Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

The Coast Guard, after receiving whistleblower complaints, initiated an investigation against two foreign-flagged vessels. The Coast Guard subsequently ordered Customs to withhold departure clearance and the vessels were held for investigation for differing lengths of time, ranging from a couple of days to over a month. The vessels were released after appellants, the ship owners and operators, posted a bond and executed a security agreement. At issue in this appeal is whether the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security – acting through the Coast Guard – may impose certain conditions (nonfinancial in nature) upon the release of ships suspected of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. 1901(a)(4). Determining that the case is justiciable, the court concluded on the merits that the first sentence of section 1908(e) gives the Coast Guard the requisite authority. Section 1908(e) states that “[i]f any ship subject to the [Convention]…is liable for a fine or civil penalty...or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the ship...may be subject to a fine or civil penalty [Customs]...upon request of the Secretary [the Coast Guard]...shall refuse...clearance,” and as such it clearly provides authority in the Coast Guard to simply hold the ship in port until legal proceedings are completed. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watervale Marine Co. v. DHS" on Justia Law

These appeals stemmed from ICI's breach of numerous contracts. Flame and Glory Wealth sought a writ of maritime attachment under Supplemental Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to attach the vessel M/V CAPE VIEWER when it docked in Norfolk, Virginia. Freight Bulk is the registered owner of the vessel, but Flame and Glory Wealth asserted that Freight Bulk was the alter ego of ICI, and that ICI had fraudulently conveyed its assets to Freight Bulk in order to evade its creditors. The district court awarded judgment to Flame and Glory Wealth, ordered the sale of the M/V CAPE VIEWER, and confirmed the distribution of the sale proceeds to Flame and Glory Wealth. Freight Bulk appealed. The court rejected Freight Bulk's arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction, Glory Wealth's judgment against ICI, discovery sanctions, and sufficiency of the evidence. Because the court found no merit in Freight Bulk's claims, the court affirmed the judgment. View "FLAME S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed these consolidated cases, alleging exposure to asbestos aboard vessels operated or owned by the various defendants. At issue was whether the cases, originally filed in state court, properly belong in federal court. Defendants argue that removal was warranted under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). In adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court found that defendants failed to establish an adequate causal link because plaintiffs’ claims were “analogous” to “failure to warn cases” where the government owns a work space infected with asbestos and the civilian contractor operating the facility fails to warn of the danger or otherwise mitigate the risk. The court found that the evidence suggests that the Federal Officer Defendants operated the vessels in a largely independent fashion and, at a minimum, were free to adopt the safety measures plaintiffs now allege would have prevented their injuries. The court concluded that the district court properly found that remand was proper based upon this ground. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bartel v. Alcoa Steamship Co." on Justia Law

In 2000 the Port Authority signed a 30-year lease for the largest marine terminal at Port Elizabeth (445 acres including structures and berthing) with Maher, which handles cargo. The Lease requires “Basic Rental,” (in 2012, $50,413 per acre, totaling $22,433,612) plus “Container Throughput Rental,” based on the type and volume of cargo at Maher’s terminal. For eight years, Maher was exempted from Throughput Rental. Since 2008 the first 356,000 containers are exempted; for containers 356,001 to 980,000, Maher paid $19.00 per container in 2012; and for each additional container, Maher paid $14.25. Maher must handle a minimum amount of cargo to maintain the Lease and pay an annual guaranteed minimum Throughput Rental. Maher paid $12.5 million in Throughput Rental in 2010, and expected the 2012 amount to be $14 million. Maher claims the Port Authority profits from the Lease and uses the revenue to fund harbor improvements and projects unrelated to services provided to Maher or vessels. In 2012 Maher sued, alleging violations of the Constitution’s Tonnage Clause; the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 5(b); and the Water Resources Development Act, 33 U.S.C. 2236. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Maher lacked standing to bring its Tonnage Clause and RHA claims because it was not a protected vessel and did not adequately plead that fees imposed on vessels were not for services rendered. Maher’s WRDA claim failed because Maher had not shown that the Authority imposed fees on vessels or cargo and because the WRDA did not prohibit use of Lease revenue to finance harbor improvements. View "Maher Terminals LLC v. Port Auth. of NY" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was an attachment of property made pursuant to Supplemental Admiralty Rule B. This appeal had a complicated background, involving multiple lawsuits in federal district courts, Florida state court, and a Spanish bankruptcy court. The common denominator of these suits was Quail Cruises Ship Management, from which multiple parties, including participants in this appeal, have tried to collect money that they believed Quail owed them. The money at issue arose from the legal settlement of a dispute over the purchase of a cruise ship featured on ABC Television Network’s long-running series, The Love Boat. The plaintiff-appellant advanced a novel interpretation of Rule B. The district court was unpersuaded, as was the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order vacating the attachment. View "World Wide Supply OU v. Quail Cruises Ship Management, et al" on Justia Law

After plaintiff, an employee of Shore, was hurt while working on a derrick barge operated by McDermott, plaintiff filed suit against both Shore and McDermott under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. Plaintiff also filed suit against Shore for cure under maritime law. The district court entered judgment against McDermott and Shore. Both defendants appealed. McDermott asks the court to render judgment, reducing the future lost wages award from $300,000 to $209,533. Plaintiff’s own expert economist determined that his net future lost wages would be $209,533 if he worked as an unarmed security guard and retired at age 55.8. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue and found it appropriate to render judgment in the amount of $209,533 for future lost wages. The court affirmed in all other respects, including issues of Jones Act liability, comparative negligence, future general damages, and cure. View "Barto v. Shore Construction" on Justia Law

Barges separated from an Artco towboat, damaging a lock and dam. Artco sought limitation of its liability to the government or exoneration under FRCP F. The court enjoined prosecution of separate suits against Artco or the vessel and directed potential claimants to file claims by June 15, 2011. The government argued that its claim, alleging violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 408, was not subject to the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 30501, and need not be litigated in the Rule F proceeding. The government never filed a timely claim in the limitation proceeding. On remand, the district court denied Artco’s motion for a decree of exoneration, reiterating that the government’s claims were not subject to the Limitation Act and that the government could pursue a remedy for its RHA claim. The court concluded that its prior injunction was overbroad and denied Artco’s motion to hold the government in contempt, to impose sanctions, and to direct dismissal of the government’s separate suit. As there were no claims filed in the limitation action, the court denied the government leave to file a late claim and directed dismissal of the limitation action. The Eighth Circuit reversed dismissal of Artco’s limitation action, affirmed denial of Artco’s motion to hold the government in contempt and for sanctions, vacated the order as to the remaining motions, and remanded. View "Am. River Transp. v. United States, Corp of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Abhe, an industrial painting contractor, used stationary leased barges as platforms while painting Pell Bridge over Narragansett Bay. Abhe changed insurance carriers three months into the project. St. Paul Fire did not request that Abhe complete an application, but accepted the application provided to its previous insurer in 2010. The attached schedule of vessels was outdated and did not include vessels leased for the Pell Bridge project. Abhe sent St. Paul an updated schedule in 2011, listing those vessels, but did not provide a 2010 survey that showed that one barge had non-watertight bulkheads. St. Paul did not attempt to survey any of the equipment, as it was entitled to do under the policy. After the barge sunk in a storm, St. Paul denied Abhe’s claims and sought a declaration that the policy was void under the doctrine of uberrimae fidei, which requires that parties to an insurance contract accord each other the highest degree of good faith. Abhe counterclaimed, alleging negligence. The district court granted St. Paul summary judgment, finding the package policy void because Abhe failed to disclose the survey. The Eight Circuit remanded, stating that reliance is an element of the defense, and that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether it is satisfied. View "St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was shot and seriously injured by a Nigerian gunman who invaded the drilling rig plaintiff was working aboard, he filed suit alleging that the negligence of other rig hands caused his injury and that GSF, a corporate parent and indirect subsidiary of the drilling company, was vicariously liable for such negligence under the general maritime law. The district court granted summary judgment for GSF. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that GSF may not be held vicariously liable for the rig hands’ alleged negligence because no reasonable jury could find an employment relationship between GSF and the rig hands. The court found that the record contains no evidence of most of the factors that would support a finding of an employment relationship where there is no evidence that GSF had the right to direct the rig hands or to control the details of their work; there is no evidence that GSF hired or had the right to fire the rig hands; and there is no evidence that GSF furnished the rig or the equipment used on the rig. View "Johnson v. PPI Tech. Serv., L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals and a corporation who reside in Hawaii, filed suit alleging that the Jones Act's cabotage provisions, 46 U.S.C. 12112(a)(2)(A) and 55102(b)(1), which prohibit foreign competition in the domestic shipping market, impair interstate trade between Hawaii and the rest of the United States to such an extent that they violate the Constitution. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged more than generalized grievances and have demonstrated an “injury in fact,” but have not met their burden to show causation or redressability, the other two elements of Article III standing. The court further concluded that although plaintiffs, could establish standing if they amended their complaint, any amendment would be futile because plaintiffs’ challenge to the Jones Act would fail on the merits. In this case, an amended complaint would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim because the enactment of the Jones Act was not beyond the authority assigned to Congress under the Commerce Clause. The court rejected plaintiffs' Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment claim, and held that the district court did not violate plaintiffs' procedural due process right by ruling on the government's motion to dismiss without an oral hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Novak v. United States" on Justia Law