Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

While inspecting a commercial fishing vessel in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal agent found that the catch contained undersized red grouper, in violation of conservation regulations, and instructed the captain, Yates, to keep the undersized fish segregated from the rest of the catch until the ship returned to port. After the officer departed, Yates told the crew to throw the undersized fish overboard. Yates was convicted of destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation under 18 U. S. C. 519, which applies when a person “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation. Yates argued that section 1519 originated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to protect investors, and that its reference to “tangible object” includes objects used to store information, such as computer hard drives. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “tangible object” refers to one used to record or preserve information. Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73 and its title, “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,” signal that it was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical evidence. The words immediately surrounding “tangible object,” “falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document,” also indicate the contextual meaning of that term. Even if traditional tools of statutory construction leave any doubt about the meaning of the term, it would be appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and for possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. At issue was whether the admission of a certification of the Secretary of State to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for prosecution of drug trafficking on the high seas violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him at trial. The court concluded that the pretrial admission of the certification did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the certification proved jurisdiction, as a diplomatic courtesy to a foreign nation, and did not prove an element of a defendant's culpability. The court also concluded that the pretrial determination of jurisdiction did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment; the district court did not err when it determined it had jurisdiction based on the certification of the Secretary of State; the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq., is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Felonies Clause; and defendant's conviction did not violate his right to due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from the U.S. DEA, which learned from British Virgin Island law enforcement, which learned from Grenadian law enforcement, that the U.S.-registered vessel“Laurel” might be smuggling illegal narcotics. The Laurel, under the command Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the U.S. and Grenada, was intercepted in international waters. Coast Guard officers conducted a routine safety inspection, which the Laurel passed. They unsuccessfully attempted to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection; rough waters made areas of the vessel inaccessible. Officer Riemer questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their destination and purpose. Benoit gave inconsistent answers. Riemer conducted ION scan swipes; none came back positive for any explosive, contraband, or narcotics. The Laurel was directed to a U.S. port, where a canine boarded and alerted to narcotics. Still unable to access the entire vessel, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to St. Thomas to enable a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) search for anomalies in the vessel, which revealed anomalous masses. A Customs officer drilled a hole and found a substance that field-tested as cocaine. Officers cut a larger hole, revealing an area filled with brick-like packages. Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. After denial of two motions to suppress, Benoit and Williams were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and attempted importation of cocaine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions stemming from his involvement in conducting the negotiations for the ransom of a ship seized by pirates and for his participation in the torture of the ship's crew as part of the process. The court affirmed defendant's piracy convictions in Counts 1 and 7, based on his intentionally facilitating two piracies on the high seas, even though his facilitating conduct took place in Somalia and its territorial waters; affirmed the district court's ruling denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of personal jurisdiction based on his being brought into the United States involuntarily; universal jurisdiction was irrelevant to the prosecution of Counts 2 through 6 and each of those counts was based on a statute that Congress validly applied to extraterritorial conduct, including defendant's conduct; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an FBI agent's testimony because they were admitted only as prior inconsistent statements. The court rejected defendant's Crawford v. Washington claim and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shibin" on Justia Law

Appellee, a Somali national, helped negotiate the ransom of a merchant vessel and its crew after they were captured by marauders in the Gulf of Aden. Appellee received a share of the ransom and also received a separate payment for his negotiation services. After appellee was appointed Director General of the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Somaliland, he was invited to attend an education conference in the United States. When appellee landed in the United States, he was promptly arrested. Appellee was indicted for conspiracy to commit piracy under the law of nations (Count One); committing piracy under the law of nations (Count Two); and conspiracy to commit hostage taking and aiding and abetting hostage taking (Counts Three and Four). On appeal, the government challenged the district court's dismissal of Counts One, Three, and Four, as well as limitation of Count Two. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count One; reversed the district court's narrowing of the scope of Count Two to acts appellee performed while on the high seas; and reversed the dismissal of Counts Three and Four. View "United States v. Ali" on Justia Law

A drug interdiction in Caribbean waters by the United States Coast Guard ended with the arrest and indictment of multiple defendants, including Appellant. The Coast Guard determined that the vessel was "without nationality" and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Appellant was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute more than 1140 pounds of cocaine and heroin while on board a vessel in violation of the MDLEA. On appeal, Appellant argued that Congress lacked the authority under the Piracies and Felonies Clause to criminalize drug trafficking on board a vessel in international waters under the MDLEA without requiring a nexus between the conduct and the United States. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that any jurisdictional error under the MDLEA related to Appellant's conviction did not constitute plain error in this case. View "United States v. Nueci-Pena" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for conspiracy to carry a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, in violation of 49 U.S.C. 46505(e), and for aiding and abetting the carrying of a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2 and 49 U.S.C. 46505(b)(1). At issue was whether 49 U.S.C. 46505 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, an airport employee, who sneaks a pocketknife past a security checkpoint and then gives it to a passenger who takes it aboard an airplane. The court concluded that 49 U.S.C. 46505 gave adequate notice to defendant that a pocketknife with a blade of slightly less than two-and-a-half inches was prohibited aboard an aircraft. Accordingly, the court held that the statute was not constitutionally vague as applied and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Nicole Walker and Bart Hyde pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Defendants appealed their respective sentences, arguing that the district court clearly erred in calculating the drug quantity attributable to each of them. Hyde also argued that the district court erred in imposing an obstruction of justice enhancement and failed to reduce Hyde's sentence for acceptance of responsibility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not rely on unreliable evidence or apply an overly broad definition of conspiracy; (2) the district court did not clearly err in determining Defendants distributed "ice" as defined in the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) the district court did not err in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement based on the court's determination that Defendant intentionally gave false testimony; and (4) the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law