Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

AdvanFort Company, a maritime security firm based in Virginia, deployed a vessel, the Seaman Guard Virginia, for anti-piracy services in the Red Sea. In October 2013, the vessel docked at the Jeddah Shipyard in Saudi Arabia for repairs by Zamil Offshore Services Company. During the repairs, a fire broke out, which AdvanFort attributed to Zamil's personnel. AdvanFort sued Zamil and the Saudi Ports Authority in a Saudi court in 2014, but the court dismissed AdvanFort's claims and awarded partial damages to Zamil on its countersuit. In 2022, Zamil moved the vessel to a storage yard, claiming it was at risk of sinking, and later informed AdvanFort that it would dispose of the vessel if not retrieved.AdvanFort filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia in July 2023, alleging conversion, breach of bailment, negligence, and gross negligence against Zamil and the Ports Authority. Zamil moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that Saudi courts were a more appropriate forum. The Ports Authority did not appear, leading to a default entry against it.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed AdvanFort's complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding that Saudi courts were available, adequate, and more convenient for the litigation. The court noted that the relevant events and evidence were located in Saudi Arabia and that the Saudi courts had jurisdiction over both defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Saudi Arabia was a more convenient forum and that the Saudi courts were both available and adequate for adjudicating AdvanFort's claims. The court also found no error in the district court's denial of limited discovery on forum non conveniens issues. View "AdvanFort Co. v. Zamil Offshore Services Co." on Justia Law

In this case, a seaman, Magnus Aadland, filed a lawsuit in 2017 against Boat Santa Rita II, Inc. (BSR II) and related parties, alleging that he fell ill while working offshore in 2014 and was owed maintenance and cure, which were not provided. Aadland sought compensatory damages for unpaid maintenance and cure, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially ruled in favor of BSR II, finding that Aadland had reached maximum medical recovery (MMR) by the time of the trial in September 2020 and that BSR II had satisfied its duty of cure. The court also denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, finding that the District Court had erred in its application of the law, particularly regarding the duty of cure and the applicability of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service, Inc. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.On remand, the District Court ruled that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and that BSR II owed cure in the amount of $605,338.07, which was the amount paid by Aadland's private insurer, Tufts. The court credited BSR II's $400,000 payment to Tufts and $238,374 in advances to Aadland against this amount, resulting in a credit for BSR II. The court again denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On further appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment regarding emotional distress damages but vacated the judgment regarding punitive damages and attorney's fees, finding that BSR II's breach of its duty of cure was willful. The case was remanded for the District Court to determine whether punitive damages and attorney's fees should be awarded. The First Circuit also affirmed the District Court's finding that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and the setoff amount for BSR II's payment to Tufts. View "Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, Inc." on Justia Law

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) sought a letter ruling from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the application of the Jones Act to its offshore wind farm project. CBP's initial ruling required Jones Act-qualified vessels for transporting scour protection rock from U.S. points to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, a modified ruling stated that the first delivery of rock to the OCS did not require a Jones Act-qualified vessel, but subsequent deliveries did. Great Lakes appealed this modified ruling, which CBP denied.Great Lakes then filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, claiming the modified ruling was contrary to law and would expose its planned Jones Act-compliant vessel to unlawful competition. The American Petroleum Institute (API) intervened, arguing that Great Lakes lacked standing as it had no actual or imminent injury. The district court agreed with API and dismissed the case, finding Great Lakes' injury hypothetical since it did not have a vessel capable of handling the Vineyard Project and no current contract for the project.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Great Lakes argued it had competitor standing due to the potential for increased competition from foreign vessels. However, the court found no evidence of actual or imminent increased competition, as the Vineyard Project was completed and there was no indication that future projects would source rock from U.S. points. The court also rejected CBP's argument that the ruling applied to identical future projects, as there was no record evidence of such projects involving U.S.-sourced rock.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Great Lakes lacked standing to challenge the CBP's modified ruling. View "Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of charter-boat operators and trade associations in Maryland, sued the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to enjoin the Commission’s striped-bass plan. The Commission, formed in 1942, recommends fishery management plans to its member states. Plaintiffs argued that the plan, which included a one-fish limit for charter boats, would significantly harm their businesses. They sought an injunction to prevent the implementation of the plan.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that Plaintiffs likely lacked standing because they were regulated by Maryland, not the Commission. The court noted that even if the Commission’s plan were enjoined, it was unlikely that Maryland would rescind its own regulations, which were stricter than the Commission’s recommendations. The court also found that Plaintiffs did not plausibly state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the Commission is not a “person” under the statute and does not act under “color of state law.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Maryland would likely rescind its regulations if the Commission’s plan were enjoined. The court emphasized that Maryland voluntarily adopted the regulations and had the authority to impose stricter measures than those recommended by the Commission. As a result, the court vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Delmarva Fisheries Association, Inc. v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission" on Justia Law

A construction company chartered a barge and obtained insurance through a broker. Upon returning the barge, the owner discovered damage and sued the construction company in federal court. The construction company requested its insurer to defend it, but the insurer refused, citing lack of coverage. After the federal court awarded damages to the barge owner, the construction company sued the insurer and broker in state court, alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and negligence.The Superior Court of Alaska denied the construction company's motion for summary judgment against the broker and insurer. The court granted summary judgment to the broker and insurer, finding that the construction company's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the construction company had not relied on any reassurances from the broker that would have delayed the filing of the lawsuit.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the construction company's claims against the broker were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer first denied coverage. The court also held that the construction company's claims against the insurer were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer refused to defend the construction company in the federal lawsuit. The court concluded that the construction company's claims were untimely and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the broker and insurer. View "Swalling Construction Company, Inc. v. Alaska USA Insurance Brokers, LLC" on Justia Law

Ultra Deep Picasso Pte. Limited (Ultra Deep) is a contractor specializing in undersea vessel operations for marine construction. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd. (Dynamic) subcontracted Ultra Deep for a project related to a contract with Saudi Aramco. Ultra Deep completed work worth over ten million dollars but alleged that Dynamic failed to pay, breaching their agreement. Ultra Deep filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas, seeking breach of contract damages and a maritime attachment and garnishment of Dynamic’s funds allegedly held by Riyad Bank.The district court granted Ultra Deep an ex parte order for attachment of Dynamic’s assets at Riyad Bank. Dynamic responded with motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and to compel arbitration, which were denied. Dynamic and Riyad Bank then moved to vacate the attachment order, arguing that Ultra Deep failed to show Dynamic had property in the Southern District of Texas. The magistrate judge held a hearing and found that Ultra Deep did not present evidence that Dynamic’s property was within the district. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, vacated the attachment order, and dismissed the case with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that for a valid Rule B attachment, the property must be found within the district. It concluded that a bank account is located where its funds can be withdrawn. Since Ultra Deep failed to show that Dynamic’s property was within the Southern District of Texas, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate the attachment order and dismiss the case. View "Ultra Deep Picasso v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd." on Justia Law

Catherine Berry sued her employer, Air Force Central Welfare Fund, and its insurer, Air Force Insurance Fund, to enforce administrative default orders for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. After Berry filed her lawsuit, the defendants voluntarily paid her the full amount owed, including penalties and interest. Berry then sought attorneys’ fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), arguing that her case was not moot due to her pending fee request.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Berry’s motion for attorneys’ fees and dismissed her complaint as moot. The court held that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim under § 928(a) because the defendants’ voluntary payment mooted the case, and Berry obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Berry appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Berry’s claim was moot because she received the full amount owed and sought no other compensation. The court also rejected Berry’s argument that her lawsuit was the catalyst for the defendants’ payment, stating that the catalyst theory is unavailable under § 928(a). The court concluded that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim in the district court, as she obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Therefore, Berry was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 928(a). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case as moot. View "BERRY V. AIR FORCE CENTRAL WELFARE FUND" on Justia Law

Marek Matthews, a seaman and captain, filed a lawsuit against Tidewater, Inc. and Tidewater Crewing, Ltd., alleging that he was exposed to toxic chemicals during his employment, resulting in severe health issues including end-stage renal failure and stage IV cancer. Matthews, a Florida resident, claimed that the exposure occurred while working on offshore supply vessels in the Red Sea. His employment contract included a forum-selection clause mandating that any disputes be litigated in the High Court of Justice in London, England.Initially, Matthews and other plaintiffs filed the suit in Louisiana state court, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Tidewater removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and moved to dismiss it based on the forum-selection clause and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, finding the forum-selection clause valid and enforceable. Matthews's subsequent motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the forum-selection clause was enforceable. The court applied a de novo review to the enforceability of the clause and an abuse of discretion standard to the forum non conveniens analysis. It concluded that Matthews did not meet the heavy burden of proving the clause was unreasonable under the circumstances, despite his health conditions and Louisiana's public policy against such clauses. The court emphasized the federal policy favoring the enforcement of forum-selection clauses in maritime contracts, which outweighed the conflicting state policy. View "Matthews v. Tidewater" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. and its affiliates, who were charged by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) for imposing "unjust and unreasonable" detention charges on TCW, Inc., a trucking company. The charges were for the late return of a shipping container. The FMC argued that the charges were unreasonable as they were levied for days when the port was closed and could not have accepted a returned container. Evergreen contested this decision, arguing that the FMC's application of the interpretive rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.The FMC had previously ruled in favor of TCW, Inc. in a small claims program. The Commission then reviewed the decision, focusing on the application of the interpretive rule on demurrage and detention. The FMC upheld the initial decision, stating that no amount of detention can incentivize the return of a container when the terminal cannot accept the container. The Commission dismissed Evergreen's arguments that failing to impose detention charges during the port closure would have disincentivized the return of the container before the closure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found the FMC's decision to be arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the FMC failed to consider relevant factors and did not provide a reasoned explanation for several aspects of its decision. The court also found that the FMC's application of the incentive principle was illogical. The court concluded that a detention charge does not necessarily lack any incentivizing effect because it is levied for a day on which a container cannot be returned to a marine terminal. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Commission’s order, and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission" on Justia Law

In March 2020, seven crewmembers of the M/V Greg Mortimer cruise ship filed a lawsuit against several companies, including CMI Leisure Management, Inc., Cruise Management International, Inc., and Vikand Medical Solutions, LLC. The crewmembers alleged that the decision to sail during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed them to foreseeable harms, resulting in six of them contracting the virus. The crewmembers had signed employment agreements with other companies that contained forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring disputes to be brought in the Bahamas under Bahamian law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the action based on the forum-selection clause. The court ruled that the defendants, who were not parties to the employment agreements, could invoke the forum-selection clause under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision. The appellate court held that the defendants could not invoke the forum-selection clause in the employment agreements under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court reasoned that the crewmembers' claims did not rely on the terms of their employment agreements, and thus, equitable estoppel did not apply. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Usme v. CMI Leisure Management, Inc." on Justia Law