Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

The Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 962, passed in 1794, is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation in support of the obligations of neutrality. The Act makes it unlawful to furnish, fit out, or arm a vessel within the U.S. with the intent of having the vessel used in the service of a foreign state or people to commit hostilities against another foreign state or people with whom the U.S. is at peace. Vessels covered by the Act are subject to forfeiture, and persons who give information leading to the seizure of such vessels may recover a bounty. Bauer sought to pursue a claim under the Act, claiming to have informed the government of vessels that had been funded, furnished, and fitted by anti-Israel organizations in the U.S., together with violent and militant anti-Israel organizations from other countries. The complaint alleged that the vessels were to be employed in the service of Hamas, a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, to commit hostilities against Israel. The district court dismissed, holding that the statute lacks an express private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that informers lack standing to sue on their own. View "Bauer v. Mavi Marmara" on Justia Law

RLB filed suit seeking to limit its liability to the value of the dredge vessel, "Jonathan King Boyd," after a fatal allision between a fishing boat and the Vessel's dredge pipe. Claimants had previously filed suit against RLB in state court for personal injuries and property damage, and for the wrongful death of one occupant. Claimants argue that RLB missed the Limitation of Liability Act's, 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq., six-month jurisdictional deadline for invoking the protections of the Act. The court concluded that claimants established that the pre-suit writing from their counsel to RLB's counsel conveyed the reasonable possibility that RLB faced a claim exceeding the value of the Vessel. Therefore, RLB had written notice under the Act earlier than six months before it filed its limitation action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of RLB's complaint as time-bared. View "RLB Contracting, Inc. v. Butler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against oil and gas companies and their insurers, alleging that aspects of the companies' pipeline activities impeded water flows and commercial navigation, causing economic damages. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their complaint for failure to state a claim in favor of two defendants, DIGC and Willbros. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for a maritime tort against DIGC and Willbros. Further, the court adopted the Golden State rule where a defendant is alleged to be a corporate successor to a maritime tortfeasor but is not accused of having engaged in tortious conduct. In this case, plaintiffs' allegations that Dow is the "predecessor" to DIGC and that DIGC operated under an Army Corps permit originally issued to Dow do not show that an exception to Golden State's default rule of nonliability plausibly applies. Without more, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for successor liability against DIGC. View "In re: Louisiana Crawfish Producers" on Justia Law

The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs, former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), as seamen. Blessey filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. required it to hold that loading and unloading duties performed by vessel-based tankermen were nonseaman duties as a matter of law; instead, the court's review of the relevant law and undisputed facts lead it to conclude that loading and unloading was seaman work when done by these vessel-based plaintiffs; and, consequently, the district court erred when it denied Blessey's motion for summary judgment on this issue. In this case, the tankermen performed duties crucial to the mission and purpose for the unit tow and were at all times engaged in work regarding the safe and efficient operation of a "vessel as a means of transportation" under 29 C.F.R. 783.31. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Coffin, et al. v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Royal Caribbean for maritime negligence after her elderly father fell and hit his head while on one of Royal Caribbean's cruise vessels. Plaintiff's father died a week after the injury. Plaintiff alleged that Royal Caribbean is vicariously liable for the negligence of two of its employees, the onboard nurse and doctor, under an actual agency or apparent agency theory. The court concluded that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint plausibly support holding Royal Caribbean vicariously liable for the medical negligence of its onboard nurse and doctor. The court declined to adopt the Barbetta rule, which immunizes a shipowner from respondent superior liability whenever a ship's employees render negligent medical care to its passengers. The court found that the complaint in this cause plausibly establishes a claim against Royal Caribbean under the doctrine of actual agency, as well as the principles of apparent agency. Because plaintiff adequately pled all the elements of both actual and apparent agency, the court held that plaintiff may press her claims under either or both theories. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

Respondent was injured while working on board a dredging vessel operated by Petitioner. Respondent sued Respondent under the Jones Act, arguing that he was injured working under a specific order. Under maritime law, when a seaman is carrying out a specific order, his damages may not be reduced by a finding of contributory negligence. A jury found Respondent was working under a specific order when he was injured and awarded him damages. The jury also found Respondent fifty percent at fault for his injures, but based on the specific-order finding, the trial court did not reduce Respondent’s award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial courts have the discretion to set a deadline for charge objections that falls before the reading of the charge to the jury, and the trial court in this case acted within its discretion in refusing to hear a last-minute charge objection, as the trial court provided a reasonable amount of time for counsel to examine and object to the change; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Respondent was following a specific order when he was injured. View "King Fisher Marine Serv., LP v. Tamez" on Justia Law

The states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island each tax the transfer of real estate. In separate actions, the Town of Johnston, Rhode Island and the Commissioners of Bristol County, Massachusetts (the municipalities) brought actions against Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, the entities), seeking declaratory judgments that the entities owed transfer taxes as well as money damages and equitable relief to recover the unpaid taxes. Federal district courts granted the entities’ motions to dismiss based on statutory exemptions from taxation. The municipalities appealed, arguing that a real property exception in the entities’ tax exemptions applies to the transfer taxes and that the exemptions themselves are unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims, holding (1) the transfer taxes are not included in the real property exception to the entities’ tax exemptions; and (2) the tax exemptions are a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and do not violate the Tenth Amendment. View "Town of Johnston v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under general maritime law against their maritime employment agencies, asserting a claim for wages. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims and plaintiffs appealed. After reviewing the record, reading the parties' briefs, and hearing oral argument, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court for the reasons set out in its two well-reasoned and well-written orders, which were filed on November 4, 2013, and November 7, 2013. The court adopted these orders as the court's opinion with the same effect as if the court had written it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jurich, et al. v. Compass Marine, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seafarers employed with Cunard Line cruise ships, filed a class action complaint against Carnival Corp. and Carnival PLC, a dual-listed company, alleging failure to provide maintenance and cure in accordance with general United States maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 50101. The court held that Carnival Corp. & PLC was not properly suable in this action. Plaintiffs could have brought an action against Carnival PLC (the Cunard Line's parent company), but chose not to, instead making a tactical decision to pursue potentially broader claims against Carnival Corp. & PLC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Sabo, et al. v. Carnival Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Freight Bulk appealed the district court's denial of its motion to vacate a writ of maritime attachment previously issued in favor of Flame under Supplemental Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Forward Freight Swap Agreements at issue in this case are maritime contracts. Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter before it. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd." on Justia Law