Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

A coastal town in Maine, known for its small population and proximity to a national park, experienced a significant increase in cruise ship tourism, with large vessels bringing thousands of passengers daily. In response to concerns about congestion, public safety, and the impact on local amenities, residents approved an ordinance capping the number of cruise ship passengers who could disembark in the town to 1,000 per day. The ordinance imposed fines for violations and was intended to address issues primarily at the waterfront and, to a lesser extent, in the downtown area.Several local businesses, a business association, and a pilots’ association challenged the ordinance in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. They argued that the ordinance was preempted by federal and state law, violated the Commerce Clause (including its dormant aspect), and infringed on due process rights. After a bench trial, the District Court largely ruled in favor of the town and an intervening resident, rejecting most claims but finding that the ordinance was preempted by federal regulations only to the extent it restricted crew members’ shore access. The court declined to enjoin the ordinance, noting the town’s intent to address this issue through further rulemaking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the state law preemption, federal preemption (except for the now-moot crew access issue), and due process claims. The First Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of discrimination-based Dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding no similarly situated in-state and out-of-state competitors. However, the court vacated and remanded the District Court’s dismissal of the Pike balancing Dormant Commerce Clause claim, instructing further analysis of whether the ordinance’s burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to its local benefits. The court dismissed as moot the appeals related to the crew access issue. View "Ass'n to Preserve and Protect Local Livelihoods v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In May 2020, a fire started in the engine of a recreational power boat on the Lake of the Ozarks, causing an explosion that injured Lauren Wilken and killed Shawn Carroll. The Carroll family and Wilken sued the boat's designer, manufacturer, and seller (collectively "Brunswick") for defective design, failure to warn, negligence, and wrongful death. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brunswick.The plaintiffs appealed, asserting four errors by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. They claimed the district court erred in denying their Batson challenge, excluding evidence of other similar incidents, striking expert testimony, and not allowing them to introduce evidence of other explosions during closing arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no clear error in the district court's denial of the Batson challenge, as Brunswick's reason for striking Juror No. 13 was deemed reasonable and based on accepted trial strategy. The court also upheld the exclusion of evidence related to the Schroeder explosion, as the plaintiffs failed to show that the conditions of the boats were sufficiently similar. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to strike the expert's testimony about the Schroeder explosion as a sanction for violating its order. Lastly, the court determined that the district court's curative instruction to the jury regarding Brunswick's counsel's comment during closing arguments was sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Brunswick. View "Carroll v. Brunswick Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2010, the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill released crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Matthew Williams, the plaintiff, performed oil spill clean-up work in the Gulf that summer. On September 24, 2020, Williams was diagnosed with chronic pansinusitis, an inflammatory condition of the nasal passages. Williams filed a lawsuit against BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co., alleging that his condition was caused by exposure to oil, dispersants, and other chemicals during the cleanup work. Williams presented two expert witnesses, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. James Clark, to establish causation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. BP filed motions to exclude the expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams lacked admissible expert testimony to establish causation. The district court granted BP’s motions to exclude the expert testimonies and the motion for summary judgment, leading Williams to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Freeman’s testimony, finding it unreliable as it did not properly apply the differential etiology approach. Similarly, the court found Dr. Clark’s testimony unreliable due to errors in his report, including references to another case and incorrect assumptions about benzene concentrations. Without admissible expert testimony, Williams could not establish specific causation, a necessary element in toxic tort cases. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Williams v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

MCS Industries, Inc. (MCS), a shipper, filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) against MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. (Mediterranean), alleging violations of the Shipping Act of 1984. MCS claimed that Mediterranean failed to provide agreed cargo space, forced MCS to pay higher rates on the spot market during the Covid-19 pandemic, refused to deal with MCS, discriminated against shippers at certain ports, and engaged in unreasonable business practices. Mediterranean initially provided some discovery material but later refused further requests, citing jurisdictional issues and Swiss law restrictions on document production.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered Mediterranean to comply with discovery requests, but Mediterranean continued to resist, arguing that the FMC lacked jurisdiction and that Swiss law precluded compliance. After multiple warnings and attempts to resolve the discovery issue, including a failed Hague Convention request, the ALJ issued a default judgment against Mediterranean, ordering it to pay reparations to MCS. The FMC affirmed the default judgment, remanding only to recalculate reparations and consider sanctions for delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FMC had jurisdiction over the complaint, as the allegations involved violations of the Shipping Act, not merely breach of contract claims. The court also found that the FMC did not abuse its discretion in issuing a default judgment. The court noted that Mediterranean's refusal to comply with discovery orders prejudiced MCS, burdened the FMC, and undermined the authority of the Commission. The court denied Mediterranean's petitions for review, affirming the FMC's decision. View "MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. Federal Maritime Commission" on Justia Law

Richard Hicks and his wife, Jocelyn Hicks, filed a lawsuit seeking monetary damages after Richard was injured by a vehicle driven by Gregory Middleton, an employee of Marine Terminals Corporation - East, d.b.a. Ports America. The incident occurred at the Port of Savannah, where both Hicks and Middleton worked as longshoremen. Middleton struck Hicks with his personal vehicle while allegedly on his way to retrieve work-related documents called "game plans."The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of Ports America. The court ruled that Ports America could not be held vicariously liable for Middleton's actions because Middleton was not acting within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court determined that Middleton was engaged in a personal activity, specifically commuting, and had not yet begun his work duties for Ports America.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Middleton was acting in furtherance of Ports America's business and within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court noted that a jury could reasonably infer that Middleton's actions, including driving to retrieve the game plans, were part of his job responsibilities and thus within the scope of his employment. The case was remanded for further proceedings to allow a jury to determine these factual issues. View "Hicks v. Middleton" on Justia Law

A jurisdictional dispute arose between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) over maintenance work at SSA Terminals in the Port of Seattle. Both unions claimed the right to perform the work under their respective collective bargaining agreements. SSA initially assigned the work to ILWU, but IAM threatened economic action, prompting SSA to seek a resolution from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB assigned the work to IAM, leading ILWU to pursue a grievance against SSA, which an arbitrator upheld.SSA then filed an unfair labor practice charge against ILWU, alleging that ILWU's pursuit of the grievance violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act. ILWU defended itself by invoking the work-preservation defense, which protects primary union activity. The NLRB rejected this defense, stating it was not applicable in pure jurisdictional disputes where multiple unions have valid contractual claims. The NLRB ordered ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the NLRB's position was foreclosed by its previous decision in International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. NLRB (Kinder Morgan), which established that a valid work-preservation objective provides a complete defense against alleged violations of section 8(b)(4)(D). The court vacated the NLRB's order and remanded the case for the NLRB to evaluate the merits of ILWU's work-preservation defense. The court also denied the petitions for review by IAM and the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A minor, J.F., was sexually assaulted by three fellow passengers in a stateroom on a Carnival cruise ship. J.F. alleged that Carnival could have foreseen the crime and failed to take preventative action. She sued Carnival for negligence, claiming the cruise line did not warn her of the danger or prevent the assault.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Carnival, concluding that the assault was not foreseeable. J.F. appealed the decision, arguing that Carnival had constructive notice of the risk due to previous incidents of sexual misconduct on its ships and the company's security policies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Carnival did not owe J.F. a relevant duty because the cruise line did not have actual or constructive notice of the specific risk that led to the assault. The court found that the general statistics on sexual assaults and the alcohol-smuggling incident involving one of the assailants were insufficient to establish foreseeability. Additionally, the court determined that the hypothetical presence of more security personnel would not have prevented the assault, as the attack occurred in a private stateroom.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Carnival neither owed J.F. a duty to prevent the assault nor proximately caused her injuries. View "J.F. v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

A man was injured while working on a man-made island in the Beaufort Sea, which served as an oil and gas drill site. In February, he drove a forklift down a ramp to unload cargo from a sled on the frozen sea. A colleague followed in a wheel loader, lost control, and collided with the sled and the forklift, crushing the man's leg. The man sued the companies owning and operating the island, alleging coverage under the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) and maritime tort jurisdiction.The Superior Court of Alaska dismissed the man's LHWCA claims as unripe and ruled that the accident did not meet the two-prong test for maritime tort jurisdiction. The court found that the accident lacked the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and did not have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities. The court also concluded that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Act (AWCA) barred the man from pursuing state law claims against the companies.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the superior court properly dismissed the LHWCA-related claims, as eligibility for LHWCA benefits does not automatically establish maritime tort jurisdiction, and the LHWCA does not preempt the AWCA. However, the Supreme Court found that the superior court erred in its analysis of the maritime nexus prong. The accident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities, such as unloading cargo.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the maritime tort claims and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the accident met the locus prong of the maritime jurisdiction test. View "Beckwith v. ENI Petroleum US, LLC" on Justia Law

John Bludworth Shipyard, L.L.C. (JBS) performed nearly $3 million in services to combine three vessels into a single dredging unit for a project along the Gulf Coast. The vessels involved were the Captain Frank Bechtolt, the CIT-103, and the Idler Barge. T.W. LaQuay Marine, L.L.C., which owned the Idler Barge and leased the other two vessels, requested the work without the knowledge or consent of the owners, Manson Construction Company and Caillou Island Towing Company, Inc. JBS asserted maritime liens on each vessel for the services provided.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied JBS’s motion for interlocutory sale of the three-vessel unit and JBS’s motion for summary judgment to confirm the validity of its maritime liens. The court granted Caillou’s motion to vacate the arrest of the CIT-103, finding that JBS did not provide necessaries to the CIT-103 and that there were fact issues regarding the Bechtolt and the Idler Barge. The district court focused on the CIT-103’s old function, disregarding any new function that JBS’s work might have equipped it to perform.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by considering only the CIT-103’s former function and not its new function after the alterations. The appellate court vacated the district court’s grant of Caillou’s motion to vacate the arrest of the CIT-103 and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether JBS’s work constituted necessaries for the CIT-103’s new function. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the remainder of JBS’s appeal challenging the denial of its motions for summary judgment and interlocutory sale. View "Bludworth v. Manson Construction" on Justia Law

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law