Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

The states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island each tax the transfer of real estate. In separate actions, the Town of Johnston, Rhode Island and the Commissioners of Bristol County, Massachusetts (the municipalities) brought actions against Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, the entities), seeking declaratory judgments that the entities owed transfer taxes as well as money damages and equitable relief to recover the unpaid taxes. Federal district courts granted the entities’ motions to dismiss based on statutory exemptions from taxation. The municipalities appealed, arguing that a real property exception in the entities’ tax exemptions applies to the transfer taxes and that the exemptions themselves are unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims, holding (1) the transfer taxes are not included in the real property exception to the entities’ tax exemptions; and (2) the tax exemptions are a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and do not violate the Tenth Amendment. View "Town of Johnston v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under general maritime law against their maritime employment agencies, asserting a claim for wages. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims and plaintiffs appealed. After reviewing the record, reading the parties' briefs, and hearing oral argument, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court for the reasons set out in its two well-reasoned and well-written orders, which were filed on November 4, 2013, and November 7, 2013. The court adopted these orders as the court's opinion with the same effect as if the court had written it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jurich, et al. v. Compass Marine, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seafarers employed with Cunard Line cruise ships, filed a class action complaint against Carnival Corp. and Carnival PLC, a dual-listed company, alleging failure to provide maintenance and cure in accordance with general United States maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 50101. The court held that Carnival Corp. & PLC was not properly suable in this action. Plaintiffs could have brought an action against Carnival PLC (the Cunard Line's parent company), but chose not to, instead making a tactical decision to pursue potentially broader claims against Carnival Corp. & PLC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Sabo, et al. v. Carnival Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Freight Bulk appealed the district court's denial of its motion to vacate a writ of maritime attachment previously issued in favor of Flame under Supplemental Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Forward Freight Swap Agreements at issue in this case are maritime contracts. Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter before it. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd." on Justia Law

Celtic Marine filed suit against Justice in this maritime dispute for breach of contract. After the parties reached two settlements and both were not fulfilled, Celtic Marine moved for summary judgment to enforce an acceleration clause contained in the second agreement for all payments due under the first settlement agreement. Celtic Marine also moved to reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(6). The district court granted both motions, granting leave for Celtic Marine to amend its complaint and then denied Justice's motion to reconsider. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3) does not grant the court jurisdiction over the district court's Rule 60(b) order and, therefore, the court dismissed Justice's appeal for want of jurisdiction. In regards to summary judgment, the court concluded that there was no genuine dispute that the email exchange did not amend the October Settlement Agreement and Celtic Marine did not waive its right to exercise the acceleration clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Celtic Marine Corp. v. James C. Justice Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a seaman, was diagnosed with aplastic anemia, a blood condition that preventing him from continuing to work. Appellant brought a personal injury action against his employer, alleging negligence under the Jones Act and maritime claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, Appellant challenged only the dismissal of his cause of action for maintenance and cure, arguing that he was entitled to that remedy until he “reaches maximum medical recovery.” The First Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling, holding that Appellant adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that his aplastic anemia arose or became aggravated during his service on the ship and, hence, triggered the duty of maintenance and cure. Remanded. View "Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc." on Justia Law

Starr Indemnity filed suit seeking a determination of their rights and obligations under Continental Cement's insurance policies after the Mark Twain, a cement barge owned by Continental Cement, sank in the Mississippi River. Continental Cement counterclaimed for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay under Missouri law. Determining that Continental Cement did not waive its appeal, the court concluded that the district court did not err by applying the federal doctrine of utmost good faith, a judicially established federal admiralty rule, instead of Missouri state law; Continental Cement waived its appeal of the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Starr Indemnity's utmost good faith defense; and, apart from the issue of waiver, the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the utmost good faith instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "New York Marine & General Ins., et al. v. Continental Cement Co., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the sinking of a vessel owned by Hornbeck while at R&R's shipyard for repairs. R&R's liability insurer, National, filed suit to disclaim liability under its policy. Hornbeck counterclaimed. The district court found that R&R was negligent and that National was liable for the ensuing damages. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that R&R was negligent under bailment law where the vessel was delivered to R&R afloat, R&R had full custody of the vessel, and the vessel sank while under R&R's care; even if the salvage company had been negligent, R&R would remain fully liable because this negligence was a foreseeable consequence of R&R's own negligence; under Rule 13(a), Hornbeck had standing to bring its counterclaim and the district court properly ruled on that claim after deciding R&R's liability; and the district court erred in the amount of damages it awarded and in applying an 18% interest rate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the entry of judgment and the appropriate assessment of interest on that judgment. View "National Liability & Fire Ins. Co. v. R & R Marine, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was injured while working as a deckhand on a commercial vessel, sued Defendant, Huntress, Inc., for maintenance and cure, negligence under the federal Jones Act, and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. After a trial, Plaintiff prevailed on his claim for maintenance and cure but not on his remaining claims. The trial justice subsequently denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial with respect to the claim for maintenance and cure and granted Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial with respect to the claims for negligence and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial with respect to the claim for maintenance and cure, holding that the trial justice gave an improper instruction to the jury regarding “unearned wages,” and the error resulted in prejudice to Defendant; and (2) vacated the trial justice’s grant of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the claims of negligence under the Jones Act and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, holding that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived testimony, resulting in a decision that was clearly wrong. View "King v. Huntress, Inc." on Justia Law

The Club is a non-profit provider of protection and indemnity insurance. The Club's Rules include a choice-of-law provision selecting New York law and a two-year statute of limitations for claims against the Club. The Club filed a civil action against defendant alleging that it breached the insurance contract by failing to reimburse the Club for a shortfall and by failing to pay the overdue insurance premiums. The court agreed with the district court, and precedent, that an otherwise valid choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract is enforceable and may require application of a jurisdiction's statute of limitations, in lieu of the doctrine of laches, to govern issues regarding the timeliness of claims asserted under that agreement. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied New York's six-year statute of limitations to the Club's claims arising under its maritime insurance contract with plaintiff. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Steamship Owners v. Dann Ocean Towing, Inc." on Justia Law