Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Hebei Prince Shipping Co., Ltd. (“Hebei Prince”) owned the M/V HEBEI SHIJIAZHUANG (“the Vessel”). The Vessel was leased to Tramp Maritime Enterprises, Ltd. under three consecutive time charters that prohibited Tramp Maritime from incurring “any lien or encumbrance” against the Vessel. World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC (“DMCC”) provided marine fuel (referred to as “bunkers”) to the Vessel but was never paid. DMCC subsequently filed this in rem action against the Vessel in federal district court asserting that it was owed $809,420 for the unpaid bunkers and that it was entitled to enforce a maritime lien on the Vessel under the Federal Maritime Lien Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DMCC. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court had admiralty jurisdiction to consider DMCC’s claim; and (2) DMCC was entitled to bring its claim that it had an enforceable maritime lien under the FMLA. View "World Fuel Servs. Trading v. Hebei Prince Shipping Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG (Rickmers) sought to enforce a Philippine arbitral award given to Lito Martinez Asignacion for maritime injuries. Asignacion sued Rickmers in Louisiana state court to recover for his injuries. Rickmers filed an exception seeking to enforce the arbitration clause of Asignacion’s contract. The state court granted the exception, stayed litigation, and ordered arbitration in the Philippines. The district court refused to enforce the award pursuant to the public-policy defense found in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the prospective-waiver doctrine. Rickmers appeals. Finding that the district court erred in reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to enforce the award. View "Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG" on Justia Law

Hicks was a deckhand on a tugboat when, while handling heavy gear, he injured his shoulder. A company doctor determined that Hicks was not fit for duty. His employer acknowledged its obligation to pay maintenance and cure and medical expenses until full recovery, maximum improvement, or until his condition was declared permanent, 46 U.S.C. 30104 (Jones Act). Hicks had surgery and physical therapy. His employer hired an investigator to videotape Hicks surreptitiously. The video showed Hicks planting a small tree and playing with his grandson. When Hicks’s doctor requested funding for an MRI scan, he was shown this footage and told that Hicks’s job required only light lifting. The doctor determined that Hicks was fit for duty. The employer terminated payments. Hicks consulted a second doctor, who diagnosed a recurrent rotator cuff tear and recommended another surgery plus rehabilitation. Under financial pressure, Hicks returned to work and missed physical therapy. His house went into foreclosure, and he was unable to pay for health insurance. Hicks sued, claiming negligence under the Jones Act and the maritime doctrines of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The jury awarded $190,000 for past and future maintenance and cure and $132,000 for pain and suffering. Based on a finding that the failure to pay was unreasonable and willful, Hicks was awarded $123,000 in punitive damages and $112,083.77 in attorney’s fees. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Hicks v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc." on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant J. Brian O'Neill purchased the Bryemere, a sport-fishing vessel, in 2006. As he negotiated the Bryemere’s price, O’Neill incorporated a limited-liability company in the state of Rhode Island, Carolina Acquisition, LLC to take ownership of the vessel. O’Neill then applied for a preferred ship mortgage with Bank of America, N.A. (BOA) to fund the Bryemere’s cost. O’Neill signed the mortgage in his capacity as managing member of Carolina, using the ship as collateral. As a condition of the loan, BOA required proof of insurance for the Bryemere, and requested that the insurance policy contain a mortgage clause that would protect BOA’s interests as a mortgagee in the event the underlying insurance policy was found void. O’Neill’s insurance broker, Willis of Pennsylvania, Inc., sought an insurance quote for the Bryemere from AIG Centennial Insurance Company. Susan Bonner, an underwriter, handled the application process on behalf of AIG. Sharon King, a broker, was assigned to O’Neill’s case on behalf of Willis. Instead of working directly with King, O’Neill delegated the task of obtaining insurance for the Bryemere to his executive secretary, Desiree Foulds. Instead of explaining the insurance-application process to Foulds, King forwarded the application to Foulds without comment and returned the application Foulds had completed to Bonner without reviewing it for accuracy or completeness. Foulds made three mistakes on the application that were relevant to this appeal: (1) she listed O’Neill as the owner of the vessel instead of Carolina; (2) in response to a question about whether the owner or captain had ever suffered any “losses,” she disclosed one prior loss in 2003, when O’Neill lost a boat due to fire, when in fact (by his own admission at trial) O’Neill had suffered two additional losses that went undisclosed: propeller damage to his Ocean yacht and a blown engine on his sailing vessel; and (3) Foulds listed the Bryemere’s purchase price as $2.35 million, when the closing statement reflected a purchase price of $2.125 million. AIG issued the final policy. Following the Bryemere’s purchase, O’Neill invested $225,000 to pay for repairs recommended for the ship. During the voyage from Florida to Rhode Island, the crew “noticed considerable flexing in the vessel’s hull.” Upon arrival in Rhode Island, several marine experts inspected the Bryemere and concluded that it suffered from a number of structural defects rendering the vessel, in the words of one marine surveyor, “un-seaworthy, dangerous and unsafe for any use.” O’Neill then submitted a claim to AIG for coverage under his insurance policy. In response, AIG filed a declaratory judgment action with the federal district court in Florida seeking affirmation that the insurance policy was void ab initio as to both O’Neill and BOA. After an eight-day bench trial, the District Court issued an order finding that neither O’Neill nor BOA could recover under the policy. As to O’Neill, the District Court held that the misrepresentations regarding O’Neill’s prior loss history and the Bryemere’s purchase price rendered the policy void ab initio under the maritime doctrine of uberrimae fidei. As to BOA, the District Court held, among other things, that the named insured on the policy, O’Neill, was not the mortgagor on the loan and that BOA had no rights under the standard mortgage clause as a result. O’Neill and BOA appealed. But finding no reversible error, however, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. View "AIG Centennial Insurance Co. v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

The Miss Dixie was a cargo line boat operated by defendant-appellant Jantran, Inc., a company involved in maritime transportation on the Verdigris River in Oklahoma. The Miss Dixie struck and extensively damaged a lock maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers. After repairing the lock, the Corps sued Jantran for the costs of repair. The district court dismissed the Corps' suit, concluding that federal law did not allow the Corps to seek in personam damages directly from the owners of a vessel that damages a structure on navigable waters. As the court found, the applicable statute, the Rivers and Harbors Act, only allowed in rem claims against the vessel that caused the damage. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Act did not authorize in personam actions against the owners of the vessel. The Act only allowed the Corps to proceed in rem against the vessel itself. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's ruling. View "United States v. Jantran" on Justia Law

In 1953, New York and New Jersey entered into the Waterfront Commission Act, establishing the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor to govern operations at the Port of New York‐New Jersey. At that time, individual pieces of cargo were loaded onto trucks, driven to the pier, and then unloaded for loading, piece‐by‐piece, onto the vessel. Similarly, arriving cargo was handled piece-by-piece. Containerization transformed shipping: a shipper loads cargo into a large container, which is loaded onto a truck and transported to the pier, where it is lifted aboard a ship. Continental operates warehouses, including one at 112 Port Jersey Boulevard, Jersey City. Continental picks up containers from the Global Marine Terminal, transports them to the Warehouse, unloads them, and removes their contents. Continental stores the freight and provides other services, such as sampling, weighing. and wrapping. In 2011, the Commission advised Continental that it was required to obtain a stevedore license, concluding that the property line and building of the 112 Warehouse were within 1,000 yards of a pier. Continental sought a declaratory judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that Continental engages in stevedoring activities at the warehouse and that the warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ under the Act and within the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Cont'l Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor" on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two Yemeni-born Muslim seamen who were United States citizens. Their civil rights action concerned a tanker ship owned by the United States Maritime Administration but operated by a private company under a contract. The first seaman alleged that the human resources director of the companying operating the ship ordered that he be fired because of his national origin. The second seaman alleged that he was not hired to work aboard the ship because of his religion and national origin. Both plaintiffs named the human resources director as a defendant but not the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Plaintiffs’ claims both involved a contract for employment or potential employment aboard a public vessel of the United States and had a sufficient maritime connection, they were required to bring those claims against the United States. View "Ali v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Appellee Palm Energy Offshore, L.L.C. owned the mineral rights in an area of the Gulf of Mexico called the West Delta 55 block (“WD55”). Palm also served as the court-appointed manager for appellee H.C. Resources, L.L.C. (“HCR”) and its mineral holdings at another Gulf location, the Chandeleur 37 block (“C37”). Acting as HCR’s manager, Palm asked CM to service one of HCR’s wells at C37. CM agreed and chartered a lift boat, the L/B Nicole Eymard from appellee Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc. to perform maintenance work. The ship worked at C37 from July 18 until July 27. On July 27, Palm, now acting on its own behalf, asked CM to send the Nicole Eymard to WD55. CM dispatched the ship to WD55. After completing the job at WD55, the crew of the Nicole Eymard attempted to retract the ship’s legs from the ocean floor. The crew discovered that one of the legs was stuck. The crew worked to free the leg until August 18, when Offshore ordered the crew to sever the leg and return to port ahead of an approaching storm. In port, Offshore completed repairs on the ship on October 10. Offshore then sued CM and Palm for charter fees that accrued from July 15 to August 18, for “downtime charter” from August 19 to October 10, and for the cost of repairs. CM and Palm then filed various counter- and cross-claims against each other and Offshore. CM and Offshore’s claims against each other are governed in part by the terms of an oral charter agreement. CM and Palm’s claims against each other are governed in part by the terms of a Master Service Agreement (“MSA”), and in part by a specific work order. The MSA contained an indemnity agreement (“Indemnity Agreement”). After a bench trial, the district court held that CM owed Offshore for charter fees that accrued from July 15 to July 27 while the Nicole Eymard was at C37, and for charter fees that accrued from July 28 to August 18 while the ship was at WD55. The court held that CM could recover the same fees from Palm. The court held that neither CM nor Palm owed Offshore for downtime charter fees from August 19 to October 10, or for repairs. CM, Offshore, and Palm filed motions to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The court granted these motions to the extent they sought clarification regarding the court’s order on prejudgment interest. The court determined that the Indemnity Agreement barred CM from seeking repayment for those fees. The court denied the parties’ motions in all other respects. CM appealed from the district court’s judgment and its post-trial order. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment and post-trial order, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Offshore Marine Contractors, et al v. Palm Energy" on Justia Law