Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff, an employee of Shore, was hurt while working on a derrick barge operated by McDermott, plaintiff filed suit against both Shore and McDermott under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. Plaintiff also filed suit against Shore for cure under maritime law. The district court entered judgment against McDermott and Shore. Both defendants appealed. McDermott asks the court to render judgment, reducing the future lost wages award from $300,000 to $209,533. Plaintiff’s own expert economist determined that his net future lost wages would be $209,533 if he worked as an unarmed security guard and retired at age 55.8. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue and found it appropriate to render judgment in the amount of $209,533 for future lost wages. The court affirmed in all other respects, including issues of Jones Act liability, comparative negligence, future general damages, and cure. View "Barto v. Shore Construction" on Justia Law

Barges separated from an Artco towboat, damaging a lock and dam. Artco sought limitation of its liability to the government or exoneration under FRCP F. The court enjoined prosecution of separate suits against Artco or the vessel and directed potential claimants to file claims by June 15, 2011. The government argued that its claim, alleging violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 408, was not subject to the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 30501, and need not be litigated in the Rule F proceeding. The government never filed a timely claim in the limitation proceeding. On remand, the district court denied Artco’s motion for a decree of exoneration, reiterating that the government’s claims were not subject to the Limitation Act and that the government could pursue a remedy for its RHA claim. The court concluded that its prior injunction was overbroad and denied Artco’s motion to hold the government in contempt, to impose sanctions, and to direct dismissal of the government’s separate suit. As there were no claims filed in the limitation action, the court denied the government leave to file a late claim and directed dismissal of the limitation action. The Eighth Circuit reversed dismissal of Artco’s limitation action, affirmed denial of Artco’s motion to hold the government in contempt and for sanctions, vacated the order as to the remaining motions, and remanded. View "Am. River Transp. v. United States, Corp of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Abhe, an industrial painting contractor, used stationary leased barges as platforms while painting Pell Bridge over Narragansett Bay. Abhe changed insurance carriers three months into the project. St. Paul Fire did not request that Abhe complete an application, but accepted the application provided to its previous insurer in 2010. The attached schedule of vessels was outdated and did not include vessels leased for the Pell Bridge project. Abhe sent St. Paul an updated schedule in 2011, listing those vessels, but did not provide a 2010 survey that showed that one barge had non-watertight bulkheads. St. Paul did not attempt to survey any of the equipment, as it was entitled to do under the policy. After the barge sunk in a storm, St. Paul denied Abhe’s claims and sought a declaration that the policy was void under the doctrine of uberrimae fidei, which requires that parties to an insurance contract accord each other the highest degree of good faith. Abhe counterclaimed, alleging negligence. The district court granted St. Paul summary judgment, finding the package policy void because Abhe failed to disclose the survey. The Eight Circuit remanded, stating that reliance is an element of the defense, and that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether it is satisfied. View "St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was shot and seriously injured by a Nigerian gunman who invaded the drilling rig plaintiff was working aboard, he filed suit alleging that the negligence of other rig hands caused his injury and that GSF, a corporate parent and indirect subsidiary of the drilling company, was vicariously liable for such negligence under the general maritime law. The district court granted summary judgment for GSF. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that GSF may not be held vicariously liable for the rig hands’ alleged negligence because no reasonable jury could find an employment relationship between GSF and the rig hands. The court found that the record contains no evidence of most of the factors that would support a finding of an employment relationship where there is no evidence that GSF had the right to direct the rig hands or to control the details of their work; there is no evidence that GSF hired or had the right to fire the rig hands; and there is no evidence that GSF furnished the rig or the equipment used on the rig. View "Johnson v. PPI Tech. Serv., L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals and a corporation who reside in Hawaii, filed suit alleging that the Jones Act's cabotage provisions, 46 U.S.C. 12112(a)(2)(A) and 55102(b)(1), which prohibit foreign competition in the domestic shipping market, impair interstate trade between Hawaii and the rest of the United States to such an extent that they violate the Constitution. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged more than generalized grievances and have demonstrated an “injury in fact,” but have not met their burden to show causation or redressability, the other two elements of Article III standing. The court further concluded that although plaintiffs, could establish standing if they amended their complaint, any amendment would be futile because plaintiffs’ challenge to the Jones Act would fail on the merits. In this case, an amended complaint would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim because the enactment of the Jones Act was not beyond the authority assigned to Congress under the Commerce Clause. The court rejected plaintiffs' Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment claim, and held that the district court did not violate plaintiffs' procedural due process right by ruling on the government's motion to dismiss without an oral hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Novak v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employer of Max Welders, was working as the borrowed employee of Wild Well, a subsidiary of Superior, when he sustained injuries while welding on an offshore platform. Plaintiff filed suit against all defendants under, inter alia, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. Superior and Wild Well filed a cross-claim for indemnity from Max Welders pursuant to a Master Service Agreement (MSA) or, in the alternative, Vessel Boarding, Utilization and Hold Harmless Agreement (VBA) between Superior and Max Welders. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the Jones Act claims because it found that plaintiff is not a Jones Act seaman. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Max Welders on indemnity because 1) the MSA was void under Louisiana law and 2) the VBA did not apply to plaintiff’s work. View "Wilcox v. Max Welders, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Bulgarelli’s 36-foot boat ran aground on Lake St. Clair. Bulgarelli contacted a tow service, which dispatched a salvage vessel commanded by Captain Leslie. Leslie claims that he quoted the price of $250 per foot of length. Bulgarelli insists that the quoted price was $1,000–$1,200, and that Leslie assured him that insurance would pay. Bulgarelli signed the contract, which did not include a printed price, but has “$250.00 FT” scrawled in its bottom margin. Bulgarelli claims that handwriting was not present when he signed the paper and Leslie had exclusive possession of the sole copy of the contract. Calling this a “hard” grounding in high winds and very rough waters, Leslie claimed that the work took 29 minutes. Bulgarelli and a corroborating witness stated that the wind and water were calm, and that Leslie pulled the vessel free in less than 10 minutes. The tow company sought enforcement of a maritime lien. Bulgarelli counterclaimed for fraud, innocent misrepresentation, and reformation. Finding Bulgarelli and his corroborating witness credible, while finding Leslie not credible, the court made a finding that Leslie had quoted the price of $1,000–$1,200, intending to bill Bulgarelli’s insurance company for $9,000, and added the handwritten margin note after Bulgarelli signed the contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "St. Clair Marine Salvage, Inc. v. Bulgarelli" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, airplane passengers, filed suit against Boeing in state court after a Boeing 777 hit a seawall at the end of a runway at the San Francisco International Airport and injured 49 passengers, killing three passengers. Suits were also brought in federal courts and were consolidated by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) under 28 U.S.C. 1407(a). Boeing removed the state suits to federal court, asserting admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333 and asserting federal officials' right to have claims against them resolved by federal courts under 28 U.S.C. 1442. The MDL decided that the state suits should be transferred to California to participate in the consolidated pretrial proceedings, but the district court remanded them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that Boeing was not entitled to remove under section 1442(a)(1) because Boeing was not acting as a federal officer in light of Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. However, the court concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction exists under section 1333(1) because section 1333(1) includes accidents caused by problems that occur in transocean commerce. In this case, the plane was a trans-ocean flight, a substitute for an ocean-going vessel. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions. View "Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law