Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

This suit arose out of a dispute between a ship repair contractor, barge owner, and insurance company over the terms of a ship repair service contract and a maritime insurance policy. The contractor appealed from the district court's ruling that that the contractor breached its contractual obligation to procure insurance coverage for the barge owner and that it was contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the barge owner against damages ensuing from a workplace injury that occurred while the barge was being repaired. The barge owner cross-appealed from the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to additional insured coverage under the contractor's insurance policy. The court affirmed the district court's holding that there was a written agreement between the contractor and the barge owner which obligated the contractor to defend, indemnify, and procure insurance for the barge owner. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the barge owner, which was not named in the policy, was not an additional insured under the policy. The court held, however, that the district court made no ruling regarding attorney's fees and therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination of the barge owner's entitlement, if any, to attorney's fees.View "One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, seeking indemnity and/or contribution based on the damage defendant allegedly caused through gross negligence in removing plaintiff's vessel from a coral reef. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., where defendant alleged that the district court erred in refusing to apply English arbitrability law. The court held that based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, courts should apply non-federal arbitrability law only if there was clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to apply such non-federal law. Because there was no clear and unmistakable evidence in this case, federal arbitrability law applied. Under federal arbitrability law, the court's decisions in Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Construction Co. and Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services, Co., mandated a narrow interpretation of a clause providing for arbitration of all disputes "arising under" an agreement. Under this narrow interpretation, the present dispute was not arbitrable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 14706, which set up a framework for the timely filing of claims against carriers for damaged cargo. In this case, it was undisputed that neither the shipper nor the shipping broker filed either a claim or a lawsuit within the prescribed time limitations. Therefore, were the court to create some exception to the statutorily authorized, contractually mandated requirements of prompt filing, the court would blow a hole in the balance struck by the Carmack Amendment and undermine Congress's intent to protect carriers against stale claims. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the shipping broker and remanded with instructions to dismiss the lawsuit. View "Dominion Resources Serv. v. 5K Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V. View "Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant had the used boat inspected. Although he could not test the engine, a certified marine surveyor concluded that the boat was good for cruising around Puerto Rico and coastal waters. Plaintiff, a first-time boat owner, purchased the boat "as is" for $38,000. During the next few years there were a number of problems; all repairs were done by defendant. Plaintiff paid $16,139.34 for repairs, $3,195.20 for towage and $2,990.00 for wharfage and insurance. During a period of 32 months, the boat was undergoing service or was otherwise unuseable for about nine months. Plaintiff filed claims under admiralty law and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. The district court found that defendant breached its duty to a workmanlike performance upon which plaintiffs had a right to rely. The First Circuit reversed. Defendant was not liable; there was no evidence that its acts or omissions were the cause of the chronic problems. The court also vacated the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress and pain and suffering under state law. View "Fairest-Knight v. Marine World Distrib., Inc" on Justia Law

QT Trading, L.P. ("QT") sued defendants for rust damage to its steel pipes that allegedly occurred during their transport from Dalian, China to Houston, Texas. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to in personam defendants on QT's claims for damages under the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. 30701 note (Carriage of Goods by Sea), and for negligent bailment of its goods. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the district court properly dismissed QT's COGSA claims where QT failed to establish genuine issues of material fact where none of the defendants were "carriers" and thus could not be liable for damages under the statute. The court also held that the district court properly dismissed QT's bailment claims where QT failed to show that a certain defendant had exclusive possession of the cargo.