Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed personal injury and wrongful death claims against the United States and Coast Guard under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA), 46 U.S.C. 30901-30918. Plaintiff and her husband fell overboard their boat and her husband subsequently died of drowning. The court concluded that the Coast Guard neither increased the danger facing plaintiff and her husband nor induced reliance on the part of either plaintiff, her husband, or a third party. Accordingly, plaintiff could not prove that the Coast Guard breached its duty to her or her deceased husband, and the district court properly entered summary judgment on plaintiff's tort claims. The court also found that the rulings on the issues of spoliation and the timeliness of the motion reflected proper exercises of the district court's discretion and the court affirmed as to these issues. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the Coast Guard's response to plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request satisfied its duty under that Act. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of an accident aboard Estis Rig 23, a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig. The principal issue was whether seamen could recover punitive damages for their employer's willful and wanton breach of the general maritime law duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Like maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness was established as a general maritime claim before the passage of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104; punitive damages were available under general maritime law; and the Jones Act did not address unseaworthiness or limit its remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that punitive damages remained available as a remedy for the general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. View "McBride, et al. v. Estis Well Service L. L. C." on Justia Law

The 19th-century steamship S.S. Central America, the “Ship of Gold,” sank in the Atlantic Ocean in 1857, taking many tons of gold with her. The wreckage was discovered more than 130 years later by explorers led by Thompson, in one of the most significant finds in maritime history. Thompson is a fugitive from the law. Those who assisted Thompson in locating the wreckage signed non-disclosure agreements in exchange for a percentage of the net recovery, but none have received payment. In their suit, Thompson’s business entities asserted a two-year statute of limitations for actions in salvage and three counterclaims. The district court rejected the time-bar argument and granted summary judgment against all counterclaims. While an interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court granted prejudgment attachment and an injunction against one of the entities and Thompson, forbidding them from divesting certain assets. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the time bar does not apply, affirmed summary judgment against the counterclaims for failure to raise an issue of fact material to the disposition of the case, and upheld the injunction. View "Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seafarers who worked aboard cruise ships operated by NCL, filed suit under the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that NCL did not pay them their full wages because their compensation did not take into account the amounts they were required to pay their helpers to complete their work on embarkation days. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in not awarding penalty wages under the Act. The court concluded that the district court made findings of fact which were supported by the record and the district court did not err by failing to award penalty wages based upon these findings. There was simply no evidence of willful, arbitrary, or willful misconduct on the part of NCL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wallace, et al. v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the crew of an Ecuadorian fishing boat, filed suit against the United States, alleging that the United States harmed plaintiffs and their property when the Coast Guard boarded the boat in search of drugs. The court held that, on the evidence submitted by the parties, reciprocity with Ecuador existed; the discretionary function exception applied generally to plaintiffs' claims because most of the actions by the Coast Guard were discretionary; the government could have violated its non-discretionary policy of paying damages to the owner of the boat; and to the extent that plaintiffs could establish that the United States violated that mandatory obligation, sovereign immunity did not bar this action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tobar v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Association of Maryland Pilots as a launch boat operator. Plaintiff was later promoted to assistant station manager. In 2008, Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis. Plaintiff sued the Association pursuant to the Jones Act, alleging negligence in regard to injuries he suffered from exposure to free silica during his employment. Whether Plaintiff's claim was properly made under the Jones Act depended on whether Plaintiff was a "seaman" at the time of the alleged negligence. To distinguish seamen from land-based workers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a seaman must ordinarily have spent at least thirty percent of work time in service of a vessel in navigation. The lower courts concluded Plaintiff was not a seaman at the time of his injury and therefore granted summary judgment for the Association. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not spend at least thirty percent of his work time performing sea-based duties, and therefore, Plaintiff was not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. View "Dize v. Ass'n of Md. Pilots" on Justia Law

Railroad conductor Sean Janes was injured while railcars were being loaded onto a barge built to transport railcars and non-rail cargo at the same time. Janes and his family sued the barge owner, alleging that placing cargo across the tracks and failing to provide devices to stop moving railcars from hitting the non-rail cargo made the barge unseaworthy under federal maritime law. After a bench trial, the superior court found that the barge was reasonably fit for its intended purpose and that Janes had not proved that the barge was unseaworthy. On appeal, Janes argued the trial court erred by rejecting his unseaworthiness claim. Because the superior court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and because the court committed no legal error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from the U.S. DEA, which learned from British Virgin Island law enforcement, which learned from Grenadian law enforcement, that the U.S.-registered vessel“Laurel” might be smuggling illegal narcotics. The Laurel, under the command Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the U.S. and Grenada, was intercepted in international waters. Coast Guard officers conducted a routine safety inspection, which the Laurel passed. They unsuccessfully attempted to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection; rough waters made areas of the vessel inaccessible. Officer Riemer questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their destination and purpose. Benoit gave inconsistent answers. Riemer conducted ION scan swipes; none came back positive for any explosive, contraband, or narcotics. The Laurel was directed to a U.S. port, where a canine boarded and alerted to narcotics. Still unable to access the entire vessel, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to St. Thomas to enable a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) search for anomalies in the vessel, which revealed anomalous masses. A Customs officer drilled a hole and found a substance that field-tested as cocaine. Officers cut a larger hole, revealing an area filled with brick-like packages. Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. After denial of two motions to suppress, Benoit and Williams were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and attempted importation of cocaine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an in rem action in federal court laying claim to the intact shipwreck of an early nineteenth century wooden schooner at the bottom of Lake Erie under admiralty law as the finder and salvor of the sunken vessel. New York intervened, asserting title under state law and the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. 4101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of New York. The court concluded that abandonment could be inferred from circumstantial evidence and affirmed the judgment of the district court on the basis that the record demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the shipwreck was abandoned within the meaning of the Act. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a material dispute of fact on this issue. View "Northeast Research, LLC v. One Shipwrecked Vessel" on Justia Law

The M/V Julie White, a towboat owned by Artco, was pushing four barges on the river when the barges separated from the towboat and allided with Lock and Dam 25. The barges then sank. After Artco salvaged and removed the sunken barges from the Mississippi River, Artco filed suit under the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C. 30501-12, seeking exoneration from, or limitation of liability for, claims arising from the allision. On appeal, Artco challenged the district court's dismissal of the limitation complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the United States' claims under the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401-76, were not subject to limitation under the Limitation Act. The court concluded that the government did not have statutory standing because it failed to file a claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Supplemental F(5), and therefore, the district court erred by entertaining the government's motion to dismiss the limitation complaint. Because the court concluded that the government was without standing, the court need not address the merits of the government's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "American River Transp., et al. v. United States, Corp of Engineers" on Justia Law