Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs used ocean common carriers to transport vehicles between foreign countries and the United States. Direct purchaser plaintiffs made arrangements with and received vehicles directly from the carriers, while indirect purchaser plaintiffs obtained the benefit of the carrier services by ultimately receiving vehicles transported from abroad. In 2012, law enforcement raided the offices of Defendants, ocean common carriers, in connection with antitrust investigations. Several Defendants pleaded pleaded guilty to antitrust violations based on price-fixing, allocating customers, and rigging bids for vehicle carrier services. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Defendants entered into agreements to fix prices and reduce capacity in violation of federal antitrust laws and state laws. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case. Defendants allegedly engaged in acts prohibited by the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. 40101, which both precludes private plaintiffs from seeking relief under the federal antitrust laws for such conduct and preempts the state law claims under circumstances like those at issue. The Act responds to “the need to foster a regulatory environment in which U.S.-flag liner operators are not placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign-flag competitors.” The Federal Maritime Commission has regulatory authority displacing private suits. View "In re: Vehicle Carrier Services Antitrust Litigations" on Justia Law

Jamie Rogers, a seaman, was injured on a fishing vessel owned and operated by Block Island Fishing, Inc. Block Island made some “maintenance and cure” payments to Rogers. Block Island then brought this suit against Rogers to dispute the duration and amount of maintenance and cure payments that it owed. Block Island filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court found that November 18, 2014 was the date on which Block Island’s obligations ended and reserved for a jury to determine the exact sum that Block Island owed Rogers for his living expenses. The court then ruled that Block Island had overpaid Rogers and that Block Island could offset the sum of overpayment against any damages award that Rogers might win at trial. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred by sua sponte replacing Block Island’s proposed date of July 31, 2014 with its own date without giving Rogers sufficient notice of opportunity to make his case against the new date; and (2) Block Island may offset any overpayment against Rogers’ potential damages award but may not sue for the sum in an independent action. View "Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

A barge exploded in 2005, while under way between Joliet and Chicago with a cargo of slurry oil. Deckhand Oliva did not survive. Claiming that Egan, master of the tug that had been pushing the barge, told Oliva to warm a pump using a propane torch, the United States filed a civil suit. Open flames on oil carriers are forbidden by Coast Guard regulations. The judge determined that the government did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oliva was using a propane torch at the time of the incident. There was no appeal. Two years later, the government charged Egan under 18 U.S.C.1115, which penalizes maritime negligence that results in death, plus other statutes that penalize the negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters. The judge found that the prosecution had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Egan gave the order to Oliva, that the torch caused the explosion, and that Oliva died and that the barge released oil as results. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has said that the outcome of a civil case has preclusive force in a criminal prosecution. If the government could not prove a claim on the preponderance standard, it cannot show the same thing beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Egan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former professional sailor, was an employee of Defendant, which owed a sailing vessel and motor support vessel. Plaintiff was injured during his employment. Plaintiff later invoked admiralty jurisdiction and sued Defendant in federal district court alleging negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. The district court awarded Plaintiff $1,460,458 in damages for loss of earnings and loss of future earning capacity and for pain, suffering, and mental anguish. The court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to add prejudgment interest to the damages award. Defendant appealed, arguing that the damages award was excessive and that the prejudgment interest increment was inappropriate. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the award of damages, holding that the award was not excessive; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part the interest award, holding that the district court committed reversible error in failing to follow Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea Corp. in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Nevor v. Moneypenny Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a maritime tort action against Bozovic Marine for injuries arising out of plaintiff's being taken to a work site on a vessel operated by defendant, a third-party tortfeasor. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his back when the captain of the vessel failed to decelerate upon reaching the crest of an eight-to-ten foot wave. The district court concluded that Bozovic Marine was negligent for: failure to request that plaintiff go to the passenger area of the vessel; failure to stay apprised of the weather conditions; and erratic operation of the vessel. Therefore, the district court concluded that plaintiff was comparatively negligent for staying in the wheelhouse. Plaintiff received 10% liability and Bozovic Marine received 90%. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by assigning 90% of the liability to Bozovic Marine based on the trial record, including the captain's control over the vessel area. The court explained that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, medical-expense payments are collateral to a third-party tortfeasor only to the extent paid; in other words, under those circumstances, plaintiff may not recover for expenses billed, but not paid. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in awarding the full amount billed. Finally, the court concluded that it was not clear error for the court to credit the vocational counselor’s expert testimony and award lost-wage damages until age 75. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "DePerrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc." on Justia Law

After Mark Barhanovich was killed in coastal waters south of Biloxi, Mississippi, Barhanovich’s estate filed claims against Bean. Mark died when the Suzuki outboard engine on his fishing boat struck an underwater dredge pipe, flipped into his boat, and struck him. Bean, responsible for dredging operations in the area, settled Barhanovich’s claims, and C.F. Bean, LLC pled guilty to one count of misconduct or neglect of ship officers in a criminal proceeding related to the same accident. While Barhanovich’s claims were pending, Bean filed a third-party complaint against SMC. After Barhanovich’s claims were settled, the district court excluded expert testimony put forth by Bean, and granted SMC’s motion for summary judgment against Bean. The court affirmed the exclusion of the expert's report; reversed the exclusion of the second expert report, notwithstanding its untimeliness; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because the district court ruled that Bean could not defeat summary judgment without expert testimony; and affirmed the district court's denial of Bean's motion to conduct additional testing on the motor. On remand, the court encouraged the district court to consider whether to reopen discovery, and to consider lesser sanctions for Bean’s untimeliness, such as costs and attorneys’ fees for SMC’s additional discovery. View "C.F. Bean, LLC v. Barhanovich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a marine salvor, filed this action in rem against the Blacksheep, seeking a salvage award for services he provided to the yacht. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff, finding that he failed to show that his services were necessary to the rescue of the Blacksheep. The court concluded, however, that a claim for a salvage award does not require such a showing. In this case, the district court's findings and some facts from the record could support the conclusion that plaintiff's action contributed to saving the Blacksheep where he deployed his high-capacity dewatering pump; dove below the ship where he successfully pushed the propeller shaft twelve inches closer to its intended position; and applied packing material to prevent further flooding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Girard v. M/V "Blacksheep"" on Justia Law

Hargus and others rented F&I's 26-foot ship, One Love, to travel throughout the U.S. Virgin Islands. F&I had hired Coleman as a captain. At Cruz Bay, Coleman anchored close to the shore. Most of the passengers disembarked. Later, members of the group, standing on the beach approximately 25 feet away from the boat, threw beer cans at Hargus while he was standing on the One Love’s deck. Coleman threw an empty insulated plastic coffee cup that hit Hargus on the side of his head. Hargus did not lose consciousness, nor complain of any injury. One Love resumed its journey. Days later, Hargus, having experienced pain and vision impairments, was diagnosed with a concussion and a mild contusion. Hargus had previously suffered 10-12 head injuries. The doctor allowed Hargus to return to work that day without restrictions. Hargus did not seek further medical treatment until a year later, when he was examined for headaches, memory loss, mood swings, and neck pain. Hargus filed suit, claiming a maritime lien against the One Love, negligence, and negligent entrustment. The district court awarded $50,000, concluding that it had admiralty jurisdiction, that Coleman was negligent and that the One Love was liable in rem. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the act giving rise to Hargus’ claim was insufficient to invoke maritime jurisdiction because it was not of the type that could potentially disrupt maritime commerce. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hargus v. Ferocious & Impetuous, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Wilchcombe, Rolle, and Beauplaint appealed their convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 100 kilograms or more of marijuana while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Rolle also appeals his conviction for failing to obey a lawful order to heave to his vessel of which he was the master, operator, and person in charge. The court rejected Wilchcombe’s and Rolle’s arguments that the court's interpretation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a) and (b), and 70506(a), violates due process; the statement of no objection (SNO) in this case was sufficient to inform the United States that the Bahamian Government consented to the United States’ exercise of jurisdiction over Rolle’s vessel; while the evidence presented at trial suggests that the Coast Guard may have incorrectly informed the Bahamian Government about the registration documents provided by Rolle to the Coast Guard, there are multiple reasons why this inconsistency does not lead the court to fault the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over defendants; the evidence is sufficient to sustain Wilchcombe’s convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute under the MDLEA; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial as to Beauplant and Rolle; the district court properly denied Beauplant's motion to dismiss; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting a DEA agent to testify regarding Beauplant's prior 2010 arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Wilchcombe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Marquette after a towing vessel owned by Marquette allided with a private vessel owned by the Trust. The district court awarded damages and attorneys' fees against Marquette. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the cost of repairing the severely damaged private vessel exceeded its pre-casualty value and, therefore, the private vessel was a constructive total loss. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to allow expert testimony from Larry Strouse regarding the pre-casualty value of the private vessel where the testimony was admittedly cumulative and any error did not affect Marquette's substantial rights. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees as a sanction and by declining to make further downward adjustment to the fee award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Moench v. M/V Salvation" on Justia Law