Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Scott Walter Maziar sustained injuries while on board a ferry operated by the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC). Maziar used the ferry to get to and from work. Since Maziar was injured at sea, he brought a general maritime negligence claim against the DOC. He initially requested a jury trial, but he moved to strike his demand because he thought that no jury trial right existed for general maritime negligence cases. The DOC objected, but the trial court agreed with Maziar, struck his jury request, and awarded him damages after a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the jury trial issue but on different grounds, holding that although a jury trial right generally applied to general maritime negligence actions in state court. The State did not have a constitutional or statutory jury trial right in tort actions. The issue this case presented on appeal was whether the State had a jury trial right in tort actions. The Court held that it does: several statutes read together demonstrate that the legislature meant to treat the State as if it were a private party with regard to matters of civil procedure and confer on any party (including the State) the right to have a jury determine most matters of fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a jury trial. View "Maziar v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Hicks was a deckhand on a tugboat when, while handling heavy gear, he injured his shoulder. A company doctor determined that Hicks was not fit for duty. His employer acknowledged its obligation to pay maintenance and cure and medical expenses until full recovery, maximum improvement, or until his condition was declared permanent, 46 U.S.C. 30104 (Jones Act). Hicks had surgery and physical therapy. His employer hired an investigator to videotape Hicks surreptitiously. The video showed Hicks planting a small tree and playing with his grandson. When Hicks’s doctor requested funding for an MRI scan, he was shown this footage and told that Hicks’s job required only light lifting. The doctor determined that Hicks was fit for duty. The employer terminated payments. Hicks consulted a second doctor, who diagnosed a recurrent rotator cuff tear and recommended another surgery plus rehabilitation. Under financial pressure, Hicks returned to work and missed physical therapy. His house went into foreclosure, and he was unable to pay for health insurance. Hicks sued, claiming negligence under the Jones Act and the maritime doctrines of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The jury awarded $190,000 for past and future maintenance and cure and $132,000 for pain and suffering. Based on a finding that the failure to pay was unreasonable and willful, Hicks was awarded $123,000 in punitive damages and $112,083.77 in attorney’s fees. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Hicks v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the captain of a crew boat, filed suit against his employer and his supervisor under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 50101, and general maritime law, seeking maintenance and cure and damages. All parties cross-appealed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff merely strained his back while lifting a hatch cover is not clearly erroneous; the district court's findings regarding the weather and condition of the seas at the time and location of the incident are not clearly erroneous; the district court properly ruled against plaintiff on all of his unseaworthiness claims; the district court's finding that defendants were not negligent is fully supported by the record; the court vacated the maintenance and cure award against the supervisor where the maintenance and cure duty extends only to the seaman's employer; and the McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. rule precludes plaintiff from obtaining maintenance and cure from his employer in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment to the extent the district court rejected plaintiff's Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims; vacated the awards against the employer and supervisor in their entirety; and rendered judgment in favor of the employer and supervisor. View "Meche v. Key Energy Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs, former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), as seamen. Blessey filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. required it to hold that loading and unloading duties performed by vessel-based tankermen were nonseaman duties as a matter of law; instead, the court's review of the relevant law and undisputed facts lead it to conclude that loading and unloading was seaman work when done by these vessel-based plaintiffs; and, consequently, the district court erred when it denied Blessey's motion for summary judgment on this issue. In this case, the tankermen performed duties crucial to the mission and purpose for the unit tow and were at all times engaged in work regarding the safe and efficient operation of a "vessel as a means of transportation" under 29 C.F.R. 783.31. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Coffin, et al. v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under general maritime law against their maritime employment agencies, asserting a claim for wages. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims and plaintiffs appealed. After reviewing the record, reading the parties' briefs, and hearing oral argument, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court for the reasons set out in its two well-reasoned and well-written orders, which were filed on November 4, 2013, and November 7, 2013. The court adopted these orders as the court's opinion with the same effect as if the court had written it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jurich, et al. v. Compass Marine, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a seaman, was diagnosed with aplastic anemia, a blood condition that preventing him from continuing to work. Appellant brought a personal injury action against his employer, alleging negligence under the Jones Act and maritime claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, Appellant challenged only the dismissal of his cause of action for maintenance and cure, arguing that he was entitled to that remedy until he “reaches maximum medical recovery.” The First Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling, holding that Appellant adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that his aplastic anemia arose or became aggravated during his service on the ship and, hence, triggered the duty of maintenance and cure. Remanded. View "Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, chief mate of the "Sealand Pride," filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that his employer, Maersk, negligently saddled him with excessive duties and duty time such that he was overworked to the point of fatigue. The court concluded that the Jones Act does not allow seaman to recover for injuries caused by work-related stress because work-related stress is not a physical peril. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied the motion of Maersk for a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Under Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, plaintiff's complaint of an injury induced by overwork was not cognizable under the Jones Act. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment awarding plaintiff damages. The court reversed the denial of the motion of Maersk for a judgment as a matter of law and rendered the judgment in favor of Maersk. View "Skye v. Maersk Line" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard one of Carnival's ships, filed suit against Carnival in state court asserting claims of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Plaintiff alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (CREFAA), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. Plaintiff argued that his Jones Act claim did not fall within his employment contract ("Seafarer's Agreement") with Carnival and, therefore, was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. The court concluded that the order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims was "a final decision with respect to arbitration," and the court had appellate jurisdiction. The court also concluded that plaintiff's dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer's Agreement and was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Martinez v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an accident that occurred on the Mobile River. Groton Pacific Carriers, Inc., and International Tanker Management Holding LTD. ("ITM") appealed a judgment in favor of Carl Jackson, as personal representative of the estate of Carl L. Williams, deceased, and as next friend of Camren Lamarcus Williams, Jayden Eugene Williams, and Cartez Labruce Williams, minors; and Edward L. Purdue. Purdue and Williams were working for Mo-Bay Shipping Services, Inc. as line handlers. In 2008, they were dispatched by Mo-Bay to meet the ocean-going tanker MT Glenross. They were to use a Mo-Bay boat to transport the Glenross's steel mooring lines from where the Glenross was anchored to shore-side bollards located a few hundred yards away. The accident occurred while Purdue and Williams were handling one of the Glenross's mooring lines. As a result of either a mechanical problem with the ship's winch or improper operation of the winch by the Glenross's crew, the mooring line continued to be reeled in, and the boat Williams and Purdue were in, which was connected to the line, was pulled out of the water and up the side of the Glenross's hull. Williams and Purdue held onto the boat as it was lifted from the water. The boat, however, broke free from the line, fell into the river, and capsized. Williams and Purdue, who were not wearing life vests, fell into the water. Purdue was able to climb atop the capsized boat and was rescued. Williams, who could not swim, drowned. Count one of the complaint alleged that Purdue and Williams were "Jones Act seamen" and asserted a Jones Act claim against Mo-Bay. Count one additionally alleged general maritime-law claims of negligence and unseaworthiness against Groton Pacific, ITM, and Cypress. Count one also made an alternative claim that Purdue and Williams were longshoremen and/or harbor workers entitled to recover from Groton Pacific, ITM, and Cypress under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Count two of the complaint asserted claims under Alabama law, including a wrongful-death claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jackson and Purdue. The jury also found Purdue and Williams guilty of 25% comparative fault. On appeal, Groton Pacific and ITM argued that the trial court erred in ruling before trial that Williams and Purdue were harbor workers. Groton and ITM argue that that ruling led the trial court into a number of subsequent legal errors, including incorrectly charging the jury, particularly with respect to the type of damages available, and refusing to allow the jury to apportion any fault to Mo-Bay. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Williams and Purdue were harbor workers. The case therefore was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Groton Pacific Carriers, Inc. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of an accident aboard Estis Rig 23, a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig. The principal issue was whether seamen could recover punitive damages for their employer's willful and wanton breach of the general maritime law duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Like maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness was established as a general maritime claim before the passage of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104; punitive damages were available under general maritime law; and the Jones Act did not address unseaworthiness or limit its remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that punitive damages remained available as a remedy for the general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. View "McBride, et al. v. Estis Well Service L. L. C." on Justia Law