Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of the sinking of a vessel owned by Hornbeck while at R&R's shipyard for repairs. R&R's liability insurer, National, filed suit to disclaim liability under its policy. Hornbeck counterclaimed. The district court found that R&R was negligent and that National was liable for the ensuing damages. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that R&R was negligent under bailment law where the vessel was delivered to R&R afloat, R&R had full custody of the vessel, and the vessel sank while under R&R's care; even if the salvage company had been negligent, R&R would remain fully liable because this negligence was a foreseeable consequence of R&R's own negligence; under Rule 13(a), Hornbeck had standing to bring its counterclaim and the district court properly ruled on that claim after deciding R&R's liability; and the district court erred in the amount of damages it awarded and in applying an 18% interest rate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the entry of judgment and the appropriate assessment of interest on that judgment. View "National Liability & Fire Ins. Co. v. R & R Marine, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Club is a non-profit provider of protection and indemnity insurance. The Club's Rules include a choice-of-law provision selecting New York law and a two-year statute of limitations for claims against the Club. The Club filed a civil action against defendant alleging that it breached the insurance contract by failing to reimburse the Club for a shortfall and by failing to pay the overdue insurance premiums. The court agreed with the district court, and precedent, that an otherwise valid choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract is enforceable and may require application of a jurisdiction's statute of limitations, in lieu of the doctrine of laches, to govern issues regarding the timeliness of claims asserted under that agreement. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied New York's six-year statute of limitations to the Club's claims arising under its maritime insurance contract with plaintiff. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Steamship Owners v. Dann Ocean Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while employed by GC, filed suit against GC alleging that he was working as a seamen at the time of his accident and sought damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, for GC's negligence. Travelers, which provided coverage to GC at the time of plaintiff's accident, moved to intervene. In this appeal, the court held that an insurer who makes voluntary Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, payments to an injured employee on behalf of the employer acquires a subrogation lien on any recovery by the employee in a Jones Act suit against the employer based on the injuries for which the insurer has already compensated him. Therefore, Travelers was entitled to the disputed funds in the district court's registry, and Travelers could intervene for the purpose of collecting these funds. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to intervene filed by Travelers and remanded with instructions. View "Chenevert v. Travelers Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an allision between a vessel owned by Settoon and an oil well. On appeal, Settoon challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the umbrella insurers. The court concluded that the umbrella insurers were not liable for damages resulting from the allision because Settoon failed to provide them notice within 30 days; SNIC was liable to Settoon because delayed delivery prevented SNIC from relying on the exclusions in the policy and the conditions precedent of the exceptions to the exclusions; and prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date Settoon paid for the allision. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest and affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "In Re: Settoon Towing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

This dispute concerned the MSA's indemnification provision and the insurance agreements supporting M-I's indemnification obligations. At issue was whether, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a), Louisiana law governed the indemnity provisions. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, finding that the OCSLA applied to the parties' contractual dispute, and thus, pursuant to the OCSLA choice of law provision, Louisiana law applied, under which the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. 9:2780(B), invalidated the indemnity provisions. View "Ace American Ins. Co. v. M-I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2008, MDS purchased a vessel and executed a note in favor of FirstBank, secured by a preferred ship mortgage, under an agreement that required that they maintain insurance. In 2009, Customs and Border Protection seized the vessel as part of a drug enforcement action. The search and seizure damaged the vessel, significantly decreasing its value. Customs notified FirstBank, which initiated an administrative forfeiture proceeding, intervened in the criminal case, obtained voluntary dismissal of the indictment against the vessel, then submitted an insurance claim for "loss of the vessel including, without limitation, the value of the Bank's collateral, legal fees incurred in attempting to secure its release, as well as any applicable costs and interests." The insurer denied the claim. The district court granted FirstBank partial summary judgment and awarded $74,512.50 in attorneys' fees for costs and expenses incurred in securing release of the vessel and defending the validity of the policy. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no genuine issues of material fact.View "Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Santiago" on Justia Law

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order.View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues.View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This suit arose out of a dispute between a ship repair contractor, barge owner, and insurance company over the terms of a ship repair service contract and a maritime insurance policy. The contractor appealed from the district court's ruling that that the contractor breached its contractual obligation to procure insurance coverage for the barge owner and that it was contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the barge owner against damages ensuing from a workplace injury that occurred while the barge was being repaired. The barge owner cross-appealed from the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to additional insured coverage under the contractor's insurance policy. The court affirmed the district court's holding that there was a written agreement between the contractor and the barge owner which obligated the contractor to defend, indemnify, and procure insurance for the barge owner. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the barge owner, which was not named in the policy, was not an additional insured under the policy. The court held, however, that the district court made no ruling regarding attorney's fees and therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination of the barge owner's entitlement, if any, to attorney's fees.View "One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Federal Insurance Company (FIC) sued for damage to property destroyed during the inland leg of international intermodal carriage where FIC was the subrogee of the shipper which contracted with an ocean carrier, APL Co. Ptc. Ltd. (APL), to ship goods from Singapore to Alabama. The district court ruled that a covenant not to sue in the through bill of lading required FIC to sue the carrier, APL, rather than the subcontractor. At issue was what legal regime applied to the shipment's inland leg under the through bill of lading and whether the applicable legal regime prohibited the covenant not to sue. The court held that the district court did not err by enforcing the covenant not to sue and granting summary judgment to the subcontractor where the requirements that FIC sue APL directly was valid under the Hague Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law