Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

After James McIndoe died from complications related to mesothelioma, McIndoe's legal heirs filed suit against defendants, arguing that McIndoe’s exposure to asbestos-containing materials aboard their ships contributed to his death. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court agreed with the district court that McIndoe’s heirs cannot sustain an action for strict products liability premised upon the notion that the warships in question are themselves “products” under maritime law. The court also concluded that, although plaintiffs have established that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether McIndoe was exposed to asbestos-containing materials originally installed upon such ships, plaintiffs have established no genuine issue of fact regarding whether any such exposure was a substantial factor in McIndoe’s injuries. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot prevail on their general negligence claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc." on Justia Law

Malin filed suit against OSA for the balance of its unpaid invoices for work, services, materials, and supplies that it had provided to OSA at the request of Con-Dive. The court affirmed the district court's denial of OSA's motion to vacate the attachment, concluding that, under Texas law, title to the bunkers at issue passed to OSA on delivery. OSA held title to the bunkers at the time of Malin's attachment, and title to property unquestionably suffices as an attachable interest under Supplemental Admiralty Rule B. Therefore, the district court had personal jurisdiction over OSA by virtue of the attachment of the bunkers on the vessel that it had chartered. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that no material issues of fact exist as to whether OSA received and ratified the invoices, including their interest and attorneys fees provisions. Thus, the court concluded that the district court committed no error in granting summary judgment for Malin. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Malin Int'l Ship Repair v. Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a pilot, seeks review of the final order of the NTSB that permanently revoked his certificates based on his criminal conviction, contending that the FAA’s earlier administrative action bars the FAA’s permanent revocation order by operation of various preclusion doctrines, double jeopardy, and due process. In this case, petitioner fraudulently sold helicopter rotor blades with maintenance records he had altered to hide the fact that another mechanic had deemed the blades to be unrepairable scrap. The court concluded that 49 U.S.C. 44726(b)(1)(A) plainly authorizes revocation of any airman certificate after a qualifying conviction, even if the FAA unsuccessfully pursued a prior subsection (B) administrative action based on the events underlying the conviction. The court further concluded that revocation of airman certificates in those circumstances is a civil, remedial measure aimed at protecting public safety that does not offend principles of preclusion, double jeopardy, or due process. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Lauterbach v. Huerta" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a pilot, seeks review of the final order of the NTSB that permanently revoked his certificates based on his criminal conviction, contending that the FAA’s earlier administrative action bars the FAA’s permanent revocation order by operation of various preclusion doctrines, double jeopardy, and due process. In this case, petitioner fraudulently sold helicopter rotor blades with maintenance records he had altered to hide the fact that another mechanic had deemed the blades to be unrepairable scrap. The court concluded that 49 U.S.C. 44726(b)(1)(A) plainly authorizes revocation of any airman certificate after a qualifying conviction, even if the FAA unsuccessfully pursued a prior subsection (B) administrative action based on the events underlying the conviction. The court further concluded that revocation of airman certificates in those circumstances is a civil, remedial measure aimed at protecting public safety that does not offend principles of preclusion, double jeopardy, or due process. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Lauterbach v. Huerta" on Justia Law

Maher, a marine terminal operator, challenges a decision of the Commission authorizing preferential lease terms to a competitor, APM-Maersk. The court concluded that, assuming arguendo that the Commission adequately responded to Maher’s contention that the same rates should be extended to it, the Commission’s explanation as to why APM-Maersk’s preference was based on a “transportation factor” was hopelessly convoluted, particularly in light of its precedent. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a more adequate explanation of its decision and policy. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Maher Terminals, LLC v. FMC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for failing to maintain an oil record book aboard a foreign-flagged merchant sea vessel, in violation of 33 U.S.C. 1908(a) and 33 C.F.R. 151.25. The district court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court reversed, concluding that the plain language of 33 C.F.R. 151.25 states that only the “master or other person having charge of the ship” has a duty to maintain the record book. The government concedes that defendant was not the “master or other person having charge” of the vessel at issue. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for entry of acquittal. View "United States v. Fafalios" on Justia Law

Petrobras and Underwriters filed suit against Vicinay, the manufacturer of an underwater tether chain that broke just after being installed to secure the piping system for oil production from the Outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico. The district court granted summary judgment for Vicinay based upon the maritime law economic loss doctrine. Underwriters then sought leave to amend their complaint, alleging, for the first time, that Louisiana law, not maritime law, applied to this dispute under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2). The court held that the choice of law prescribed by OCSLA is statutorily mandated and is consequently not waivable by the parties. The court also held that the applicable law is that of the adjacent state of Louisiana, not admiralty law. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's denial of Underwriters' motion to amend and remanded for application of Louisiana law. View "Petrobras America Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A." on Justia Law

Muse, with others, boarded the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009, off the Somalian coast, taking its captain hostage. Muse initially stated that he was 16 at the time. Before a hearing to determine his age, Muse told an agent that he was 18. At the hearing, Muse refused to testify. A New York Magistrate concluded that Muse was at least 18 when the crime occurred. Prosecuted as an adult, Muse pleaded guilty to piracy, 18 U.S.C. 2280, and was sentenced to 405 months’ imprisonment. The plea agreement contains a promise “not to seek to withdraw his guilty plea or file a direct appeal or any kind of collateral attack" based on his age at the time of the crime or the time of the plea. Nonetheless, Muse filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing that a magistrate lacked authority to decide whether he was an adult and that his lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by not pursuing that question. Chief District Judge Preska denied that motion; the Second Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Turning to the Southern District of Indiana, where he is imprisoned, Muse unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Muse has not identified any inadequacy in section 2255. The reason he could not contest the magistrate’s decision has nothing to do with section 2255, but was the consequence of his waiver. View "Muse v. Daniels" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from injuries sustained by a platform worker employed by Vertex. Continental appealed the district court's final judgment in favor of Tetra and Maritech, requiring Continental and its codefendant insured, Vertex, to indemnify them. The court concluded that the summary judgment record is inadequate to determine whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), requires the adoption of Louisiana law as surrogate federal law where the court cannot determine whether there is an OCSLA situs, the court cannot determine whether federal maritime law applies, and the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2780, is consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither party is entitled to summary judgment as to whether LOIA must be adopted as surrogate federal law under OCSLA. The court remanded to the district court to determine the dispositive issue of whether Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal law. View "Tetra Tech. v. Vertex Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and its officers under 42 U.S.C.1983, federal maritime law, and state law, alleging that defendants seized his sailboat and destroyed it without justification and without notice. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court should not have placed a “heightened pleading” burden on plaintiff for his section 1983 claims. The court also concluded that the district court erred to the extent that it dismissed the federal constitutional claims in Counts I, II, and V, and the maritime claims in Counts III and IV, based on the contents of the incident reports. On remand, the court instructed the district court to assess the sufficiency of the procedural due process, search and seizure, and takings claims without reliance on the disputed portions of the incident reports. The court further instructed that the district court should assume that the sailboat was not derelict, and that plaintiff was never given adequate notice that it was derelict and subject to removal and destruction. The court further concluded that the district court erred with respect to the procedural due process claim in Count I and the Fourth Amendment claim in Count II. In this case, all plaintiff needed to do to establish municipal liability was allege a policy, practice, or custom of the City which caused the seizure and destruction of his sailboat, which he did. Further, defendants cannot point to any post-Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit Supreme Court or circuit cases - and the court has not been able to locate any - holding that a complaint asserting a section 1983 municipal liability claim must, as a Rule 8(a) pleading matter, always specifically identify the municipality’s final policymaker by name. Finally, plaintiff also sufficiently stated a claim for an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to state a substantive due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hoefling, Jr. v. City of Miami" on Justia Law