Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Wapiti Energy, L.L.C. ("Wapiti"), the owner of a 155-foot tank barge, the SMI 315, which broke free of its moorings and ran aground in marshland owned by a third party during Hurricane Ida. The vessel was insured under a marine package policy issued by Clear Spring Property and Casualty Company ("Clear Spring"). The policy provided coverage for wreck removal expenses that are compulsory by law. After the incident, Wapiti incurred expenses in removing the stranded vessel from the marshland and sought reimbursement from Clear Spring. Clear Spring, however, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the removal of the SMI 315 was not compulsory by law, and thus, it was not obligated to reimburse the expenses.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled in favor of Clear Spring, concluding that removal of the SMI 315 was not compulsory by law and dismissing Wapiti’s claims. Wapiti appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that the removal of the SMI 315 was compelled by the Louisiana possessory action, which made removal compulsory by law. The court reasoned that at the time of the incident, a reasonable owner would know that the barge stranded on a third party's property would expose them to a high probability of having to comply with an injunction mandating the removal of the vessel. Therefore, Wapiti's proactive removal of the vessel from the third party's marshland was warranted, and Clear Spring was obligated to reimburse the expenses. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Wapiti Energy v. Clear Spring Property and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In March 2020, seven crewmembers of the M/V Greg Mortimer cruise ship filed a lawsuit against several companies, including CMI Leisure Management, Inc., Cruise Management International, Inc., and Vikand Medical Solutions, LLC. The crewmembers alleged that the decision to sail during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed them to foreseeable harms, resulting in six of them contracting the virus. The crewmembers had signed employment agreements with other companies that contained forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring disputes to be brought in the Bahamas under Bahamian law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the action based on the forum-selection clause. The court ruled that the defendants, who were not parties to the employment agreements, could invoke the forum-selection clause under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision. The appellate court held that the defendants could not invoke the forum-selection clause in the employment agreements under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court reasoned that the crewmembers' claims did not rely on the terms of their employment agreements, and thus, equitable estoppel did not apply. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Usme v. CMI Leisure Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed two cases involving challenges to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The rule required certain fishing vessels to carry observers onboard to collect data necessary for fishery conservation and management, with the cost of these observers to be borne by the vessel owners. The petitioners, various fishing businesses, argued that the Act did not authorize the Fisheries Service to impose these costs on them.In the lower courts, the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit Court of Appeals both upheld the rule. They applied the Chevron framework, a two-step process used to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies. Under this framework, if a statute is ambiguous, courts defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable. Both courts found that the Magnuson-Stevens Act was ambiguous on the issue of observer costs and deferred to the Fisheries Service's interpretation.The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Chevron doctrine, holding that it was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. Courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. The Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court emphasized that while courts may seek guidance from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes, they must not defer to these interpretations. Instead, they must independently interpret the statute and ensure that the agency has acted within its statutory authority. View "Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

Brent Adkins, a crew member on one of Marathon Petroleum Company’s inland river barges, claimed that his service on the barge caused his lung function to deteriorate. He brought claims against Marathon under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Adkins worked on the barge from 2008 to 2012. During this time, he underwent several medical examinations which showed a decline in his Forced Vital Capacity (FVC), a measure of lung function. Despite this, Marathon cleared Adkins to work without restriction. In March 2012, Adkins fell ill and was diagnosed with an irregular heartbeat and heat intolerance. He never returned to work for Marathon and subsequently sued the company.The case was initially filed in Louisiana state court but was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Adkins then sued Marathon in the Southern District of Ohio. He claimed that repeated exposure to hydrogen sulfide and other hydrocarbon fumes while working on the barge caused his pulmonary function to deteriorate. He also claimed that Marathon failed to pay maintenance and cure for the injuries and illnesses he sustained while working on the barge. Marathon moved for summary judgment on all of Adkins’s claims. The district court granted Marathon’s motion for summary judgment and denied Adkins’s.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The court held that Adkins needed expert medical proof to show causation on his Jones Act negligence claims. However, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Marathon on Adkins’s maintenance-and-cure claim, finding that Adkins presented evidence that created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether his lung problems manifested while he was in Marathon’s service. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Adkins v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LP" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Mary Rodgers-Rouzier, worked as a bartender on steamboats operated by American Queen. She alleged that she and her coworkers were wrongly denied overtime wages. Rodgers-Rouzier filed a suit as a collective action, and over one hundred of her coworkers joined her proposed collective action. Meanwhile, American Queen moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Rodgers-Rouzier had agreed to arbitration. The district court denied the motion, but American Queen moved again to dismiss based on the arbitration agreement, this time invoking Indiana state law. The district court granted this motion, over Rodgers-Rouzier’s objections.The district court had previously denied American Queen's motion to dismiss the case for improper venue because Rodgers-Rouzier had agreed to arbitration. However, American Queen then moved again to dismiss based on the arbitration agreement, this time invoking Indiana state law. The district court granted this motion, over Rodgers-Rouzier’s objections that American Queen had waived its argument and the court lacked authority to apply Indiana law in this context. The court further determined that all the workers who had filed consent forms were not parties to the action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that although American Queen’s arguments were not waived and the court had authority to enforce the arbitration agreement under Indiana law, Indiana law would hold American Queen to its bargain that its arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Therefore, Rodgers-Rouzier’s case may continue in federal court. The court did not decide whether it may do so as a collective action and left that question for further litigation. View "Rodgers-Rouzier v. American Queen Steamboat Operating Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Coast Guard seized a vessel in the Dominican Republic's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that bore no nationality indicators. The crew claimed Colombian nationality for the vessel, but Colombia could not confirm or deny the vessel's registry, rendering it stateless under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The vessel was found to contain drugs, leading to the arrest and prosecution of the crew members, Jhonathan Alfonso, Jose Jorge Kohen, and Jose Miguel Rosario-Rojas, under the MDLEA.The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to them because they were arrested in the EEZ, which they asserted is not part of the "high seas" as defined by customary international law. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA. The defendants subsequently pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the EEZ is part of the "high seas" and thus within Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause. The court also concluded that the defendants could not show any plain error with regard to the MDLEA’s definition of a vessel without nationality as including vessels where registry is asserted but cannot be confirmed or denied by the foreign country. View "United States v. Alfonso" on Justia Law

The case involves the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (Soundkeeper), an environmental organization, and the Port of Tacoma and SSA Terminals, LLC (collectively, the Port), operators of the West Sitcum Terminal, a marine cargo terminal. The dispute centers on a portion of the terminal known as "the Wharf," where stormwater runoff carries pollutants into Puget Sound. The Soundkeeper alleges that the Port violated the Clean Water Act by not implementing stormwater controls across the entire facility, including the Wharf. The Port argues that the Wharf is not subject to regulation because it does not conduct industrial activities that require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Port. The court concluded that the Industrial Stormwater General Permits (ISGPs) issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology did not extend coverage to the Wharf, as the Wharf did not conduct the industrial activities specified in the permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain text of the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility. Therefore, the Port needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the Terminal while the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs were in effect. The court also held that the ISGPs were enforceable in a citizen suit, even if they exceeded the requirements of the federal regulations.However, the court vacated the district court's decision regarding the 2020 ISGP, which was subject to an ongoing state-court challenge, and remanded the case for further consideration. The court instructed the district court to consider the effect of the state proceedings on this case. View "PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA" on Justia Law

VT Halter Marine (VTHM), a shipbuilder, contracted to build a barge and a tug for a client. During construction, over a thousand steel flange plates were incorrectly bent due to the use of an improperly sized die, leading to thinning and cracking of the plates. The faulty plates were installed onto the vessels, and the cracking was discovered later. The cost of replacing and repairing the cracked flange plates amounted to approximately $3,300,000. VTHM submitted a claim to their insurer, Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s of London (Underwriters), for the cracked flange plates.The Underwriters denied VTHM's claim, asserting that the policy excluded coverage for faulty workmanship and the cost of replacing or repairing improper or defective materials. VTHM contested the denial, leading to a lawsuit for breach of contract. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in the trial court. The trial court granted Underwriters' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for faulty workmanship and the cost of repairing, replacing, or renewing any improper or defective materials.In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, VTHM appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the flanges were part of the vessel and coverage for faulty workmanship exists if it results in cracking of the vessel. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court found that the insurance policy unambiguously excluded the cost of replacing or repairing improper or defective materials. The court concluded that the faulty workmanship directly resulted in improper materials being installed, and the only resulting damage was to the improper materials themselves. Therefore, VTHM's claim for the costs of repairing and/or replacing the improper materials installed was not covered under the policy. View "VT Halter Marine, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action brought by Earlene McBride against Carnival Corporation. McBride fell out of her wheelchair while being assisted by a Carnival crewmember, Fritz Charles, during disembarkation from a Carnival cruise ship. McBride claimed that she suffered severe injuries due to the fall and sued Carnival for negligence.The case was initially heard in the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court allowed the deposition testimony of Charles to be presented to the jury over McBride's objection. The jury awarded McBride economic damages for past medical expenses related to the fall but did not award her any damages for past pain and suffering. McBride appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in allowing Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury and that the jury's verdict was inadequate because it did not award her past pain and suffering damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury. The court found that McBride had waived her objection to the use of the deposition by not raising it at the appropriate time during the trial. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of McBride's motion for a new trial on the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. The court found that the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of law because there was uncontradicted evidence that McBride suffered at least some pain in the immediate aftermath of the wheelchair incident. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. View "McBride v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC ("Fast Ferries") and Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran Marine, LLC ("SeaTran") (collectively, "defendants-appellees"). Fast Ferries had entered into a Master Time Charter Agreement with Mr. Cade, LLC to charter the motor vessel Mr. Cade and procure a licensed crew. The agreement contained mediation and forum-selection clauses. When the final Short Form expired, Fast Ferries returned the vessel to its home port in Louisiana. A year later, Fast Ferries filed a complaint against Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran alleging breach of contract and liability pursuant to culpa in contrahendo. The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Master Agreement was still in effect and required a written agreement for the charter of M/V Mr. Cade.The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that the Master Agreement did not contain a termination date and remained in effect. Therefore, the contract's mediation and forum-selection clauses were binding on the parties. However, the district court did not address Fast Ferries' argument that SeaTran was not a signatory of the agreement and, therefore, could not invoke the mediation and forum-selection clauses contained therein.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order on the defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss. The court held that the Master Agreement was still in effect and that SeaTran, despite being a non-signatory, could enforce the Master Agreement's mediation and forum-selection clauses. The court reasoned that Fast Ferries' claims against SeaTran were necessarily intertwined with the Master Agreement, and thus, Fast Ferries was equitably estopped from avoiding the mediation and forum-selection clauses with respect to SeaTran. View "Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine, LLC" on Justia Law