Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Two men were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in international waters south of Puerto Rico after being observed jettisoning bales of cocaine from a vessel that lacked any indication of nationality. The Coast Guard recovered approximately 306 kilograms of cocaine and eventually transported the men, including the appellant, to St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The government asserted that the men were never brought to Puerto Rico, though the appellant disputed this. A grand jury in the District of the Virgin Islands indicted the appellant on multiple drug trafficking charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), as well as related offenses.The appellant moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue, arguing that the MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision was unconstitutional and that venue was proper in Puerto Rico, where he claimed he was first brought. He also sought a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue and the issuance of subpoenas for Coast Guard witnesses. The United States District Court of the Virgin Islands denied these motions, holding that the MDLEA’s venue provision was constitutional and that the Virgin Islands was a proper venue. The court also found that mere passage through Puerto Rico’s territorial waters did not constitute being “first brought” there under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and denied the request for an evidentiary hearing, finding no colorable factual dispute that would affect the outcome.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The Third Circuit held that the MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision is constitutional, both facially and as applied, for offenses committed on the high seas. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. View "USA v. Cuevas-Almonte" on Justia Law

A coastal town in Maine, known for its small population and proximity to a national park, experienced a significant increase in cruise ship tourism, with large vessels bringing thousands of passengers daily. In response to concerns about congestion, public safety, and the impact on local amenities, residents approved an ordinance capping the number of cruise ship passengers who could disembark in the town to 1,000 per day. The ordinance imposed fines for violations and was intended to address issues primarily at the waterfront and, to a lesser extent, in the downtown area.Several local businesses, a business association, and a pilots’ association challenged the ordinance in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. They argued that the ordinance was preempted by federal and state law, violated the Commerce Clause (including its dormant aspect), and infringed on due process rights. After a bench trial, the District Court largely ruled in favor of the town and an intervening resident, rejecting most claims but finding that the ordinance was preempted by federal regulations only to the extent it restricted crew members’ shore access. The court declined to enjoin the ordinance, noting the town’s intent to address this issue through further rulemaking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the state law preemption, federal preemption (except for the now-moot crew access issue), and due process claims. The First Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of discrimination-based Dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding no similarly situated in-state and out-of-state competitors. However, the court vacated and remanded the District Court’s dismissal of the Pike balancing Dormant Commerce Clause claim, instructing further analysis of whether the ordinance’s burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to its local benefits. The court dismissed as moot the appeals related to the crew access issue. View "Ass'n to Preserve and Protect Local Livelihoods v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, were convicted of cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Lemus was apprehended on December 30, 2021, when U.S. Coast Guard officers intercepted a vessel north of Panama, found cocaine, and determined the vessel was without nationality after Colombia could not confirm its registration. Canario-Vilomar was arrested on December 6, 2021, when a similar vessel was intercepted north of Colombia, and the Dominican Republic could not confirm its registration. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.In the Southern District of Florida, Lemus pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. In the Middle District of Florida, Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to conspiracy, and his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the MDLEA exceeded Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution and that their vessels were not stateless under international law. Canario-Vilomar also argued that his offense occurred in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which he claimed was beyond Congress's regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law, affirming that the MDLEA's definition of a "vessel without nationality" and the inclusion of the EEZ within the "high seas" were constitutional. The court also rejected Canario-Vilomar's due process argument, citing precedent that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants. View "USA v. Canario-Vilomar" on Justia Law

Tim Daniels, a commercial fisherman in Florida, challenged the constitutionality of regulations by Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) that restrict where and how Florida-registered vessels can harvest Florida pompano in federal waters. Daniels argued that federal law preempts state regulations affecting fishing in federal waters and that Florida’s regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by only restricting Florida-registered vessels.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the FWC, concluding that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court also determined that Daniels lacked standing to sue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Daniels has standing to sue because he faces a credible threat of prosecution under Florida’s regulations, which affects his commercial fishing activities. The court found that Daniels’s injury is directly traceable to Florida’s regulations and can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act does not preempt Florida’s regulations. The court reasoned that the Act allows states to regulate fishing vessels registered under their laws in federal waters when there is no federal fishery management plan or regulations in place. The court also held that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving and managing pompano stock, and the regulations only apply to Florida-registered vessels, which are within the state’s jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, upholding Florida’s pompano regulations. View "Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel. The defendants were arrested after their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed nor denied the nationality. The United States treated the vessel as stateless and exercised jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing that the relevant provision of the MDLEA under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because it conflicts with international law regarding when a vessel may be treated as stateless. The court held that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA does not conflict with international law, and thus affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. MARIN" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case involved Asdrubal Quijada Marin and Juan Carlos Acosta Hurtado, two Venezuelan nationals who were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in the Caribbean Sea. They were convicted after a bench trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.On appeal, Marin and Acosta Hurtado challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the evidence should have been suppressed due to violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They also contended that their detention at sea for 48 days prior to indictment constituted unnecessary delay and outrageous government conduct.The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Marin and Acosta Hurtado under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act because Cameroon, the flag nation of the vessel, had consented to United States jurisdiction over the crew of the vessel. It also held that the Northland’s stop and search of the Zumaque Tracer did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so the District Court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court also held that the District Court did not err in denying Acosta Hurtado’s motion to dismiss based on unnecessary delay arguments. Lastly, the Court held that Acosta Hurtado's claim of outrageous government conduct was meritless. View "USA v. Hurtado" on Justia Law

17 people were killed a commercial tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm. The government charged the captain and the managers of the duck boat company, with felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. Section 1115 and misdemeanor counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner. The government alleged that the charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that concluded the prescriptive reaches of Sections 1115 and 2302(b) is defined by admiralty law and do not cover the alleged conduct. The government appealed the dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a review of the statute’s history leads to the conclusion that the origins of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. Here, the government objected to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argued that the evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented, in this case, established that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards, the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the court wrote that it detects no clear error in the district court’s finding or conclusion. View "United States v. Kenneth McKee" on Justia Law