Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Talos ERT, L.L.C. (Talos) hired DLS, L.L.C. (DLS) to remove corroded piping from an oil-and-gas platform off the Louisiana coast. During the project, a 129-pound pipe fell and struck Walter Jackson, a DLS employee, resulting in his death. Jackson’s widow, Vantrece Jackson, and his son, Y.J., represented by his mother, Anika Warner, sued Talos for wrongful death. The suits were consolidated, and the case proceeded to trial.The jury found Talos 88% at fault for Jackson’s death and awarded significant damages to both plaintiffs. Y.J. was awarded $120,000 in special damages and $20,000,000 in general damages. Mrs. Jackson was awarded $987,930 in special damages and $6,600,000 in general damages. Talos filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and alternatively moved for a new trial or remittitur. The district court denied the JMOL and new trial motions but granted a partial remittitur, reducing Y.J.’s general damages to $4,360,708.59 and Mrs. Jackson’s to $5,104,226.22. Plaintiffs declined a new trial on damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Talos’s renewed JMOL motion, finding sufficient evidence to support both theories of liability: vicarious liability and independent negligence. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial on liability, noting the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence.Regarding damages, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the maximum recovery rule for Y.J.’s award, using a factually similar case, Rachal v. Brouillette. However, the court vacated Mrs. Jackson’s general damages award and remanded for redetermination of remittitur, as the district court’s comparison case, Zimko v. American Cyanamid, was not factually similar. The court found no plain error in the alleged prejudicial statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during the trial. View "Warner v. Talos ERT" on Justia Law

Adam P. Harrington was injured on February 15, 2018, while using a swing rope to transfer from an offshore gas platform to a transport vessel. Harrington, employed by Skelton's Fire Equipment, Inc., was inspecting fire-suppression equipment on Exxon's platform. Due to rough seas, Harrington mistimed his swing and fractured his leg. His medical expenses were covered by Skelton's workers' compensation insurer.Harrington sued Exxon for maritime negligence and wantonness in the Mobile Circuit Court. Before trial, the court granted Harrington's motion to exclude evidence of his medical expenses being paid by the workers' compensation insurer. The jury found Exxon liable for $1,500,000 in damages, reduced by 10% for Harrington's fault, resulting in a $1,350,000 judgment. Exxon's postjudgment motion for a new trial, arguing the exclusion of evidence was erroneous, was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Exxon argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the workers' compensation payments, citing Alabama Code § 12-21-45. However, the court held that substantive maritime law, which includes the collateral-source rule, applied. This rule prevents the reduction of damages by amounts received from third parties, such as insurance. The court found that applying § 12-21-45 would conflict with maritime law.Exxon also claimed that Harrington's expert witness opened the door to admitting evidence of the workers' compensation payments. The court disagreed, stating that the expert's testimony did not justify introducing such evidence under the doctrine of curative admissibility.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Harrington and dismissed Harrington's conditional cross-appeal as moot. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action brought by Earlene McBride against Carnival Corporation. McBride fell out of her wheelchair while being assisted by a Carnival crewmember, Fritz Charles, during disembarkation from a Carnival cruise ship. McBride claimed that she suffered severe injuries due to the fall and sued Carnival for negligence.The case was initially heard in the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court allowed the deposition testimony of Charles to be presented to the jury over McBride's objection. The jury awarded McBride economic damages for past medical expenses related to the fall but did not award her any damages for past pain and suffering. McBride appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in allowing Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury and that the jury's verdict was inadequate because it did not award her past pain and suffering damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury. The court found that McBride had waived her objection to the use of the deposition by not raising it at the appropriate time during the trial. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of McBride's motion for a new trial on the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. The court found that the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of law because there was uncontradicted evidence that McBride suffered at least some pain in the immediate aftermath of the wheelchair incident. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. View "McBride v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

In a personal injury lawsuit, Carelyn Fylling sued Royal Caribbean Cruises for negligence after she tripped, fell, and hit her head while entering a deck on one of their cruise ships. The case was tried before a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court became aware that one of the jurors had a niece who worked for Royal Caribbean. Despite this potential conflict of interest, the court did not remove or question this juror about any potential bias, and allowed her to participate in deliberations. The jury found Royal Caribbean negligent, but also found Fylling comparative-negligent, reducing her recovery by ninety percent. Fylling appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion by not investigating the potential bias of the juror related to an employee of the defendant.The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Fylling. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not investigating whether the juror could impartially discharge her responsibilities once it became aware of her potential bias. The court explained that when a district court becomes aware of potential juror bias, it is required to develop the factual circumstances sufficiently to make an informed judgment as to whether bias exists. A district court's obligation to protect the right to an impartial jury does not end when the jury is impaneled and sworn. The Eleventh Circuit therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Fylling v. Royal Carribean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellant worked as a barge cleaner for T.T. Barge Services, which provides barge cleaning services to Ingram Barge Company. Appellant asserted negligence claims against Ingram after Appellant was injured by caustic soda that he was cleaning up on Ingram Barge 976, which was moored to one of T.T.’s work barges at the time of his injury. After Ingram filed a district court complaint to limit liability, Appellant counterclaimed and asserted claims of negligence against Ingram. T.T. also filed a claim for contribution and indemnity against Ingram. The district court granted summary judgment (1) as to Appellant’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act and (2) as to all of Appellant’s negligence claims against Ingram. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellant challenged the district court’s orders.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is semi-permanently and indefinitely attached to land by steel cables, except for rare moves during repairs or to accommodate nearby dredging operations. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge lacked vessel status at summary judgment.   Further, the court explained that to qualify as a Jones Act seaman, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. First, an employee’s duties must ‘contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Second, that employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. Here, Ratcliff lacks a substantial connection to Ingram’s barges. View "Ingram Barge v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while stepping from a dock to a boat. He sued his employer—a yacht club in Long Beach—under federal admiralty law. The trial court sustained the club’s final demurrer to the second amended complaint. The court ruled there was no admiralty jurisdiction.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s ruling without deciding about admiralty jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress in 1984 specified employees covered by state workers’ compensation law working at a “club” are covered by state workers’ compensation law and not federal law if they are eligible for state workers’ compensation. The court wrote that Plaintiff concedes the yacht club is a “club.” Federal law thus makes California state workers’ compensation law paramount, which means Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. The court wrote that a core part of the state workers’ compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are barred from suing their employers in tort. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s tort suit against his employer. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a three-count maritime negligence action against Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”) after she fell aboard one of its cruise ships. She alleged that during the ship’s muster drill, a Royal Caribbean employee rushed her down a set of stairs—causing her to fall and severely injure her neck. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Royal Caribbean. First, on Count I (general negligence) and Count II (negligent failure to warn), the district court found that Plaintiff failed to show that Royal Caribbean had notice of the dangerous conditions that allegedly caused her fall. Second, on Count III (general negligence against Royal Caribbean for its employee’s conduct under a theory of vicarious liability), the district court determined that Plaintiff put forth insufficient evidence of medical causation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that looking to Florida negligence law: non-readily observable injuries require expert medical evidence to prove causation. The court concluded that Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient medical evidence to satisfy proximate cause. And because proximate cause must be satisfied for each of Plaintiff’s three negligence-based claims to prevail, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Royal Caribbean. View "Judith Willis v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a longshoreman as early as 1998 and worked regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22, 2018, never going more than a week and a half without working. He performed various jobs including operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading barges. Employer classified Plaintiff as a non-assigned employee, meaning he was not assigned to a specific vessel. Employer has other employees who are assigned to vessels.Plaintiff was hurt when he fell to the deck of a ship he was working on. He filed suit against Employer in federal district court in November 2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleged that if he was not a seaman and was covered by the LHWCA.The District Court found Plaintiff failed to cite evidence that showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and, alternatively, as to vessel negligence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not have a connection to the ship he was working on at the time he was injured, and that he could not establish vessel negligence. View "Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring" on Justia Law

Crounse delivered barges to Mulzer, which cleaned the barges, loaded them with Mulzer’s crushed stone, delivered the stone, cleaned the barges again, and released the barges to Crounse. Crounse’s barges were used by other companies to haul other materials. Barges carrying coal sometimes returned with as much as a foot of coal remaining in the hopper. Mulzer would clear the coal and sell it for a profit. Mulzer's employee, Smith, was operating a skid steer with a “blade” positioned at its lowest height to push coal to the front of the hopper for removal with a broom. The blade hit a "scab." Smith was propelled forward. Smith’s seatbelt failed; he was injured when he hit a safety bar. The hopper floor scab resulted from a split seam, 12-14 inches long, and a few inches tall. The barge was 24 years old. Crounse had procedures for regularly inspecting and repairing its barge, including the hopper. Crounse had received no reports of damage to the barge; 23 days before Smith’s accident, the barge had been cleaned by a blade without incident.Smith sued Crounse under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901, and general maritime law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Crounse. Smith lacked evidence that Crounse’s inspection and repair procedures were inadequate; that Crounse had actual knowledge or should have known of the defect in the exercise of ordinary care; and did not demonstrate that Crounse failed to comply with its turnover duties. View "Smith v. Crounse Corp." on Justia Law