Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

The government appealed the district court's order which altered the terms of a bond the Coast Guard had fixed for the release of a detained ship that was under investigation and restricted the types of penalties the government could seek for the ship's potential violations of certain ocean pollution prevention statutes. The ship at issue, the Pappadakis, an ocean-going bulk cargo carrier carrying a shipment of coal to Brazil, was detained by the Coast Guard because the vessel had likely been discharging bilge water overboard. The court reversed and remanded for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) where the matter was not subject to review in the district court because the Coast Guard's actions were committed to agency discretion by law. Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. View "Angelex Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a maritime contract entered into by Blue Whale and Development. Blue Whale filed a complaint in district seeking to attach property belonging to Development's alleged alter ego, HNA, in anticipation of a future arbitration award against Development pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The court concluded that the district court properly applied federal maritime law to the procedural question of whether Blue Whale's claim sounded in admiralty, and the claim did sound in admiralty because it arose out of a maritime contract; the issue of the claim's prima facie validity was a substantive inquiry; however, the district court's application of English law to this question was improper because the charter's party's choice-of-law provision did not govern Blue Whale's collateral alter-ego claim against HNA; and drawing on maritime choice-of-law principles, the court held that although federal common law did not govern every claim of this nature, federal common law did apply here, primarily because of the collateral claim's close ties to the United States. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration of the prima facie validity of Blue Whale's alter-ego claim under federal common law. View "Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions stemming from his involvement in conducting the negotiations for the ransom of a ship seized by pirates and for his participation in the torture of the ship's crew as part of the process. The court affirmed defendant's piracy convictions in Counts 1 and 7, based on his intentionally facilitating two piracies on the high seas, even though his facilitating conduct took place in Somalia and its territorial waters; affirmed the district court's ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of personal jurisdiction based on his being brought into the United States involuntarily; universal jurisdiction was irrelevant to the prosecution of Counts 2 through 6 and each of those counts was based on a statute that Congress validly applied to extraterritorial conduct, including defendant's conduct; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an FBI agent's testimony because they were admitted only as prior inconsistent statements. The court rejected defendant's Crawford v. Washington claim and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shibin" on Justia Law

A class of seafarers sought, as part of unearned wages, overtime pay from Maersk that they would have earned from the time of their discharge until the end of their respective voyages. On appeal, Maersk challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the seafarers. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the application of general maritime law could be limited, but not abrogated, in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs); the CBA at issue here did not address the inclusion of overtime pay in the calculation of Plaintiff Padilla's unearned wages; the unearned wages included overtime pay where the seafarer reasonably expected to earn overtime pay on a regular basis throughout his service in an amount that was not speculative and would have earned it "but for" an illness or injury; and, given that overtime was a substantial and routine component of the seafarer's compensation, they were entitled to overtime payments because, under general maritime law, they must be placed in the same position they would have been in had they not been injured or disabled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, including the district court's denial of Maersk's motion to amend the judgment. View "Padilla v. Maersk Line, Limited" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Sudan after the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole and the district court found Sudan liable under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. 30301 et seq. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's conclusion that the DOHSA action precluded their subsequent federal cause of action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605. The court concluded that the various provisions of section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, were inapplicable here and, therefore, the court declined to consider the constitutionality of NDAA section 1083; the district court did not abuse its discretion when, as part of a close look, considered sua sponte whether res judicata barred plaintiffs' claims; but the court concluded, however, that res judicata should not apply here. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an allision between a vessel owned by Settoon and an oil well. On appeal, Settoon challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the umbrella insurers. The court concluded that the umbrella insurers were not liable for damages resulting from the allision because Settoon failed to provide them notice within 30 days; SNIC was liable to Settoon because delayed delivery prevented SNIC from relying on the exclusions in the policy and the conditions precedent of the exceptions to the exclusions; and prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date Settoon paid for the allision. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest and affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "In Re: Settoon Towing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellee, a Somali national, helped negotiate the ransom of a merchant vessel and its crew after they were captured by marauders in the Gulf of Aden. Appellee received a share of the ransom and also received a separate payment for his negotiation services. After appellee was appointed Director General of the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Somaliland, he was invited to attend an education conference in the United States. When appellee landed in the United States, he was promptly arrested. Appellee was indicted for conspiracy to commit piracy under the law of nations (Count One); committing piracy under the law of nations (Count Two); and conspiracy to commit hostage taking and aiding and abetting hostage taking (Counts Three and Four). On appeal, the government challenged the district court's dismissal of Counts One, Three, and Four, as well as limitation of Count Two. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count One; reversed the district court's narrowing of the scope of Count Two to acts appellee performed while on the high seas; and reversed the dismissal of Counts Three and Four. View "United States v. Ali" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was operating in the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (ICW) under its contract with the Corp when it was struck by a passing vessel. This admiralty appeal challenged the district court's finding of liability arising from the allision in the ICW. The court agreed with the district court and held that plaintiff violated Inland Navigation Rule 9 (INR 9) by mooring in a narrow channel; and that the violation triggered the rule of The Pennsylvania, shifting the burden of proving causation to the dredge. Because plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of causation by demonstrating that the dredge was not a cause of the allision, the court affirmed the district court's judgment holding plaintiff partially liable. The court found that the district court committed no error in finding plaintiff 70 percent liable and thus affirmed the allocation of fault. View "Mike Hooks Dredging Co., Inc. v. Eckstein Marine Serv., Inc., et al" on Justia Law

As the tanker Athos neared Paulsboro, New Jersey, an abandoned anchor in the Delaware River punctured its hull and caused 263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill. The owner of the tanker, Frescati, paid $180 million in cleanup costs and ship damages, but was reimbursed for nearly $88 million by the U.S. government under the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 2701. Frescati made claims against CARCO, which ordered the oil and owned the terminal where the Athos was to unload, claiming breach of the safe port/safe berth warranty made to an intermediary responsible for chartering the Athos and negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The government, as a statutory subrogee for the $88 million reimbursement reached a limited settlement agreement. The district court held that CARCO was not liable for the accident, but made no findings of fact and conclusions of law, required by FRCP 52(a)(1). The Third Circuit remanded for findings, but stated that the Athos and Frescati were implied beneficiaries of CARCO‘s safe berth warranty; that the warranty is an express assurance of safety; and that the named port exception to that warranty does not apply to hazards that are unknown and not reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that it is not clear that the warranty was actually breached, absent findings as to the Athos‘s actual draft or the clearance provided. The court further stated that CARCO could be liable in negligence for hazards outside the approach to CARCO‘s terminal. View "United States v. Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co." on Justia Law

Clevo appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hecny. Clevo, a Taiwan-based manufacturer of computer parts and accessories, and Amazon, a Brazilian entity, agreed that Clevo would manufacture and sell, and Amazon would buy, millions of dollars' worth of Clevo computer parts. Under Clevo and Amazon's negotiated terms, the Hecny Group was designated to handle all of the contract shipments. More than a year after the initial misdelivery to Amazon, Clevo sued numerous Hecny Group entities for the unpaid remainder of the goods' purchase price. The court concluded that the Guarantee was initially effective to place Clevo and Hecny Transportation in direct contractual privity, without any contractually-created statute of limitations. But that initial relationship was modified when the Bills of Lading issued. By operation of the Himalaya Clause, the benefit of the one-year statue of limitations in the Bills of Lading extended beyond Hecny Shipping to Hecny Transportation as well. Because Hecny Transportation had asserted that provision in defense to suit, Clevo's claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc." on Justia Law