Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

In 1953, New York and New Jersey entered into the Waterfront Commission Act, establishing the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to govern operations at the Port of New York‐New Jersey. At that time, individual pieces of cargo were loaded onto trucks, driven to the pier, and then unloaded for loading, piece‐by‐piece, onto the vessel. Similarly, arriving cargo was handled piece-by-piece. Containerization transformed shipping: a shipper loads cargo into a large container, which is loaded onto a truck and transported to the pier, where it is lifted aboard a ship. Continental operates warehouses, including one at 112 Port Jersey Boulevard, Jersey City. Continental picks up containers from the Global Marine Terminal, transports them to the Warehouse, unloads them, and removes their contents. Continental stores the freight and provides other services, such as sampling, weighing. and wrapping. In 2011, the Commission advised Continental that it was required to obtain a stevedore license, concluding that the property line and building of the 112 Warehouse were within 1,000 yards of a pier. Continental sought a declaratory judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that Continental engages in stevedoring activities at the warehouse and that the warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ under the Act and within the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Cont'l Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor" on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two Yemeni-born Muslim seamen who were United States citizens. Their civil rights action concerned a tanker ship owned by the United States Maritime Administration but operated by a private company under a contract. The first seaman alleged that the human resources director of the companying operating the ship ordered that he be fired because of his national origin. The second seaman alleged that he was not hired to work aboard the ship because of his religion and national origin. Both plaintiffs named the human resources director as a defendant but not the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Plaintiffs’ claims both involved a contract for employment or potential employment aboard a public vessel of the United States and had a sufficient maritime connection, they were required to bring those claims against the United States. View "Ali v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Appellee Palm Energy Offshore, L.L.C. owned the mineral rights in an area of the Gulf of Mexico called the West Delta 55 block (“WD55”). Palm also served as the court-appointed manager for appellee H.C. Resources, L.L.C. (“HCR”) and its mineral holdings at another Gulf location, the Chandeleur 37 block (“C37”). Acting as HCR’s manager, Palm asked CM to service one of HCR’s wells at C37. CM agreed and chartered a lift boat, the L/B Nicole Eymard from appellee Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc. to perform maintenance work. The ship worked at C37 from July 18 until July 27. On July 27, Palm, now acting on its own behalf, asked CM to send the Nicole Eymard to WD55. CM dispatched the ship to WD55. After completing the job at WD55, the crew of the Nicole Eymard attempted to retract the ship’s legs from the ocean floor. The crew discovered that one of the legs was stuck. The crew worked to free the leg until August 18, when Offshore ordered the crew to sever the leg and return to port ahead of an approaching storm. In port, Offshore completed repairs on the ship on October 10. Offshore then sued CM and Palm for charter fees that accrued from July 15 to August 18, for “downtime charter” from August 19 to October 10, and for the cost of repairs. CM and Palm then filed various counter- and cross-claims against each other and Offshore. CM and Offshore’s claims against each other are governed in part by the terms of an oral charter agreement. CM and Palm’s claims against each other are governed in part by the terms of a Master Service Agreement (“MSA”), and in part by a specific work order. The MSA contained an indemnity agreement (“Indemnity Agreement”). After a bench trial, the district court held that CM owed Offshore for charter fees that accrued from July 15 to July 27 while the Nicole Eymard was at C37, and for charter fees that accrued from July 28 to August 18 while the ship was at WD55. The court held that CM could recover the same fees from Palm. The court held that neither CM nor Palm owed Offshore for downtime charter fees from August 19 to October 10, or for repairs. CM, Offshore, and Palm filed motions to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The court granted these motions to the extent they sought clarification regarding the court’s order on prejudgment interest. The court determined that the Indemnity Agreement barred CM from seeking repayment for those fees. The court denied the parties’ motions in all other respects. CM appealed from the district court’s judgment and its post-trial order. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment and post-trial order, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Offshore Marine Contractors, et al v. Palm Energy" on Justia Law

While inspecting a commercial fishing vessel in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal agent found that the catch contained undersized red grouper, in violation of conservation regulations, and instructed the captain, Yates, to keep the undersized fish segregated from the rest of the catch until the ship returned to port. After the officer departed, Yates told the crew to throw the undersized fish overboard. Yates was convicted of destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation under 18 U. S. C. 519, which applies when a person “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation. Yates argued that section 1519 originated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to protect investors, and that its reference to “tangible object” includes objects used to store information, such as computer hard drives. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “tangible object” refers to one used to record or preserve information. Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73 and its title, “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,” signal that it was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical evidence. The words immediately surrounding “tangible object,” “falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document,” also indicate the contextual meaning of that term. Even if traditional tools of statutory construction leave any doubt about the meaning of the term, it would be appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011, Catlin (Syndicate 2003) at Lloyd’s (“Catlin”) issued to San Juan Towing and Marine Services (SJT), a ship repair company based on San Jan, Puerto Rico, a marine insurance policy to cover SJT’s floating drydock. After the drydock was damaged and sold for scrap, the SJT filed a claim with Catlin, alleging the total loss of the drydock in the amount of $1,750,000. Catlin denied this claim. Catlin then filed a declaratory judgment complaint against SJT, alleging eight admiralty or maritime claims and seeking to void the policy. SJT filed a separate diversity suit against Catlin seeking recovery for the full insured value under the policy for the loss of the drydock. At trial, the district court concluded that the insurance policy was void ab initio pursuant to the doctrine of uberrimae fidei. The First Circuit affirmed as modified, holding (1) the contract was voidable, not void ab initio; and (2) SJT violated the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in its procurement of the policy, and thus, Catlin was entitled to void the policy. View "Catlin (Syndicate 2003) at Lloyd’s v. San Juan Towing & Marine Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of Taiwan, filed suit against the United States, seeking damages for the accidental killing of her husband and the intentional sinking of her husband's fishing vessel during a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) counter-piracy mission. Plaintiff's husband was one of three Chinese hostages captured by pirates. Because allowing this action to proceed would thrust courts into the middle of a sensitive multinational counter-piracy operation and force courts to second-guess the conduct of military engagement, the court agreed that the separation of powers prevents the judicial branch from hearing the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action under the political question and discretionary function doctrines. View "Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the captain of a crew boat, filed suit against his employer and his supervisor under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 50101, and general maritime law, seeking maintenance and cure and damages. All parties cross-appealed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff merely strained his back while lifting a hatch cover is not clearly erroneous; the district court's findings regarding the weather and condition of the seas at the time and location of the incident are not clearly erroneous; the district court properly ruled against plaintiff on all of his unseaworthiness claims; the district court's finding that defendants were not negligent is fully supported by the record; the court vacated the maintenance and cure award against the supervisor where the maintenance and cure duty extends only to the seaman's employer; and the McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. rule precludes plaintiff from obtaining maintenance and cure from his employer in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment to the extent the district court rejected plaintiff's Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims; vacated the awards against the employer and supervisor in their entirety; and rendered judgment in favor of the employer and supervisor. View "Meche v. Key Energy Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

The Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 962, passed in 1794, is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation in support of the obligations of neutrality. The Act makes it unlawful to furnish, fit out, or arm a vessel within the U.S. with the intent of having the vessel used in the service of a foreign state or people to commit hostilities against another foreign state or people with whom the U.S. is at peace. Vessels covered by the Act are subject to forfeiture, and persons who give information leading to the seizure of such vessels may recover a bounty. Bauer sought to pursue a claim under the Act, claiming to have informed the government of vessels that had been funded, furnished, and fitted by anti-Israel organizations in the U.S., together with violent and militant anti-Israel organizations from other countries. The complaint alleged that the vessels were to be employed in the service of Hamas, a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, to commit hostilities against Israel. The district court dismissed, holding that the statute lacks an express private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that informers lack standing to sue on their own. View "Bauer v. Mavi Marmara" on Justia Law

RLB filed suit seeking to limit its liability to the value of the dredge vessel, "Jonathan King Boyd," after a fatal allision between a fishing boat and the Vessel's dredge pipe. Claimants had previously filed suit against RLB in state court for personal injuries and property damage, and for the wrongful death of one occupant. Claimants argue that RLB missed the Limitation of Liability Act's, 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq., six-month jurisdictional deadline for invoking the protections of the Act. The court concluded that claimants established that the pre-suit writing from their counsel to RLB's counsel conveyed the reasonable possibility that RLB faced a claim exceeding the value of the Vessel. Therefore, RLB had written notice under the Act earlier than six months before it filed its limitation action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of RLB's complaint as time-bared. View "RLB Contracting, Inc. v. Butler" on Justia Law