Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for failing to maintain an oil record book aboard a foreign-flagged merchant sea vessel, in violation of 33 U.S.C. 1908(a) and 33 C.F.R. 151.25. The district court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court reversed, concluding that the plain language of 33 C.F.R. 151.25 states that only the “master or other person having charge of the ship” has a duty to maintain the record book. The government concedes that defendant was not the “master or other person having charge” of the vessel at issue. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for entry of acquittal. View "United States v. Fafalios" on Justia Law

Muse, with others, boarded the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009, off the Somalian coast, taking its captain hostage. Muse initially stated that he was 16 at the time. Before a hearing to determine his age, Muse told an agent that he was 18. At the hearing, Muse refused to testify. A New York Magistrate concluded that Muse was at least 18 when the crime occurred. Prosecuted as an adult, Muse pleaded guilty to piracy, 18 U.S.C. 2280, and was sentenced to 405 months’ imprisonment. The plea agreement contains a promise “not to seek to withdraw his guilty plea or file a direct appeal or any kind of collateral attack" based on his age at the time of the crime or the time of the plea. Nonetheless, Muse filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing that a magistrate lacked authority to decide whether he was an adult and that his lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by not pursuing that question. Chief District Judge Preska denied that motion; the Second Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Turning to the Southern District of Indiana, where he is imprisoned, Muse unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Muse has not identified any inadequacy in section 2255. The reason he could not contest the magistrate’s decision has nothing to do with section 2255, but was the consequence of his waiver. View "Muse v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

While inspecting a commercial fishing vessel in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal agent found that the catch contained undersized red grouper, in violation of conservation regulations, and instructed the captain, Yates, to keep the undersized fish segregated from the rest of the catch until the ship returned to port. After the officer departed, Yates told the crew to throw the undersized fish overboard. Yates was convicted of destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation under 18 U. S. C. 519, which applies when a person “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation. Yates argued that section 1519 originated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to protect investors, and that its reference to “tangible object” includes objects used to store information, such as computer hard drives. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “tangible object” refers to one used to record or preserve information. Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73 and its title, “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,” signal that it was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical evidence. The words immediately surrounding “tangible object,” “falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document,” also indicate the contextual meaning of that term. Even if traditional tools of statutory construction leave any doubt about the meaning of the term, it would be appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and for possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. At issue was whether the admission of a certification of the Secretary of State to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for prosecution of drug trafficking on the high seas violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him at trial. The court concluded that the pretrial admission of the certification did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the certification proved jurisdiction, as a diplomatic courtesy to a foreign nation, and did not prove an element of a defendant's culpability. The court also concluded that the pretrial determination of jurisdiction did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment; the district court did not err when it determined it had jurisdiction based on the certification of the Secretary of State; the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq., is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Felonies Clause; and defendant's conviction did not violate his right to due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from the U.S. DEA, which learned from British Virgin Island law enforcement, which learned from Grenadian law enforcement, that the U.S.-registered vessel“Laurel” might be smuggling illegal narcotics. The Laurel, under the command Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the U.S. and Grenada, was intercepted in international waters. Coast Guard officers conducted a routine safety inspection, which the Laurel passed. They unsuccessfully attempted to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection; rough waters made areas of the vessel inaccessible. Officer Riemer questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their destination and purpose. Benoit gave inconsistent answers. Riemer conducted ION scan swipes; none came back positive for any explosive, contraband, or narcotics. The Laurel was directed to a U.S. port, where a canine boarded and alerted to narcotics. Still unable to access the entire vessel, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to St. Thomas to enable a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) search for anomalies in the vessel, which revealed anomalous masses. A Customs officer drilled a hole and found a substance that field-tested as cocaine. Officers cut a larger hole, revealing an area filled with brick-like packages. Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. After denial of two motions to suppress, Benoit and Williams were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and attempted importation of cocaine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Benoit" on Justia Law