Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose from injuries sustained by a platform worker employed by Vertex. Continental appealed the district court's final judgment in favor of Tetra and Maritech, requiring Continental and its codefendant insured, Vertex, to indemnify them. The court concluded that the summary judgment record is inadequate to determine whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), requires the adoption of Louisiana law as surrogate federal law where the court cannot determine whether there is an OCSLA situs, the court cannot determine whether federal maritime law applies, and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2780, is consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither party is entitled to summary judgment as to whether LOIA must be adopted as surrogate federal law under OCSLA. The court remanded to the district court to determine the dispositive issue of whether Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal law. View "Tetra Tech. v. Vertex Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and its officers under 42 U.S.C.1983, federal maritime law, and state law, alleging that defendants seized his sailboat and destroyed it without justification and without notice. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court should not have placed a “heightened pleading” burden on plaintiff for his section 1983 claims. The court also concluded that the district court erred to the extent that it dismissed the federal constitutional claims in Counts I, II, and V, and the maritime claims in Counts III and IV, based on the contents of the incident reports. On remand, the court instructed the district court to assess the sufficiency of the procedural due process, search and seizure, and takings claims without reliance on the disputed portions of the incident reports. The court further instructed that the district court should assume that the sailboat was not derelict, and that plaintiff was never given adequate notice that it was derelict and subject to removal and destruction. The court further concluded that the district court erred with respect to the procedural due process claim in Count I and the Fourth Amendment claim in Count II. In this case, all plaintiff needed to do to establish municipal liability was allege a policy, practice, or custom of the City which caused the seizure and destruction of his sailboat, which he did. Further, defendants cannot point to any post-Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit Supreme Court or circuit cases - and the court has not been able to locate any - holding that a complaint asserting a section 1983 municipal liability claim must, as a Rule 8(a) pleading matter, always specifically identify the municipality’s final policymaker by name. Finally, plaintiff also sufficiently stated a claim for an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to state a substantive due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hoefling, Jr. v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

In 2000 the Port Authority signed a 30-year lease for the largest marine terminal at Port Elizabeth (445 acres including structures and berthing) with Maher, which handles cargo. The Lease requires “Basic Rental,” (in 2012, $50,413 per acre, totaling $22,433,612) plus “Container Throughput Rental,” based on the type and volume of cargo at Maher’s terminal. For eight years, Maher was exempted from Throughput Rental. Since 2008 the first 356,000 containers are exempted; for containers 356,001 to 980,000, Maher paid $19.00 per container in 2012; and for each additional container, Maher paid $14.25. Maher must handle a minimum amount of cargo to maintain the Lease and pay an annual guaranteed minimum Throughput Rental. Maher paid $12.5 million in Throughput Rental in 2010, and expected the 2012 amount to be $14 million. Maher claims the Port Authority profits from the Lease and uses the revenue to fund harbor improvements and projects unrelated to services provided to Maher or vessels. In 2012 Maher sued, alleging violations of the Constitution’s Tonnage Clause; the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 5(b); and the Water Resources Development Act, 33 U.S.C. 2236. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Maher lacked standing to bring its Tonnage Clause and RHA claims because it was not a protected vessel and did not adequately plead that fees imposed on vessels were not for services rendered. Maher’s WRDA claim failed because Maher had not shown that the Authority imposed fees on vessels or cargo and because the WRDA did not prohibit use of Lease revenue to finance harbor improvements. View "Maher Terminals LLC v. Port Auth. of NY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two Yemeni-born Muslim seamen who were United States citizens. Their civil rights action concerned a tanker ship owned by the United States Maritime Administration but operated by a private company under a contract. The first seaman alleged that the human resources director of the companying operating the ship ordered that he be fired because of his national origin. The second seaman alleged that he was not hired to work aboard the ship because of his religion and national origin. Both plaintiffs named the human resources director as a defendant but not the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Plaintiffs’ claims both involved a contract for employment or potential employment aboard a public vessel of the United States and had a sufficient maritime connection, they were required to bring those claims against the United States. View "Ali v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island each tax the transfer of real estate. In separate actions, the Town of Johnston, Rhode Island and the Commissioners of Bristol County, Massachusetts (the municipalities) brought actions against Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, the entities), seeking declaratory judgments that the entities owed transfer taxes as well as money damages and equitable relief to recover the unpaid taxes. Federal district courts granted the entities’ motions to dismiss based on statutory exemptions from taxation. The municipalities appealed, arguing that a real property exception in the entities’ tax exemptions applies to the transfer taxes and that the exemptions themselves are unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims, holding (1) the transfer taxes are not included in the real property exception to the entities’ tax exemptions; and (2) the tax exemptions are a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and do not violate the Tenth Amendment. View "Town of Johnston v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

The Parishes filed suit against BP and others involved in the "Deepwater Horizon" oil spill, seeking to recover penalties under The Louisiana Wildlife Protection Statute, La. R.S. 56:40:1. On appeal, the Parishes challenged the denial of its motion to remand to state court and dismissal of its claims as preempted by federal law. The court concluded that the state law claims were removable pursuant to the broad jurisdictional grant of section 1349 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1349. The court also concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the Parishes' claims were preempted by the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1321, as interpreted in International Paper Co v. Ouellette, and that Congress did not reject that interpretation explicitly or by negative implication in the CWA or when it passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2718(c). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the crew of an Ecuadorian fishing boat, filed suit against the United States, alleging that the United States harmed plaintiffs and their property when the Coast Guard boarded the boat in search of drugs. The court held that, on the evidence submitted by the parties, reciprocity with Ecuador existed; the discretionary function exception applied generally to plaintiffs' claims because most of the actions by the Coast Guard were discretionary; the government could have violated its non-discretionary policy of paying damages to the owner of the boat; and to the extent that plaintiffs could establish that the United States violated that mandatory obligation, sovereign immunity did not bar this action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tobar v. United States" on Justia Law

The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from the U.S. DEA, which learned from British Virgin Island law enforcement, which learned from Grenadian law enforcement, that the U.S.-registered vessel“Laurel” might be smuggling illegal narcotics. The Laurel, under the command Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the U.S. and Grenada, was intercepted in international waters. Coast Guard officers conducted a routine safety inspection, which the Laurel passed. They unsuccessfully attempted to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection; rough waters made areas of the vessel inaccessible. Officer Riemer questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their destination and purpose. Benoit gave inconsistent answers. Riemer conducted ION scan swipes; none came back positive for any explosive, contraband, or narcotics. The Laurel was directed to a U.S. port, where a canine boarded and alerted to narcotics. Still unable to access the entire vessel, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to St. Thomas to enable a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) search for anomalies in the vessel, which revealed anomalous masses. A Customs officer drilled a hole and found a substance that field-tested as cocaine. Officers cut a larger hole, revealing an area filled with brick-like packages. Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. After denial of two motions to suppress, Benoit and Williams were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and attempted importation of cocaine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Benoit" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a maritime contract entered into by Blue Whale and Development. Blue Whale filed a complaint in district seeking to attach property belonging to Development's alleged alter ego, HNA, in anticipation of a future arbitration award against Development pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The court concluded that the district court properly applied federal maritime law to the procedural question of whether Blue Whale's claim sounded in admiralty, and the claim did sound in admiralty because it arose out of a maritime contract; the issue of the claim's prima facie validity was a substantive inquiry; however, the district court's application of English law to this question was improper because the charter's party's choice-of-law provision did not govern Blue Whale's collateral alter-ego claim against HNA; and drawing on maritime choice-of-law principles, the court held that although federal common law did not govern every claim of this nature, federal common law did apply here, primarily because of the collateral claim's close ties to the United States. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration of the prima facie validity of Blue Whale's alter-ego claim under federal common law. View "Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

A drug interdiction in Caribbean waters by the United States Coast Guard ended with the arrest and indictment of multiple defendants, including Appellant. The Coast Guard determined that the vessel was "without nationality" and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Appellant was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute more than 1140 pounds of cocaine and heroin while on board a vessel in violation of the MDLEA. On appeal, Appellant argued that Congress lacked the authority under the Piracies and Felonies Clause to criminalize drug trafficking on board a vessel in international waters under the MDLEA without requiring a nexus between the conduct and the United States. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that any jurisdictional error under the MDLEA related to Appellant's conviction did not constitute plain error in this case. View "United States v. Nueci-Pena" on Justia Law