Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, a 13,000-volt electric cable owned by Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. (BG&E) was damaged at the bottom of Eli Cove in Pasadena, Maryland. BG&E alleged that the cable was struck by a barge owned by Coastline Commercial Contracting while performing work for a couple who owned property on the cove. BG&E sued Coastline and the property owners for negligence, invoking federal admiralty jurisdiction over the claim against Coastline and supplemental jurisdiction over the claim against the property owners. The central issue was whether a U.S. court has admiralty jurisdiction to determine the existence and extent of Coastline’s tort liability.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the case, ruling that it did not have admiralty jurisdiction. The court found that Eli Cove was not part of the navigable waters because it could not accommodate commercial navigation and was not susceptible of being used as a highway for commerce. The court also found that the incident did not bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity because Coastline’s barge was present on Eli Cove solely to extend an existing pier at a private residence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the case falls within federal admiralty jurisdiction. The court found that the district court applied the incorrect standard when determining whether Eli Cove was navigable and whether the incident bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. The court held that the incident had a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce and that the activity giving rise to the incident bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Baltimore Gas and Electric Company v. Coastline Commercial Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned whether an international trader of bunker fuel was entitled to a maritime lien on a vessel under the Commercial Instrument and Maritime Lien Act (CIMLA). The M/V LILA SHANGHAI (the Vessel) was a gross tonnage bulk carrier owned by Autumn Harvest Maritime Co. Autumn Harvest time-chartered the Vessel to Bostomar Bulk Shipping Pte Ltd. (Bostomar). The contract foreclosed charterers from unilaterally placing liens on the Vessel; in the event of "any dispute" between Autumn Harvest and Bostomar about the Vessel and their respective obligations, the parties would refer the matter to arbitration. Bostomar sub-chartered the Vessel to Medmar Inc. (Medmar). While sailing to India, the Vessel needed bunkers to complete its journey. Costas Mylonakis, an employee of Windrose Marine, contacted Appellant Sing Fuels Pte. Ltd. (Sing Fuels) to order the Vessel’s bunkers. Sing Fuels transmitted its bunker contract only to Mylonakis’s e-mail address affiliated with Windrose Marine. Mylonakis never returned any memorialized document from Medmar. Sing Fuels exclusively communicated with Mylonakis for this transaction, considered Mylonakis to be Medmar’s fuel broker, and never spoke directly with Medmar. Mylonakis also never communicated with Medmar, he conferred instead with a mysterious entity called M.A.C. Shipping. Medmar returned the Vessel to Bostomar in August 2019, with Sing Fuels still awaiting payment for July bunkers. By October 2019, payment for the July bunkers was still outstanding, so Sing Fuels sent Autumn Harvest a notice of nonpayment; Autumn Harvest refused to pay. In the wake of collapsed negotiations, Sing Fuels paid the physical supplier of the July bunkers. Without knowing where to turn after Medmar’s payment default on the bunkers, and its discussions with Autumn Harvest exhausted, Sing Fuels waited until the Vessel docked in the United States and then availed itself of US courts to recoup payment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the bunker trader failed to show that it procured the vessel’s fuel “on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner,” under CIMLA, therefore, it affirmed the district court’s judgment denying the maritime lien. View "Sing Fuels Pte Ltd. v. M/V LILA SHANGHAI" on Justia Law

Nadella Corporation bought a ship, the MV Falcon Carrier, for scrap from Falcon Carrier Shipping Limited. Unbeknownst to Nadella, the ship was encumbered by a $368,000 debt. To recover that debt, the debt holder “arrested” Nadella’s new ship. Nadella then tried to recover that debt from the ship’s seller Falcon Carrier Shipping. Newbrook Shipping—the owner of those two ships arrested by Nadella—sued Nadella in South Africa and was considering another lawsuit in Nevis. Newbrook applied in Maryland federal court for an ex parte order under Sec. 1782 authorizing discovery from Nadella’s purported parent company, Global Marketing Systems. The district court rejected discovery for the speculative “proceeding” in Nevis but then granted the full application.On appeal, Global Marketing argues that the district court substantively erred in granting the entire application and approving service of process. The court stated that Sec. 1782 identifies four mandatory conditions that must be satisfied before an application can be granted. Here, the last condition, that the evidence sought must be “for use” in a foreign proceeding, is not fully satisfied.The court held that Section 1782 gives litigants access to federal courts to obtain discovery for use in international litigation. But that access is not unlimited. The district court erred by granting the full application when it held the speculative proceeding in Nevis did not provide a basis for Sec. 1782 discovery. The court remanded for the district court to consider Global Marketing’s arguments. View "In re: Application of Newbrook" on Justia Law

Addax filed an in rem action against the vessel to enforce a maritime lien under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act (CIMLA) and Supplemental Admiralty Rule C. The vessel asserted that Addax's right to a maritime lien was extinguished when Addax settled its breach of contract claim with the charterer in a separate proceeding.The Court of Appeal first concluded that the district court correctly rejected the vessel's affirmative defense that Addax was not the party legally entitled to bring this claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Addax, concluding that the settlement agreement did not extinguish Addax's right to a maritime lien, and that Addax was entitled to enforce that right in the district court. The court explained that the settlement agreement does not reference the maritime lien, and includes no language limiting the obligations of the vessel or Addax's ability to pursue an in rem action to satisfy the debt. The court also rejected the vessel's arguments regarding the value of the lien, the expenses awarded to Addax, and the vessel's due process rights. View "Addax Energy SA v. M/V Yasa H. Mulla" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Oceanic and Oceanfleet's conviction and sentence for nine criminal offenses committed by the supervisory personnel of an oceangoing cargo ship owned and operated by defendants. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove corporate criminal liability where the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt — with respect to any of the offenses in the Indictment — that any cargo ship crewmember was acting pursuant to corporate authority or with an intent to benefit Oceanic or Oceanfleet. The court rejected defendants' arguments that the sentencing court erred by grouping the various offenses; by failing to consider their independent financial conditions and separate abilities to pay the fines imposed; by imposing erroneously disparate fines on Oceanfleet compared to fines on similarly situated defendants; and by imposing a special condition of probation that improperly impacted related third parties. View "United States v. Oceanic Illsabe Limited" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wauquiez Boats, alleging claims for breach of maritime contract and for products liability under the general maritime law. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for failing adequately to demonstrate admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. However, plaintiff had filed an amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 roughly an hour before the district court filed its order dismissing the case. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, because the amended complaint remained the operative complaint in the district court and was unaddressed by Wauquiez Boats or the court, the district court's order dismissing the original complaint and denying sanctions was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Accordingly, the court dismissed plaintiff's appeal and Wauquiez Boats' cross-appeal requesting sanctions, for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Fawzy v. Wauquiez Boats SNC" on Justia Law