vessel remained in its constructive custody; the district court's control over the vessel, once obtained, was exclusive; and the automatic bankruptcy stay did not affect the seaman's lien against the vessel and the bankruptcy court had no authority to dispose of the lien through the application of bankruptcy law. The court explained that when, as in this case, a seaman establishes his entitlement to maintenance and provides some evidence of his actual living expenses, the burden shifts to the vessel's owner to produce evidence that the seaman's actual costs were unreasonable. The panel issued a writ of mandamus to the district court to award the seaman maintenance for his undisputed actual and reasonable expenses subject to a potential increase after trial. View "Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case arose when one assisting tug allided with a bridge fender system and sank. The Fifth Circuit held that "tow" as used in Atlantic Specialty's policy was defined by its plain, ordinary meaning: a vessel that is provided auxiliary motive power by being pushed or pulled. A tug remains a tug when it is tugging (i.e., pushing or pulling), and a tow is a tow only when it is being towed (i.e., being pushed or pulled). In this case, because the MISS DOROTHY was not provided any extra motive power, it was not a tow. Therefore, Atlantic Specialty's policy did not apply. The court reversed the district court's application of the tort principle known as the "dominant mind" doctrine and rendered judgment in favor of Atlantic Specialty. View "Continental Insurance Co. v. L&L Marine Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of DC-Rendite's motion for a maritime attachment and garnishment under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. In this classic quasi in rem proceeding, the court held that DC-Rendite's complaint and affidavit did not allege sufficient allegations that identifiable property of defendants, tangible or intangible, was in the hands of garnishees. Even assuming that defendants and garnishees were somehow affiliates or subsidiaries of the same group, it did not follow that there was a specific entitlement of one of the defendants to a debt owed by a garnishee. View "DS-Rendite v. Essar Capital Americas" on Justia Law

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Punitive damages are awardable to seamen for their own injuries in general maritime unseaworthiness actions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to strike a prayer for punitive damages. The panel held that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), did not implicitly overrule the holding of Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987). Under Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003), Evich remains good law. Under Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the panel reached the same conclusion Evich did, even if the panel were not bound by Evich. View "Batterton v. Dutra Group" on Justia Law

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Punitive damages are awardable to seamen for their own injuries in general maritime unseaworthiness actions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to strike a prayer for punitive damages. The panel held that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), did not implicitly overrule the holding of Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987). Under Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003), Evich remains good law. Under Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the panel reached the same conclusion Evich did, even if the panel were not bound by Evich. View "Batterton v. Dutra Group" on Justia Law

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An arbitration provision in a maritime insurance policy is enforceable despite law in the forum state assertedly precluding its application. This case concerned the scope of insurance coverage Galilea bought for its yacht. The Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, applied to the insurance policy but not the insurance application. In this case, the insurance application was not a contract, but the insurance policy was a contract subject to the FAA because the FAA constituted established federal maritime law for maritime transactions; federal maritime law was not precluded by Montana law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012; and federal maritime law was not precluded by Montana law under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The panel also held that the parties have delegated arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's order finding the policy's arbitration clause enforceable and affirmed the district court's order granting the Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration as to certain causes of action. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Galilea, LLC v. AGCS Marine Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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In this case concerning the application and operation of Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the First Circuit held that the exclusionary remedy limned in Article 31(d) applies to evidence offered in a trial by court-martial but not in a non-judicial punishment proceeding. Petitioner, a petty officer in the United States Navy, received a non-judicial punishment, rescission of his recommendation for promotion, and an adverse employment evaluation. Petitioner appealed, alleging, inter alia, that his waiver of Article 31 rights was involuntary. The Board of Correction of Naval Records upheld the adverse employment consequences. Petitioner sought judicial review. The district court refused to set aside the Board’s decision. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Board’s determination of voluntariness and its approval of the adverse employment consequences were in accordance with law. View "Sasen v. Spencer" on Justia Law