Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a seaman, was diagnosed with aplastic anemia, a blood condition that preventing him from continuing to work. Appellant brought a personal injury action against his employer, alleging negligence under the Jones Act and maritime claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, Appellant challenged only the dismissal of his cause of action for maintenance and cure, arguing that he was entitled to that remedy until he “reaches maximum medical recovery.” The First Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling, holding that Appellant adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that his aplastic anemia arose or became aggravated during his service on the ship and, hence, triggered the duty of maintenance and cure. Remanded. View "Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc." on Justia Law

Starr Indemnity filed suit seeking a determination of their rights and obligations under Continental Cement's insurance policies after the Mark Twain, a cement barge owned by Continental Cement, sank in the Mississippi River. Continental Cement counterclaimed for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay under Missouri law. Determining that Continental Cement did not waive its appeal, the court concluded that the district court did not err by applying the federal doctrine of utmost good faith, a judicially established federal admiralty rule, instead of Missouri state law; Continental Cement waived its appeal of the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Starr Indemnity's utmost good faith defense; and, apart from the issue of waiver, the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the utmost good faith instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "New York Marine & General Ins., et al. v. Continental Cement Co., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the sinking of a vessel owned by Hornbeck while at R&R's shipyard for repairs. R&R's liability insurer, National, filed suit to disclaim liability under its policy. Hornbeck counterclaimed. The district court found that R&R was negligent and that National was liable for the ensuing damages. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that R&R was negligent under bailment law where the vessel was delivered to R&R afloat, R&R had full custody of the vessel, and the vessel sank while under R&R's care; even if the salvage company had been negligent, R&R would remain fully liable because this negligence was a foreseeable consequence of R&R's own negligence; under Rule 13(a), Hornbeck had standing to bring its counterclaim and the district court properly ruled on that claim after deciding R&R's liability; and the district court erred in the amount of damages it awarded and in applying an 18% interest rate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the entry of judgment and the appropriate assessment of interest on that judgment. View "National Liability & Fire Ins. Co. v. R & R Marine, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was injured while working as a deckhand on a commercial vessel, sued Defendant, Huntress, Inc., for maintenance and cure, negligence under the federal Jones Act, and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. After a trial, Plaintiff prevailed on his claim for maintenance and cure but not on his remaining claims. The trial justice subsequently denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial with respect to the claim for maintenance and cure and granted Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial with respect to the claims for negligence and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial with respect to the claim for maintenance and cure, holding that the trial justice gave an improper instruction to the jury regarding “unearned wages,” and the error resulted in prejudice to Defendant; and (2) vacated the trial justice’s grant of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the claims of negligence under the Jones Act and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, holding that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived testimony, resulting in a decision that was clearly wrong. View "King v. Huntress, Inc." on Justia Law

The Club is a non-profit provider of protection and indemnity insurance. The Club's Rules include a choice-of-law provision selecting New York law and a two-year statute of limitations for claims against the Club. The Club filed a civil action against defendant alleging that it breached the insurance contract by failing to reimburse the Club for a shortfall and by failing to pay the overdue insurance premiums. The court agreed with the district court, and precedent, that an otherwise valid choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract is enforceable and may require application of a jurisdiction's statute of limitations, in lieu of the doctrine of laches, to govern issues regarding the timeliness of claims asserted under that agreement. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied New York's six-year statute of limitations to the Club's claims arising under its maritime insurance contract with plaintiff. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Steamship Owners v. Dann Ocean Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

A corporation invited guests to a business retreat at the corporation’s expense at a lodge near the Gulf of Mexico. The lodge provided the guests with bay fishing from small boats. The corporation provided alcoholic beverages on the boats at the guests’ request. After one guest spent some time on the boat, returned to the lodge, and left to drive home, the guest struck a motorcycle ridden by the plaintiffs, who were severely injured. The plaintiffs sued the corporation, alleging that it negligently allowed the guest to drink excessively. Because Texas law does not recognize such social host liability, the plaintiffs asserted that federal maritime law applied in this case because, before the accident, the guest became intoxicated while on the fishing boat. The court of appeals concluded that maritime law applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the tests set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the action did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction. View "Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Arthey" on Justia Law

D'Amico filed suit to enforce an English court's judgment on a forward freight agreement (FFA) between D'Amico and Primera. On appeal, D'Amico challenged the district court's dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted Primera's motion to dismiss, holding that the suit did not fall under the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction because the English judgment was not rendered by an admiralty court and the claim underlying the judgment was not deemed to be maritime under English law. The court concluded that, under 28 U.S.C. 1333, United States courts have jurisdiction to enforce a judgment of a foreign non-admiralty court if the claim underlying that judgment would be deemed maritime under the standards of U.S. law. Because the district court did not consider this question, the court remanded to the district court to make that determination in the first instance. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded. View "D'Amico Dry Ltd. v. Primera Maritime, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for limitation on liability after visitors of their powerboat were involved in a fistfight on a floating dock operated by Claimant. At issue was whether federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to tort claims arising from a physical altercation among recreational visitors on and around a permanent dock surrounded by navigable water. The court held that federal admiralty jurisdiction did not reach the claims at issue because this type of incident did not have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Tandon v. Ulbrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, chief mate of the "Sealand Pride," filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that his employer, Maersk, negligently saddled him with excessive duties and duty time such that he was overworked to the point of fatigue. The court concluded that the Jones Act does not allow seaman to recover for injuries caused by work-related stress because work-related stress is not a physical peril. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied the motion of Maersk for a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Under Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, plaintiff's complaint of an injury induced by overwork was not cognizable under the Jones Act. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment awarding plaintiff damages. The court reversed the denial of the motion of Maersk for a judgment as a matter of law and rendered the judgment in favor of Maersk. View "Skye v. Maersk Line" on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law