Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was operating in the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (ICW) under its contract with the Corp when it was struck by a passing vessel. This admiralty appeal challenged the district court's finding of liability arising from the allision in the ICW. The court agreed with the district court and held that plaintiff violated Inland Navigation Rule 9 (INR 9) by mooring in a narrow channel; and that the violation triggered the rule of The Pennsylvania, shifting the burden of proving causation to the dredge. Because plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of causation by demonstrating that the dredge was not a cause of the allision, the court affirmed the district court's judgment holding plaintiff partially liable. The court found that the district court committed no error in finding plaintiff 70 percent liable and thus affirmed the allocation of fault. View "Mike Hooks Dredging Co., Inc. v. Eckstein Marine Serv., Inc., et al" on Justia Law

As the tanker Athos neared Paulsboro, New Jersey, an abandoned anchor in the Delaware River punctured its hull and caused 263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill. The owner of the tanker, Frescati, paid $180 million in cleanup costs and ship damages, but was reimbursed for nearly $88 million by the U.S. government under the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 2701. Frescati made claims against CARCO, which ordered the oil and owned the terminal where the Athos was to unload, claiming breach of the safe port/safe berth warranty made to an intermediary responsible for chartering the Athos and negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The government, as a statutory subrogee for the $88 million reimbursement reached a limited settlement agreement. The district court held that CARCO was not liable for the accident, but made no findings of fact and conclusions of law, required by FRCP 52(a)(1). The Third Circuit remanded for findings, but stated that the Athos and Frescati were implied beneficiaries of CARCO‘s safe berth warranty; that the warranty is an express assurance of safety; and that the named port exception to that warranty does not apply to hazards that are unknown and not reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that it is not clear that the warranty was actually breached, absent findings as to the Athos‘s actual draft or the clearance provided. The court further stated that CARCO could be liable in negligence for hazards outside the approach to CARCO‘s terminal. View "United States v. Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co." on Justia Law

Clevo appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hecny. Clevo, a Taiwan-based manufacturer of computer parts and accessories, and Amazon, a Brazilian entity, agreed that Clevo would manufacture and sell, and Amazon would buy, millions of dollars' worth of Clevo computer parts. Under Clevo and Amazon's negotiated terms, the Hecny Group was designated to handle all of the contract shipments. More than a year after the initial misdelivery to Amazon, Clevo sued numerous Hecny Group entities for the unpaid remainder of the goods' purchase price. The court concluded that the Guarantee was initially effective to place Clevo and Hecny Transportation in direct contractual privity, without any contractually-created statute of limitations. But that initial relationship was modified when the Bills of Lading issued. By operation of the Himalaya Clause, the benefit of the one-year statue of limitations in the Bills of Lading extended beyond Hecny Shipping to Hecny Transportation as well. Because Hecny Transportation had asserted that provision in defense to suit, Clevo's claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

The Village commenced this action against the Corps to require it to honor commitments made to the Village and other North Carolina towns when developing its plan to widen, deepen, and realign portions of the Cape Fear River navigation channel. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the Corps' failure to implement "commitments" made to the Village during development of the plans for the project was not final agency action subject to judicial review. The court also concluded that the alleged contracts on which the Village relied for its contract claims were not maritime contracts that justified the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Village of Bald Head Island v. U. S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a maritime accident where a vessel owned by Bertucci hit the Leo Kerner bridge in Louisiana. Claimants, residents of an affected community, argued that they suffered damages as a result of the accident. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims, holding that the case was barred by Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The law of this circuit did not allow recovery of purely economic claims absent physical injury to a proprietary interest in a maritime negligence suit. Claimants failed to point to any facts that might plausibly state a claim for physical damages of any kind. View "In Re: Bertucci Contracting" on Justia Law

A drug interdiction in Caribbean waters by the United States Coast Guard ended with the arrest and indictment of multiple defendants, including Appellant. The Coast Guard determined that the vessel was "without nationality" and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Appellant was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute more than 1140 pounds of cocaine and heroin while on board a vessel in violation of the MDLEA. On appeal, Appellant argued that Congress lacked the authority under the Piracies and Felonies Clause to criminalize drug trafficking on board a vessel in international waters under the MDLEA without requiring a nexus between the conduct and the United States. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that any jurisdictional error under the MDLEA related to Appellant's conviction did not constitute plain error in this case. View "United States v. Nueci-Pena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Transocean to recover maintenance and cure for a back injury allegedly sustained on the job. The district court awarded summary judgment to Transocean on its counterclaim to recover benefits it already paid to plaintiff, concluding that Transocean's successful McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. defense automatically established its right to restitution - a right of action never before recognized in maritime law. The court concluded that, though most courts have accepted McCorpen, Transocean's attempt to invoke the case as an affirmative right of recovery finds virtually no support, and the court was not inclined to accede. Accordingly, the court rejected Transocean's claim, and reversed and remanded the district court's judgment. View "Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant bought a custom-made yacht with the help of a loan from Barclays Bank. When Defendant stopped making payments on the loan, Barclays repossessed the yacht and sold it pursuant to the Florida UCC. Barclays got less than what Defendant owed on the yacht, and therefore, Barclays sued Defendant for the deficiency. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Barclays was barred from recovering the deficiency because, in violation of the mortgage's terms, it did not provide Defendant with proper notice of the sale. The district court denied Defendant's motion and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of Barclays. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the notice Barclays provided to Defendant was sufficient. View "Barclays Bank PLC v. Poynter" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Greenpeace's public campaign to stop Shell from driling in the Arctic. Greenpeace appealed the district court's grant of Shell's motion for a preliminary injunction, which prohibited Greenpeace from coming within a specified distance of vessels involved in Shell's Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) exploration and from committing various unlawful and tortious acts against those vessels. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the action presented a justiciable case or controversy, that the district court had jurisdiction to issue its order, and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Shell Offshore, Inc., et al v. Greenpeace, Inc." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned segments of two Georgia waterways, the Flint River and Spring Creek. Aqua Log, a company that finds, removes, and sells submerged logs, brought three in rem actions seeking a salvage award for the logs submerged at the bottom of the waterways or, in the alternative, an award of title to the logs based on the American Law of Finds. Because the segments of the Flint River and Spring Creek at issue in these cases were capable of supporting commercial activity, they were navigable waters for admiralty-jurisdiction purposes. The court therefore held that the district court erred in concluding that the waterways were not navigable and dismissing the cases for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aqua Log Inc. v. Lost and Abandoned Pre-Cut Logs and Rafts of Logs" on Justia Law