Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, chief mate of the "Sealand Pride," filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that his employer, Maersk, negligently saddled him with excessive duties and duty time such that he was overworked to the point of fatigue. The court concluded that the Jones Act does not allow seaman to recover for injuries caused by work-related stress because work-related stress is not a physical peril. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied the motion of Maersk for a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Under Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, plaintiff's complaint of an injury induced by overwork was not cognizable under the Jones Act. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment awarding plaintiff damages. The court reversed the denial of the motion of Maersk for a judgment as a matter of law and rendered the judgment in favor of Maersk. View "Skye v. Maersk Line" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit alleging that EBI was negligent in the construction and/or maintenance of the LC-400 shipyard crane. A jury concluded that plaintiff was a Jones Act, 33 U.S.C. 902(3), seaman and that EBI's negligence caused his injury from the crane, awarding him past and future physical pain and suffering, past and future mental pain and suffering, and future lost wages. EBI appealed. The court concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act; because the district court's seaman status instruction was clear and consistent with the usual articulation, the court concluded that the district court did not err in its instruction on the issue of seaman status; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence; and because the court could not discern to what extent plaintiff's award for emotional suffering was based upon the non-compensable harm caused by a relative's death, his awards were tainted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court as it related to liability but vacated the judgment as it related to damages, remanding for further proceedings. View "Naquin, Sr. v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while working on the Motor Vessel Liberty Sun, filed suit against his employer and others asserting claims for damages under a negligence theory and an admiralty cause of action against the owners of "unseaworthy" vessels. The court declined to adopt the maritime rescue doctrine and held that the correct standard of care in maritime injury cases is that of a reasonable mariner under the circumstances. Since evidence supported the conclusion that abnormal forces were acting on the Liberty Sun at the time, she was not unseaworthy as a matter of law. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Barlow, Jr. v. Liberty Maritime, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard one of Carnival's ships, filed suit against Carnival in state court asserting claims of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Plaintiff alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (CREFAA), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. Plaintiff argued that his Jones Act claim did not fall within his employment contract ("Seafarer's Agreement") with Carnival and, therefore, was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. The court concluded that the order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims was "a final decision with respect to arbitration," and the court had appellate jurisdiction. The court also concluded that plaintiff's dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer's Agreement and was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Martinez v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an accident that occurred on the Mobile River. Groton Pacific Carriers, Inc., and International Tanker Management Holding LTD. ("ITM") appealed a judgment in favor of Carl Jackson, as personal representative of the estate of Carl L. Williams, deceased, and as next friend of Camren Lamarcus Williams, Jayden Eugene Williams, and Cartez Labruce Williams, minors; and Edward L. Purdue. Purdue and Williams were working for Mo-Bay Shipping Services, Inc. as line handlers. In 2008, they were dispatched by Mo-Bay to meet the ocean-going tanker MT Glenross. They were to use a Mo-Bay boat to transport the Glenross's steel mooring lines from where the Glenross was anchored to shore-side bollards located a few hundred yards away. The accident occurred while Purdue and Williams were handling one of the Glenross's mooring lines. As a result of either a mechanical problem with the ship's winch or improper operation of the winch by the Glenross's crew, the mooring line continued to be reeled in, and the boat Williams and Purdue were in, which was connected to the line, was pulled out of the water and up the side of the Glenross's hull. Williams and Purdue held onto the boat as it was lifted from the water. The boat, however, broke free from the line, fell into the river, and capsized. Williams and Purdue, who were not wearing life vests, fell into the water. Purdue was able to climb atop the capsized boat and was rescued. Williams, who could not swim, drowned. Count one of the complaint alleged that Purdue and Williams were "Jones Act seamen" and asserted a Jones Act claim against Mo-Bay. Count one additionally alleged general maritime-law claims of negligence and unseaworthiness against Groton Pacific, ITM, and Cypress. Count one also made an alternative claim that Purdue and Williams were longshoremen and/or harbor workers entitled to recover from Groton Pacific, ITM, and Cypress under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Count two of the complaint asserted claims under Alabama law, including a wrongful-death claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jackson and Purdue. The jury also found Purdue and Williams guilty of 25% comparative fault. On appeal, Groton Pacific and ITM argued that the trial court erred in ruling before trial that Williams and Purdue were harbor workers. Groton and ITM argue that that ruling led the trial court into a number of subsequent legal errors, including incorrectly charging the jury, particularly with respect to the type of damages available, and refusing to allow the jury to apportion any fault to Mo-Bay. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Williams and Purdue were harbor workers. The case therefore was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Groton Pacific Carriers, Inc. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

American, a corporation in the business of transporting petroleum products by water, filed suit against the City for common law negligence and for violation of 33 U.S.C. 494, which required that a drawbridge over navigable water be opened promptly by the persons owning or operating such bridge upon reasonable signal for the passage of boats and other water craft. Due to a mechanical malfunction, which American alleged was the result of negligence, the City did not open the Pelham Parkway Bridge, delaying American's tug and barge for approximately two and a half days. At issue was whether, under maritime law, an owner of a vessel could be awarded damages for economic loss due to negligence in the absence of physical damage to its property. Although the court concluded that Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint has been overread to establish a rule barring damages for economic loss in the absence of an owner's property damage, the court believed that the rule has been so consistently applied in admiralty that it should continue to be applied unless and until altered by Congress or the Supreme Court. View "American Petroleum and Transport v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed personal injury and wrongful death claims against the United States and Coast Guard under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA), 46 U.S.C. 30901-30918. Plaintiff and her husband fell overboard their boat and her husband subsequently died of drowning. The court concluded that the Coast Guard neither increased the danger facing plaintiff and her husband nor induced reliance on the part of either plaintiff, her husband, or a third party. Accordingly, plaintiff could not prove that the Coast Guard breached its duty to her or her deceased husband, and the district court properly entered summary judgment on plaintiff's tort claims. The court also found that the rulings on the issues of spoliation and the timeliness of the motion reflected proper exercises of the district court's discretion and the court affirmed as to these issues. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the Coast Guard's response to plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request satisfied its duty under that Act. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of an accident aboard Estis Rig 23, a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig. The principal issue was whether seamen could recover punitive damages for their employer's willful and wanton breach of the general maritime law duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Like maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness was established as a general maritime claim before the passage of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104; punitive damages were available under general maritime law; and the Jones Act did not address unseaworthiness or limit its remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that punitive damages remained available as a remedy for the general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. View "McBride, et al. v. Estis Well Service L. L. C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Association of Maryland Pilots as a launch boat operator. Plaintiff was later promoted to assistant station manager. In 2008, Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis. Plaintiff sued the Association pursuant to the Jones Act, alleging negligence in regard to injuries he suffered from exposure to free silica during his employment. Whether Plaintiff's claim was properly made under the Jones Act depended on whether Plaintiff was a "seaman" at the time of the alleged negligence. To distinguish seamen from land-based workers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a seaman must ordinarily have spent at least thirty percent of work time in service of a vessel in navigation. The lower courts concluded Plaintiff was not a seaman at the time of his injury and therefore granted summary judgment for the Association. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not spend at least thirty percent of his work time performing sea-based duties, and therefore, Plaintiff was not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. View "Dize v. Ass'n of Md. Pilots" on Justia Law

Railroad conductor Sean Janes was injured while railcars were being loaded onto a barge built to transport railcars and non-rail cargo at the same time. Janes and his family sued the barge owner, alleging that placing cargo across the tracks and failing to provide devices to stop moving railcars from hitting the non-rail cargo made the barge unseaworthy under federal maritime law. After a bench trial, the superior court found that the barge was reasonably fit for its intended purpose and that Janes had not proved that the barge was unseaworthy. On appeal, Janes argued the trial court erred by rejecting his unseaworthiness claim. Because the superior court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and because the court committed no legal error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC" on Justia Law