Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant bought a custom-made yacht with the help of a loan from Barclays Bank. When Defendant stopped making payments on the loan, Barclays repossessed the yacht and sold it pursuant to the Florida UCC. Barclays got less than what Defendant owed on the yacht, and therefore, Barclays sued Defendant for the deficiency. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Barclays was barred from recovering the deficiency because, in violation of the mortgage's terms, it did not provide Defendant with proper notice of the sale. The district court denied Defendant's motion and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of Barclays. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the notice Barclays provided to Defendant was sufficient. View "Barclays Bank PLC v. Poynter" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Greenpeace's public campaign to stop Shell from driling in the Arctic. Greenpeace appealed the district court's grant of Shell's motion for a preliminary injunction, which prohibited Greenpeace from coming within a specified distance of vessels involved in Shell's Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) exploration and from committing various unlawful and tortious acts against those vessels. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the action presented a justiciable case or controversy, that the district court had jurisdiction to issue its order, and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Shell Offshore, Inc., et al v. Greenpeace, Inc." on Justia Law

Seaman filed this action to recover maintenance and cure and compensatory and punitive damages from his former employer (Employer), claiming that he suffered PTSD and depression as a result of being gang-raped by uniformed Korean police officers while he was on shore leave from Employer's ship docked in Korea. The jury awarded Seaman $20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment precluding Seaman's denial of maintenance and cure, set aside the punitive damages award, and remitted the compensatory damages award to $2,000,000. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues relating to the seaworthiness and Jones Act claims regarding Employer's actions after Seaman returned to the ship, and Seaman's claim for maintenance and cure benefits, holding (1) the circuit court erred by not ordering a new trial after concluding that the maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing the instruction proffered by Employer quoting the circuit court's pre-trial ruling on the Jones Act and seaworthiness claims, and the refusal was not harmless. View "Hale v. Maersk Line Ltd." on Justia Law

Nicole Walker and Bart Hyde pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Defendants appealed their respective sentences, arguing that the district court clearly erred in calculating the drug quantity attributable to each of them. Hyde also argued that the district court erred in imposing an obstruction of justice enhancement and failed to reduce Hyde's sentence for acceptance of responsibility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not rely on unreliable evidence or apply an overly broad definition of conspiracy; (2) the district court did not clearly err in determining Defendants distributed "ice" as defined in the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) the district court did not err in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement based on the court's determination that Defendant intentionally gave false testimony; and (4) the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendants, all Somalis, were convicted, among other things, of the crime of piracy under 18 U.S.C. 1651 after they launched an attack on the USS Nicholas on the high seas between Somalia and the Seychelles. On appeal, defendants challenged their convictions and sentences on several grounds, including that their attack on the USS Nicholas did not, as a matter of law, amount to a section 1651 piracy offense. Because the district court correctly applied the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, definition of piracy as customary international law, the court rejected defendants' challenge to their Count One piracy convictions, as well as their mandatory life sentences. Defendants raised several additional appellate contentions which the court also rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences of each of the defendants. View "United States v. Dire; United States v. Ali; United States v. Umar; United States v. Gurewardher; United States v. Hasan" on Justia Law

The city filed a complaint in admiralty against defendant, a vessel, claiming that defendant committed the maritime tort of trespass because it remained at the city marina after the city explicitly revoked its consent, and seeking to foreclose its maritime lien for necessaries (unpaid dockage provided to defendant by the city). Claimant, owner of the vessel, appealed from the district court's entry of an order of summary judgment and an order of final judgment for the city in an in rem proceeding against defendant. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that it had federal admiralty jurisdiction over defendant where defendant was a "vessel" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction; the district court's factual findings regarding the amount claimant owed under the city's maritime lien for necessaries were not clearly erroneous; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the city on claimant's affirmative defense of retaliation; the district court correctly concluded that the city was not estopped from bringing its action in admiralty against defendant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply collateral estoppel because the issues at stake were significantly different from those in dispute in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the district court's orders were affirmed.View "City of Riviera Beach v. Lozman" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc.'s (Odyssey) discovery of a 19th Century Spanish vessel in international waters where Odyssey filed a verified admiralty complaint in rem against the shipwrecked vessel and sought a warrant of arrest. The Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Peru, and twenty-five individuals filed claims against the res and Spain subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the res was a Spanish warship and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Odyssey's claims because the vessel was immune from judicial arrest under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Spain's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly applied the Rule 12(b)(1) standard for factual challenges to jurisdiction to Spain's motion to dismiss; the district court did not abuse its discretion by evaluating Spain's Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on the extensive record before it; the evidence in the record fully supported the finding of the district court that the res was the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes (Mercedes), a Spanish vessel that sank in 1804, for the purposes of sovereign immunity and the district court correctly decided that FSIA immunity applied to the arrest of the Mercedes; the cargo aboard the Mercedes was treated as part of the shipwreck of the Mercedes for sovereign immunity purposes; and the district court did not err when it ordered the Odyssey to release the recovered res to the custody of Spain. View "Odyssey Marine Exploration v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, et al." on Justia Law

The Port of Los Angeles is run by a Board of Harbor Commissioners under a municipal ordinance (the tariff) and leases terminal facilities to operators that load and unload ships. Federally-licensed short-haul drayage trucks move cargo in and out of the Port. In response to concerns over proposed port expansion, the Board implemented a Clean Truck Program that involved a standard “concession agreement,” governing the relationship between the Port and drayage companies. It required a placard on each truck including a phone number and submission a plan listing off-street parking locations. Other requirements relate to financial capacity, truck maintenance, and drivers. The Board amended the tariff to make it a misdemeanor for a terminal operator to grant access to an unregistered drayage truck. An association of drayage companies sued, claiming that the requirements are expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 4501(c)(1), and that even if the requirements are valid, the Port may not enforce them by withdrawing a right to operate at the Port. The district court ruled in favor of the Port. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding only the driver-employment provision preempted. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part. The FAAAA expressly preempts the placard and parking requirements, which relate to a motor carrier’s price, route, or service with respect to transporting property and “hav[e] the force and effect of law.” The Port exercised classic regulatory authority in forcing terminal operators and, therefore, trucking companies, to alter their conduct by implementing a criminal prohibition punishable by imprisonment. The Port’s proprietary intentions do not control. The Court declined to determine, in a “pre-enforcement posture” whether precedent limits the way the Port can en¬force the financial-capacity and truck-maintenance requirements. View "Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Port of Los Angeles is run by a Board of Harbor Commissioners under a municipal ordinance (the tariff) and leases terminal facilities to operators that load and unload ships. Federally-licensed short-haul drayage trucks move cargo in and out of the Port. In response to concerns over proposed port expansion, the Board implemented a Clean Truck Program that involved a standard “concession agreement,” governing the relationship between the Port and drayage companies. It required a placard on each truck including a phone number and submission a plan listing off-street parking locations. Other requirements relate to financial capacity, truck maintenance, and drivers. The Board amended the tariff to make it a misdemeanor for a terminal operator to grant access to an unregistered drayage truck. An association of drayage companies sued, claiming that the requirements are expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 4501(c)(1), and that even if the requirements are valid, the Port may not enforce them by withdrawing a right to operate at the Port. The district court ruled in favor of the Port. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding only the driver-employment provision preempted. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part. The FAAAA expressly preempts the placard and parking requirements, which relate to a motor carrier’s price, route, or service with respect to transporting property and “hav[e] the force and effect of law.” The Port exercised classic regulatory authority in forcing terminal operators and, therefore, trucking companies, to alter their conduct by implementing a criminal prohibition punishable by imprisonment. The Port’s proprietary intentions do not control. The Court declined to determine, in a “pre-enforcement posture” whether precedent limits the way the Port can en¬force the financial-capacity and truck-maintenance requirements. View "Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Ecuadorian members of a fishing boat, sued the United States for damages that resulted from the United States Coast Guard's ("Coast Guard") stop of plaintiffs' boat in international waters near the Galapagos Islands under suspicion of plaintiffs' involvement with smuggling drugs. The Coast Guard performed tests on plaintiffs' boat that yielded inconclusive results and the Ecuadorian government conducted further tests which resulted in no contraband and no charges filed against plaintiffs. At issue was whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity under numerous sources. The court held that non-congressional sources were not acts of Congress and did not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Military Claims Act, Alien Tort Statute, and a bilateral treaty concerning the Air Force base at Manta, Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity. The court further held that the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act provided waivers of sovereign immunity. The court finally held that if a suit falls within the scope of the PVA, 46 U.S.C. 31102, plaintiffs must meet the reciprocity requirement of the PVA regardless of the type of claim they assert. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to give the parties and the district court additional opportunity to determine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian Law.