Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

A hotel guest, who was staying at a lodge as part of a cruise package, fell in his bathroom after tripping over a raised shower ledge situated close to the toilet. He alleged that the bathroom’s configuration was unreasonably dangerous, and that the cruise line and hotel operator were negligent in constructing or maintaining that configuration. The guest asserted both a traditional maritime negligence claim and an alternative theory of negligence per se, arguing that the bathroom violated applicable plumbing codes.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the defendants on both theories. Regarding the negligence claim, the district court ruled that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. On the negligence per se theory, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence that a plumbing code violation caused the plaintiff’s injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, because the defendants owned and constructed the lodge’s bathroom, there was no dispute that they knew or should have known the configuration existed. It found that the plaintiff’s expert evidence created a genuine dispute about whether the defendants knew or should have known that the configuration was unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the maritime negligence claim. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, concluding that a movable shower curtain did not violate the cited plumbing code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on negligence per se and remanded the general negligence claim for further proceedings. View "PETREY V. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD." on Justia Law

A seaman who worked aboard a Cayman Islands-flagged yacht suffered a right shoulder injury while helping recover an underwater scooter at the direction of his captain. After the incident, the seaman alleged he was denied pain medication, reassigned to night shifts to hide his injury from guests, and eventually repatriated to his home country without his belongings. He sued the yacht’s beneficial owner, the captain, the vessel’s record owner, his nominal employer, the yacht’s manager, and the insurer, asserting various claims including negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, failure to provide maintenance and cure, failure to treat, negligence, conversion, and breach of insurance contract.The defendants (except the insurer) removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under the New York Convention, citing an arbitration provision in the seaman’s employment agreement requiring disputes to be arbitrated in the Cayman Islands. The district court compelled arbitration as to the Jones Act, maintenance and cure, and failure to treat claims against the yacht owner, the beneficial owner, and the employer, but remanded the remaining claims to state court. The insurer later settled.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision compelling arbitration for the Jones Act, maintenance and cure, and failure to treat claims against the nominal employer, and for the maintenance and cure and failure to treat claims against the yacht owner and beneficial owner. However, it reversed the order to the extent it compelled arbitration of the Jones Act claim against the yacht owner and beneficial owner, finding insufficient allegations of concerted misconduct to warrant estoppel. The court dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to the remanded claims. The main holding is that arbitration must be compelled for the relevant claims as to the nominal employer, and for maintenance and cure and failure to treat as to the yacht owner and beneficial owner, but not for the Jones Act claim against the latter two. View "Chemaly v. Lampert" on Justia Law

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law

Three individuals were detected by U.S. authorities aboard a “go-fast” vessel approximately 158 nautical miles southeast of Isla Beata, Dominican Republic. During the encounter, the men were seen discarding packages, later recovered as cocaine. The Coast Guard boarded the vessel, whose master claimed Colombian nationality, but Colombian authorities would not confirm or deny the vessel’s registration. As a result, U.S. authorities deemed the vessel “stateless” and seized approximately 375 kilograms of cocaine. The men were arrested and charged under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while onboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss the indictment. The court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding the constitutionality of the MDLEA, specifically regarding Congress’s ability to assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas under the protective principle of international law. After the motion was denied, all three defendants pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the district court imposed varying terms of imprisonment and supervised release, granting some downward variances but denying a minor-role reduction to one defendant, who raised the issue on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that binding circuit precedent forecloses constitutional challenges to the MDLEA, including claims based on the Felonies Clause, the lack of a nexus to the United States, and the statute’s definition of “stateless vessel.” The court also held that recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines regarding minor-role reductions were substantive and not retroactively applicable. The district court’s denial of a minor-role reduction and all other challenged rulings were affirmed. View "USA v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident that occurred at Lake Mead, where Bryce Tyrone Verhonich operated a jet ski with a passenger, Lily Hatcher, in the early morning hours. After taking a detour to view the sunrise, both Verhonich and Hatcher fell into the water under rough conditions. Verhonich, who was not wearing a life jacket or engine cut-off lanyard, was rescued, but Hatcher drowned. Subsequent investigation revealed that neither individual was wearing a personal flotation device and the engine cut-off switch lanyard was not attached to Verhonich. Surveillance and body camera footage confirmed these facts. Hatcher’s body was later recovered, and an autopsy found drowning as the cause of death, with drugs as contributing factors.The case was first tried before a United States magistrate judge, who found Verhonich guilty of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach the engine cut-off switch lanyard—all in violation of National Park Service regulations. The magistrate judge sentenced him to six months in custody and two years of probation. Verhonich appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing improper admission of evidence, insufficient evidence for conviction on negligent operation, and sentencing error. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentence.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may both be considered in determining negligent operation under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The court found sufficient evidence to support Verhonich’s conviction, determined that evidentiary objections did not survive plain error review, and upheld the sentence as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. VERHONICH" on Justia Law

A man sought to contest the forfeiture of a boat, claiming he was its rightful owner. The boat had been seized and made subject to forfeiture following his brother’s guilty plea to a federal drug conspiracy that began in May 2019. The man submitted a pro se petition in federal district court, asserting under penalty of perjury that he was the sole and rightful owner of the boat at the time it was seized. He attached several documents, all in Spanish, which he described as evidence of ownership and title. Later, with counsel, he provided additional documents purporting to show that he acquired the boat in 2017.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had issued a preliminary order of forfeiture following the brother’s plea. After the man’s petition, the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to allege when and how the man acquired his interest in the boat, as required by statute. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss without a hearing and entered a final order of forfeiture. The man appealed, arguing that his submissions sufficed or, alternatively, that he should have been allowed to amend his petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the man’s petition did not satisfy the statutory requirement to state the time and circumstances of his acquisition of the boat, and that untranslated documents could not be considered. However, the appellate court found that the district court did not address the alternative request for leave to amend, and the reasons for denial were not apparent from the record. The First Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to consider the request to amend in light of the liberal construction required by statute. View "US v. Calderin-Pascual" on Justia Law

A trade association representing the majority of the world’s liner shipping services challenged a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. Under recent amendments to the Shipping Act, Congress directed the Commission to define what constitutes an “unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate” by ocean common carriers regarding vessel space accommodations. The Commission responded by adopting a rule specifying non-binding factors for evaluating unreasonable refusals, including whether a carrier quoted rates vastly above market value, required carriers to submit an annual “documented export policy,” and removed explicit reference to “business decisions” from its list of factors. The association objected, arguing that the rule exceeded the Commission’s authority and was arbitrary and capricious.After the Commission published its final rule, the association filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The association claimed that the Commission lacked authority to consider price in its analysis, that the requirement for a documented export policy was ultra vires and arbitrary, and that removal of the “business decisions” factor was likewise arbitrary. The Commission defended the rule’s approach, asserting its statutory power to require reports and to evaluate factors relevant to reasonableness.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the Commission’s consideration of price as an indicator of unreasonable refusal did not amount to unauthorized rate regulation, and that the requirement for a documented export policy was within the Commission’s statutory authority. The court also found that the omission of “business decisions” as a listed factor did not preclude their consideration in individual cases. The court concluded that the rule was neither beyond the Commission’s statutory authority nor arbitrary and capricious. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

A maritime worker was injured while unloading cargo from a vessel managed by Grieg Star AS. The worker, employed by a stevedoring company, fell ten feet when she stepped onto plastic sheeting covering a gap between rolls of cargo in the ship’s hold. The cargo, consisting of large rolls of kraft liner board, had been loaded by longshoremen overseas, and plastic sheeting was used to cover gaps between layers. The injured worker had been assigned to roll up this sheeting during the final phase of unloading. She was aware of the gaps but alleged that the plastic concealed them and appeared to provide fall protection.After the accident, the worker filed a suit in Texas state court against Grieg Star, alleging vessel negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically violations of the turnover and active control duties. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Following discovery, Grieg Star moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Grieg Star. The worker appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the alleged hazard was open and obvious to the worker, so the vessel owed no turnover duty to warn. The court also found that Grieg Star did not exercise active control over the stevedoring operations or the area where the injury occurred, as the stevedore had responsibility for the hold at the time. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Grieg Star. View "Renteria v. Grieg Star AS" on Justia Law

A business agreement was made in early 2020 for the rental of a yacht for an event. The agreement involved a payment of $18,280, which was to cover a deposit and a down payment toward the rental fee. The event was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the party that made the payment requested a refund. The yacht provider did not return the funds. The party seeking the refund sued under several theories, including unjust enrichment and breach of contract.After mandatory arbitration resulted in an award for the plaintiff, the defendant requested a trial de novo, and the matter proceeded under Nevada’s Short Trial Program. A short trial judge rendered a proposed judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant objected to this proposed judgment, but the short trial judge, after consulting with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office, ruled on the objection and later denied the defendant’s NRCP 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. The district court then entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, apparently approving the short trial judge’s proposed judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether a short trial judge has authority to adjudicate objections to a proposed judgment and post-judgment NRCP 59 motions. The court held that under the plain language of NSTR 3(d), only the district court—not a short trial judge—may review and adjudicate objections to proposed judgments and NRCP 59 motions. The court found that the short trial judge exceeded her authority by ruling on these matters. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s judgment and the short trial judge’s post-judgment orders, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "VEGAS AQUA, LLC VS. JUPITOR CORP." on Justia Law

A resident of Puerto Rico suffered work-related injuries in 1994, resulting in permanent total disability. His employer and its insurance carrier were ordered to provide medical care under Section 7 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as extended by the Defense Base Act. In 2019, a Puerto Rico-licensed physician recommended medical cannabis-infused edibles to treat the petitioner’s chronic pain. The petitioner sought reimbursement for these products from the employer’s insurance carrier, which denied the request.The petitioner then asked the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Administrative Law Judges to order reimbursement, arguing that medical cannabis was a reasonable and necessary treatment. The Administrative Law Judge denied the request, finding that marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) meant it could not have an accepted medical use under federal law. On appeal, the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board affirmed this decision by a 2-1 vote, agreeing that reimbursement was barred by the CSA and rejecting arguments that recent federal appropriations riders or executive actions altered the federal legal status of marijuana.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because marijuana remains a Schedule I substance under the CSA, it cannot be considered a reasonable and necessary medical expense for purposes of reimbursement under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The court found that neither appropriations riders nor recent executive or legislative actions had changed marijuana’s federal classification or its legal status under the Act. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Garcia v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law