Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues.View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This suit arose out of a dispute between a ship repair contractor, barge owner, and insurance company over the terms of a ship repair service contract and a maritime insurance policy. The contractor appealed from the district court's ruling that that the contractor breached its contractual obligation to procure insurance coverage for the barge owner and that it was contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the barge owner against damages ensuing from a workplace injury that occurred while the barge was being repaired. The barge owner cross-appealed from the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to additional insured coverage under the contractor's insurance policy. The court affirmed the district court's holding that there was a written agreement between the contractor and the barge owner which obligated the contractor to defend, indemnify, and procure insurance for the barge owner. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the barge owner, which was not named in the policy, was not an additional insured under the policy. The court held, however, that the district court made no ruling regarding attorney's fees and therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination of the barge owner's entitlement, if any, to attorney's fees.View "One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, seeking indemnity and/or contribution based on the damage defendant allegedly caused through gross negligence in removing plaintiff's vessel from a coral reef. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., where defendant alleged that the district court erred in refusing to apply English arbitrability law. The court held that based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, courts should apply non-federal arbitrability law only if there was clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to apply such non-federal law. Because there was no clear and unmistakable evidence in this case, federal arbitrability law applied. Under federal arbitrability law, the court's decisions in Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Construction Co. and Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services, Co., mandated a narrow interpretation of a clause providing for arbitration of all disputes "arising under" an agreement. Under this narrow interpretation, the present dispute was not arbitrable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an engineer aboard defendant's dive vessel, challenged the denial of his claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., and general maritime law and of his costs. Defendant challenged the amount plaintiff was awarded for cure and his being awarded attorney's fees, including the amount. Based on the court's review of the record, the court held that the denial of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime law claims were not clearly erroneous. In regard to plaintiff's challenge of the district court's application of the collateral-source rule in determining the amount of cure awarded him, the court held that, regardless of what plaintiff's medical providers charged, those charges were satisfied by the much lower amount paid by his insurer. Consequently, the district court erred by awarding the higher, charged amount. The court also held that the district court clearly erred in finding defendant arbitrary and capricious in denying maintenance and cure to plaintiff. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 54(d) motion for costs. View "Manderson v. Chet Morrison Contr, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff's complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Exoneration and Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq. Plaintiff initiated this limitation proceeding following an accident that took place when defendant intended to go fishing as a passenger aboard plaintiff's fishing vessel, slipped and fell on a ramp leading from the marina to a floating dock that passengers were required to traverse in order to access the vessel. The court held that defendant's accident did not occur on or over navigable waters and so this action fell outside the traditional scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction. The court also held that the Limitation Act did not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for petitions that arose from incidents not occurring on or over navigable waters. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez" on Justia Law

The interlocutory appeals subject to the motion before the court arose from conjoined multi-party actions stemming from a maritime disaster during which the M/V Rickmers Genoa vessel collided with the M/V Sun Cross vessel in the Yellow Sea. On their motion to dismiss appeals from two interlocutory orders for summary judgment entered in their favor in the district court, or in the alternative, for consolidation of the appeals in the captioned actions involving claims arising out of the maritime casualty, the ESM party defendants contended that the appeals were premature and not authorized by the maritime interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), and that consolidation of the appeals was warranted by reason of equity and economy. The court held that, given that the district court had determined conclusively all of the claims against the ESM parties, and that decision was unaffected by any remaining claims, the court could exercise appellate jurisdiction over the present appeals under section 1292(a)(3). Delaying appeal merely because a "final judgment" as to all of the claims against all of the parties had not been issued would defeat the interlocutory nature of section 1292(a)(3) and effectively render the statute a nullity in the modern era of litigation in which admiralty suits frequently involved multiple parties and claims. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was denied. The court granted, however, the motion brought by ESM insofar as they sought consolidation because the appeals arose from the same conjoined multi-party litigation in the district court, and consolidation would be both efficient and equitable for the disposition of the appeals. Moreover, consolidation was unopposed. View "Chem One, Ltd. v. M/V Rickmers Genoa; Atlantic Coast Yacht Sales, Inc. v. ESM Group, Inc.; St. Paul Travelers v. M/V Rickmers Genoa" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V. View "Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd." on Justia Law

These cases stemmed from plaintiff's complaint that defendants conspired to induce plaintiff to purchase the "M/V Pacific" (vessel) - better known as the eponymous "Love Boat" from its television days of the 1970s and 1980s - by fraudulently misrepresenting the vessel's deterioration and defective condition. Plaintiffs brought claims for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; maritime torts of fraud in the inducement, recklessness, and negligence/negligent misrepresentation; and common law claims. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court vacated the district court's order dismissing the complaint and remanded for further proceedings where the court could not conclude at that stage in the proceedings that the alleged transfer of title to the shares in the United States was beyond section 10(b)'s territorial reach in light of Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. Accordingly, the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's claim on that basis. View "Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt v. Agencia De Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, et al." on Justia Law

Resolute Industries, Inc. ("Resolute"), appealed an adverse summary judgment on its products liability claims against Webasto Products NA, Inc. ("Webasto"), the manufacturer of a heater that caught fire on Curtis Oswalt's boat during repairs performed by Resolute's employee. Resolute also challenged a judgment in Oswalt's favor on his claim against Resolute for breach of the implied warranty of workmanlife performance. At issue was whether the district court correctly rejected Resolute's products liability claims, correctly found Resolute liable to Oswalt, and properly awarded Oswalt and his insurer damages for surveyor's fees and for the loss of use of the boat during repairs. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Webasto on Resolute's inadequate warnings claim, but erroneously granted summary judgment on the design defect claim. The court further held that the court properly held Resolute liable on Oswalt's implied warranty claim and properly awarded damages for loss of use and surveyor's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings on Resolute's design defect claim. View "Oswalt, et al. v. Resolute Industries Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Ecuadorian members of a fishing boat, sued the United States for damages that resulted from the United States Coast Guard's ("Coast Guard") stop of plaintiffs' boat in international waters near the Galapagos Islands under suspicion of plaintiffs' involvement with smuggling drugs. The Coast Guard performed tests on plaintiffs' boat that yielded inconclusive results and the Ecuadorian government conducted further tests which resulted in no contraband and no charges filed against plaintiffs. At issue was whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity under numerous sources. The court held that non-congressional sources were not acts of Congress and did not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Military Claims Act, Alien Tort Statute, and a bilateral treaty concerning the Air Force base at Manta, Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity. The court further held that the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act provided waivers of sovereign immunity. The court finally held that if a suit falls within the scope of the PVA, 46 U.S.C. 31102, plaintiffs must meet the reciprocity requirement of the PVA regardless of the type of claim they assert. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to give the parties and the district court additional opportunity to determine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian Law.