Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employer of Max Welders, was working as the borrowed employee of Wild Well, a subsidiary of Superior, when he sustained injuries while welding on an offshore platform. Plaintiff filed suit against all defendants under, inter alia, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. Superior and Wild Well filed a cross-claim for indemnity from Max Welders pursuant to a Master Service Agreement (MSA) or, in the alternative, Vessel Boarding, Utilization and Hold Harmless Agreement (VBA) between Superior and Max Welders. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the Jones Act claims because it found that plaintiff is not a Jones Act seaman. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Max Welders on indemnity because 1) the MSA was void under Louisiana law and 2) the VBA did not apply to plaintiff’s work. View "Wilcox v. Max Welders, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Bulgarelli’s 36-foot boat ran aground on Lake St. Clair. Bulgarelli contacted a tow service, which dispatched a salvage vessel commanded by Captain Leslie. Leslie claims that he quoted the price of $250 per foot of length. Bulgarelli insists that the quoted price was $1,000–$1,200, and that Leslie assured him that insurance would pay. Bulgarelli signed the contract, which did not include a printed price, but has “$250.00 FT” scrawled in its bottom margin. Bulgarelli claims that handwriting was not present when he signed the paper and Leslie had exclusive possession of the sole copy of the contract. Calling this a “hard” grounding in high winds and very rough waters, Leslie claimed that the work took 29 minutes. Bulgarelli and a corroborating witness stated that the wind and water were calm, and that Leslie pulled the vessel free in less than 10 minutes. The tow company sought enforcement of a maritime lien. Bulgarelli counterclaimed for fraud, innocent misrepresentation, and reformation. Finding Bulgarelli and his corroborating witness credible, while finding Leslie not credible, the court made a finding that Leslie had quoted the price of $1,000–$1,200, intending to bill Bulgarelli’s insurance company for $9,000, and added the handwritten margin note after Bulgarelli signed the contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "St. Clair Marine Salvage, Inc. v. Bulgarelli" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, airplane passengers, filed suit against Boeing in state court after a Boeing 777 hit a seawall at the end of a runway at the San Francisco International Airport and injured 49 passengers, killing three passengers. Suits were also brought in federal courts and were consolidated by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) under 28 U.S.C. 1407(a). Boeing removed the state suits to federal court, asserting admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333 and asserting federal officials' right to have claims against them resolved by federal courts under 28 U.S.C. 1442. The MDL decided that the state suits should be transferred to California to participate in the consolidated pretrial proceedings, but the district court remanded them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that Boeing was not entitled to remove under section 1442(a)(1) because Boeing was not acting as a federal officer in light of Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. However, the court concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction exists under section 1333(1) because section 1333(1) includes accidents caused by problems that occur in transocean commerce. In this case, the plane was a trans-ocean flight, a substitute for an ocean-going vessel. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions. View "Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Comar filed suit against vessel-owning LLCs after the LLCs decided to terminate an agreement with Comar in which Comar would manage the vessels on behalf of the LLCs. JPMorgan and Allegiance provided the financing for the vessel purchases and intervened to defend their preferred ship mortgages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan and Allegiance. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that breach of the management agreements did not give rise to maritime liens; the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Allegiance and JPMorgan; and the court did not reach whether the district court’s alternate holding that Comar was a joint venturer and therefore foreclosed from asserting a maritime lien was erroneous. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in concluding that the termination-fee provision is unenforceable; the district court’s award to Comar is plausible in light of the record and not clearly erroneous; the district court did not clearly err in finding that Comar acted in bad faith when arresting the vessels and did not rely on legal advice in good faith; the district court did not clearly err in denying lost-profit and lost-equity damages; and the court concluded that the district court did not commit any other errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Comar Marine, Corp. v. Raider Marine Logistics" on Justia Law

CHMM, owner of a luxury yacht, filed suit against Freeman, manufacturer of a "weathertight" door for installation on the yacht, alleging five tort claims arising out of the door's alleged malfunction. The court applied the rule in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., concluding that where the manufacturer of a product had no responsibility for manufacturing or assembling items that the user adds to the product, the user-added items are considered “other property” for purposes of the economic loss doctrine. In this case, the economic loss doctrine does not bar CHMM from suing in tort for damage to the Interior Outfit caused by the allegedly defective Freeman door. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "CHMM v. Freeman Marine Equip." on Justia Law

Columbus-America, acting as the agent for Recovery, discovered the wreck of the "S.S. Central America," which was loaded with tons of gold when it sank. The district court granted Columbus-America salvage rights. Robol represented Columbus-American in proceedings to establish salvage rights. Robol subsequently filed a claim in this in rem admiralty action to obtain a salvage award for himself, alleging that he had provided voluntary assistance to the Receiver in turning over files and documents related to the salvage operation, which proved useful in the continuing salvage of the sunken vessel. The district court dismissed Robol’s claim for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed, agreeing with the district court's conclusion that Robol had been obligated to return the files and documents to his former clients under the applicable rules of professional responsibility and principles of agency law and therefore that his act of returning the materials to his former clients was not a voluntary act, as would be required for him to obtain a salvage award. View "Robol Law Office v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while employed as a lead hand/operator in Express's plug and abandonment department, which specializes in decommissioned oil wells on various platforms off the coast of Louisiana. Plaintiff filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104 et seq., against Express and others. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff, concluding that plaintiff is not a seaman and the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against Express with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of showing that he is a seaman where the undisputed evidence demonstrated that approximately 65% of plaintiff's job involved a fix platform only, without the help of an adjacent vessel. Even on the other jobs involving a vessel adjacent to plaintiff's platform, his work occurred mostly on the platform. Plaintiff failed to prove that he actually worked on a vessel at least 30% of the time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alexander v. Express Energy" on Justia Law

Scott Walter Maziar sustained injuries while on board a ferry operated by the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC). Maziar used the ferry to get to and from work. Since Maziar was injured at sea, he brought a general maritime negligence claim against the DOC. He initially requested a jury trial, but he moved to strike his demand because he thought that no jury trial right existed for general maritime negligence cases. The DOC objected, but the trial court agreed with Maziar, struck his jury request, and awarded him damages after a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the jury trial issue but on different grounds, holding that although a jury trial right generally applied to general maritime negligence actions in state court. The State did not have a constitutional or statutory jury trial right in tort actions. The issue this case presented on appeal was whether the State had a jury trial right in tort actions. The Court held that it does: several statutes read together demonstrate that the legislature meant to treat the State as if it were a private party with regard to matters of civil procedure and confer on any party (including the State) the right to have a jury determine most matters of fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a jury trial. View "Maziar v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law