Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners filed a petition for limitation on liability after visitors of their powerboat were involved in a fistfight on a floating dock operated by Claimant. At issue was whether federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to tort claims arising from a physical altercation among recreational visitors on and around a permanent dock surrounded by navigable water. The court held that federal admiralty jurisdiction did not reach the claims at issue because this type of incident did not have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Tandon v. Ulbrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, chief mate of the "Sealand Pride," filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that his employer, Maersk, negligently saddled him with excessive duties and duty time such that he was overworked to the point of fatigue. The court concluded that the Jones Act does not allow seaman to recover for injuries caused by work-related stress because work-related stress is not a physical peril. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied the motion of Maersk for a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Under Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, plaintiff's complaint of an injury induced by overwork was not cognizable under the Jones Act. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment awarding plaintiff damages. The court reversed the denial of the motion of Maersk for a judgment as a matter of law and rendered the judgment in favor of Maersk. View "Skye v. Maersk Line" on Justia Law

Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law

The Chincoteague Inn constructed a floating platform secured alongside its building to be used as part of the Inn’s restaurant. The platform was situated partially over state-owned submerged lands. In an enforcement action, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission directed removal of a portion of the platform. The circuit court set aside the Commission’s decision and dismissed with prejudice the Commission’s enforcement action, finding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to require removal of the floating platform. A panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding that under the facts of this case, federal maritime law did not preempt the Commission’s authority to order the removal of the floating platform over state-owned submerged lands. The court of appeals then granted the Inn’s petition for a rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the floating platform. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in interpreting the scope of the Commission’s authority under Va. Code Ann. 28.2-1203(A); and (2) because the court of appeals’ en banc opinion did not address the issue of federal preemption, that issue remained outstanding. Remanded. View "Va. Marine Res. Comm’n v. Chincoteague Inn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit alleging that EBI was negligent in the construction and/or maintenance of the LC-400 shipyard crane. A jury concluded that plaintiff was a Jones Act, 33 U.S.C. 902(3), seaman and that EBI's negligence caused his injury from the crane, awarding him past and future physical pain and suffering, past and future mental pain and suffering, and future lost wages. EBI appealed. The court concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act; because the district court's seaman status instruction was clear and consistent with the usual articulation, the court concluded that the district court did not err in its instruction on the issue of seaman status; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence; and because the court could not discern to what extent plaintiff's award for emotional suffering was based upon the non-compensable harm caused by a relative's death, his awards were tainted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court as it related to liability but vacated the judgment as it related to damages, remanding for further proceedings. View "Naquin, Sr. v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while employed by GC, filed suit against GC alleging that he was working as a seamen at the time of his accident and sought damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, for GC's negligence. Travelers, which provided coverage to GC at the time of plaintiff's accident, moved to intervene. In this appeal, the court held that an insurer who makes voluntary Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, payments to an injured employee on behalf of the employer acquires a subrogation lien on any recovery by the employee in a Jones Act suit against the employer based on the injuries for which the insurer has already compensated him. Therefore, Travelers was entitled to the disputed funds in the district court's registry, and Travelers could intervene for the purpose of collecting these funds. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to intervene filed by Travelers and remanded with instructions. View "Chenevert v. Travelers Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while working on the Motor Vessel Liberty Sun, filed suit against his employer and others asserting claims for damages under a negligence theory and an admiralty cause of action against the owners of "unseaworthy" vessels. The court declined to adopt the maritime rescue doctrine and held that the correct standard of care in maritime injury cases is that of a reasonable mariner under the circumstances. Since evidence supported the conclusion that abnormal forces were acting on the Liberty Sun at the time, she was not unseaworthy as a matter of law. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Barlow, Jr. v. Liberty Maritime, et al." on Justia Law

The Parishes filed suit against BP and others involved in the "Deepwater Horizon" oil spill, seeking to recover penalties under The Louisiana Wildlife Protection Statute, La. R.S. 56:40:1. On appeal, the Parishes challenged the denial of its motion to remand to state court and dismissal of its claims as preempted by federal law. The court concluded that the state law claims were removable pursuant to the broad jurisdictional grant of section 1349 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1349. The court also concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the Parishes' claims were preempted by the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1321, as interpreted in International Paper Co v. Ouellette, and that Congress did not reject that interpretation explicitly or by negative implication in the CWA or when it passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2718(c). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard one of Carnival's ships, filed suit against Carnival in state court asserting claims of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Plaintiff alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (CREFAA), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. Plaintiff argued that his Jones Act claim did not fall within his employment contract ("Seafarer's Agreement") with Carnival and, therefore, was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. The court concluded that the order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims was "a final decision with respect to arbitration," and the court had appellate jurisdiction. The court also concluded that plaintiff's dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer's Agreement and was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Martinez v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and for possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. At issue was whether the admission of a certification of the Secretary of State to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for prosecution of drug trafficking on the high seas violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him at trial. The court concluded that the pretrial admission of the certification did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the certification proved jurisdiction, as a diplomatic courtesy to a foreign nation, and did not prove an element of a defendant's culpability. The court also concluded that the pretrial determination of jurisdiction did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment; the district court did not err when it determined it had jurisdiction based on the certification of the Secretary of State; the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq., is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Felonies Clause; and defendant's conviction did not violate his right to due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law