Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

A maintenance diver, Eduardo Loaiza, suffered severe injuries while servicing the sailboat Allora in Marina Del Rey, California. Loaiza was injured when the propeller was activated, causing significant harm to his hands. The shipowners, Live Life Bella Vita LLC, Gary Dordick, and Nava Dordick, sought to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act by filing an action in the Central District of California. The district court enjoined all related suits, including those in state courts.Loaiza filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court and counterclaims in the federal limitation proceeding. He also filed a third-party complaint against several entities, including S and K Dive Service, Inc. The district court granted Loaiza's motion to stay the limitation proceeding, allowing him to pursue his claims in state court under the "single claimant" exception, despite the Vessel Owners' argument that multiple claims were likely. Subsequently, S and K Dive filed counterclaims in federal court for indemnity, contribution, and attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that parties seeking indemnity or contribution are separate claimants under the Limitation Act, creating a multiple claimant situation. The court also held that claims for attorney’s fees constitute separate claims. The court vacated the district court’s dissolution of the injunction, reinstating the injunction against all related suits. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to resume the limitation proceeding and review all claims and stipulations to ensure the shipowners' right to limit liability is protected. View "LIVE LIFE BELLA VITA, LLC V. CRUISING YACHTS, INC." on Justia Law

Catherine Berry sued her employer, Air Force Central Welfare Fund, and its insurer, Air Force Insurance Fund, to enforce administrative default orders for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. After Berry filed her lawsuit, the defendants voluntarily paid her the full amount owed, including penalties and interest. Berry then sought attorneys’ fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), arguing that her case was not moot due to her pending fee request.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Berry’s motion for attorneys’ fees and dismissed her complaint as moot. The court held that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim under § 928(a) because the defendants’ voluntary payment mooted the case, and Berry obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Berry appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Berry’s claim was moot because she received the full amount owed and sought no other compensation. The court also rejected Berry’s argument that her lawsuit was the catalyst for the defendants’ payment, stating that the catalyst theory is unavailable under § 928(a). The court concluded that Berry did not “successfully prosecute” her claim in the district court, as she obtained no judicially sanctioned relief. Therefore, Berry was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 928(a). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case as moot. View "BERRY V. AIR FORCE CENTRAL WELFARE FUND" on Justia Law

In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence. View "USA V. CHICHANDE" on Justia Law

The case involves the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (Soundkeeper), an environmental organization, and the Port of Tacoma and SSA Terminals, LLC (collectively, the Port), operators of the West Sitcum Terminal, a marine cargo terminal. The dispute centers on a portion of the terminal known as "the Wharf," where stormwater runoff carries pollutants into Puget Sound. The Soundkeeper alleges that the Port violated the Clean Water Act by not implementing stormwater controls across the entire facility, including the Wharf. The Port argues that the Wharf is not subject to regulation because it does not conduct industrial activities that require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Port. The court concluded that the Industrial Stormwater General Permits (ISGPs) issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology did not extend coverage to the Wharf, as the Wharf did not conduct the industrial activities specified in the permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain text of the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility. Therefore, the Port needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the Terminal while the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs were in effect. The court also held that the ISGPs were enforceable in a citizen suit, even if they exceeded the requirements of the federal regulations.However, the court vacated the district court's decision regarding the 2020 ISGP, which was subject to an ongoing state-court challenge, and remanded the case for further consideration. The court instructed the district court to consider the effect of the state proceedings on this case. View "PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to vacate the plaintiffs' quasi in rem attachment of a vessel owned by Bergshav Aframax Ltd., a defendant in an admiralty action seeking fulfillment of arbitration awards. The arbitration awards were owed to the plaintiffs by B-Gas Ltd., renamed Bepalo, a different corporate entity. The plaintiffs tried to hold Aframax liable for the arbitration awards by arguing that Aframax and Bepalo were alter egos, essentially the same entity.However, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable probability of success on their veil piercing theory, which would be required to establish that Aframax and Bepalo were alter egos. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that Bepalo was dominated and controlled by the Bergshav Group, the parent corporate group of Aframax. The court noted that the minority shareholders of Bepalo exercised independent judgment in approving the relevant transactions, countering the claim that the Bergshav Group had total domination of Bepalo. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability of success on their veil-piercing claim, leading to the affirmation of the district court's decision to vacate the attachment of the vessel. View "SIKOUSIS LEGACY, INC. V. B-GAS LIMITED" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff's wife died during a scuba and snorkeling tour from Lahaina Harbor to Molokini Crater, an atoll off the coast of Maui, Hawaii. Before the tour, the plaintiff and his wife each signed a waiver document releasing their rights to sue the defendants. The plaintiff's claims were based on gross negligence and simple negligence. The defendants argued that the waiver and release were an affirmative defense to the claims based on simple negligence. However, the district court struck the defense, stating that the liability waivers were void under 46 U.S.C. § 30527(a), which prohibits certain liability waivers for vessels transporting passengers between ports in the United States or between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order and held that the term "between ports in the United States" in 46 U.S.C. § 30527(a) refers to transportation between at least two separate ports in the United States. Therefore, the statute does not apply to vessels that transport passengers away from and back to a single port without stopping at any other port. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EHART V. LAHAINA DIVERS, INC." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel. The defendants were arrested after their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed nor denied the nationality. The United States treated the vessel as stateless and exercised jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing that the relevant provision of the MDLEA under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because it conflicts with international law regarding when a vessel may be treated as stateless. The court held that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA does not conflict with international law, and thus affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. MARIN" on Justia Law

In the case involving Williams Sports Rentals Inc. (WSR) and Marian Latasha Willis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on the scope of an injunction under the Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act. The case stemmed from a fatal accident involving a jet ski owned by WSR. Anticipating a lawsuit, WSR filed a complaint under the Limitation Act, which allows a vessel owner to limit its liability for accidents. The district court granted an injunction against all other lawsuits related to the accident, and the case reached the Ninth Circuit after the district court reinstated the injunction when new claims arose. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the authority to grant an injunction since the limitation fund was insufficient to cover all pending claims, but found the injunction to be overly broad. The court ruled that under the Anti-Injunction Act, the district court could only bar claims against the owner (WSR), not claims against other parties. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the case with instructions to narrow the injunction so that it only barred claims against WSR. View "Williams Sports Rentals Inc. v. Willis" on Justia Law

Vigor Marine, LLC  hired Western to tow a drydock, which was damaged in a storm off the coast of California. In an attempt to bring the drydock to shelter in Monterey Bay, Western’s tug towed the drydock into the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary, where it capsized and sank. Western sued Vigor, seeking recovery of the towing fee under its contract with Vigor and a declaratory judgment that it would not be liable for any damages or penalty sought by the government under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA). Vigor counterclaimed for breach of contract and negligence by Western.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in all respects but one the district court’s judgment after a bench trial in an admiralty action brought by Western against Vigor Marine; vacated an award of prejudgment interest; and remanded. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Vigor on the grounds that Western was negligent as a matter of law in allowing the drydock to sink in the Sanctuary, and there were no material issues of fact regarding Western’s lack of awareness of the legal consequences of allowing the drydock to sink there. After a trial on the remaining claims, the district court denied both parties’ contract claims and held that both had been negligent. Vacating the district court’s award of prejudgment interest on the $40,000 award against Western, the panel held that interest should run from the date of Vigor’s expenditures rather than the date the drydock sank. The panel remanded to allow the district court to recalculate the prejudgment interest based on the correct date. View "WESTERN TOWBOAT COMPANY V. VIGOR MARINE, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants in three consolidated cases were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine on board a vessel, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel, and aiding and abetting. They challenged the district court’s denial of their pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment. Defendants also argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument. The Defendants made individual claims as well.   Defendants argued that even if outrageous government conduct does not require dismissal of the indictment, the district court should have used its supervisory powers to provide the same remedy, asserting that the government should tread lightly in international waters, and the court should not condone mistreatment of foreigners with no connection to the United States. The Ninth Circuit wrote that pursuant to United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995), that is not a sufficient reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the indictment. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment.   Further, the court held that a court has the power to dismiss an indictment for egregious violations of Rule 5, and that the proper inquiry is whether transportation to the United States as a whole was unnecessarily delayed, rather than whether there was some other district in the United States in which the defendant could have been brought before a magistrate judge more quickly. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that 23 days was not an unreasonable delay. View "USA V. SEGUNDO DOMINGUEZ-CAICEDO" on Justia Law