Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

Vitol brought the underlying action against S&P seeking to "pierce the corporate veil" and enforce a judgment against S&P it had previously obtained against Capri Marine. The district court granted motions to dismiss and to vacate attachment filed by S&P after determining that its exercise of admiralty jurisdiction was proper. The court agreed that the district court properly exercised admiralty jurisdiction over Vitol's claims. On the merits, however, the court concluded that dismissal was appropriate pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where Vitol's allegations were conclusory and contained legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, and the district court's order of attachment was properly vacated. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Vitol, S.A. v. Capri Marine LTD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court seeking relief under general maritime law, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, and Texas tort law. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered severe emotional distress from witnessing his friend's death as a result of an accident on a jack-up rig attached to the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for remand and granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the suit was properly removed to federal court under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's, 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356, grant of original federal question jurisdiction, regardless of whether maritime law provided the substantive rule of decision, and regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Because plaintiff could not show a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claims under either Texas or maritime law, the court affirmed the district court's orders denying remand and granting summary judgment to defendants. View "Barker, Jr. v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of an order declaring enforceable under general maritime law a liquidated damages provision (LD Provision) in a contract between defendant and plaintiff. The parties entered into a Vessel Sales Agreement (VSA), which included the LD Provision, that provided for a $250,000 payment for each violation of the non-competition clause. The court followed Farmers Exp. Co. v. M/V Georgis Prois in finding persuasive the district court's careful factual findings as to whether the LD Provision was a reasonable forecast of damages. The court held that looking at the contract at the time it was made, ex ante breach, the court could not bicker with the $250,000 per occurrence forecast. Plaintiff had not met its burden to prove that the LD Provision was a penalty. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly held that the LD Provision was enforceable and affirmed the judgment. View "International Marine, L.L.C., et al v. Delta Towing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Rubert Minton suffered injuries as a result of developing mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while working on Exxon Mobile Corporation (Exxon) ships during his employment at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (Shipyard). Minton filed suit against Exxon under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for failure to warn Minton of, and protect him from, the dangers associated with asbestos. The jury found in favor of Minton and awarded him compensatory damages, medical expenses, and punitive damages. Exxon appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in refusing to admit relevant evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of asbestos exposure and its ability to remedy the danger; and (2) the award of $12,500,000 in punitive damages was inappropriately granted because punitive damages are a remedy prohibited by the terms of LHWCA. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Minton" on Justia Law

This case involved claims brought by cabin stewards against their employer, Celebrity Cruises, and against the Union (FIT) that represented them. Because the stewards were foreign employees involved in an internal wage dispute with a foreign ship, neither the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159, applied to the stewards' challenges. Since their claims were dependent upon the protections of those acts, the district court properly dismissed their claims against Celebrity and FIT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-13623. Because the stewards could have raised their Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313, claim in Lobo II but did not, the court affirmed the district court's order in Gomez as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-10406 View "Lobo, et al v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Mala entered Crown Bay Marina, tied the boat to a fueling station and began filling his tank with an automatic gas pump. Before walking to the register to buy oil, Mala asked an attendant to watch his boat. When Mala returned, the tank was overflowing and fuel was spilling into the boat and the water. The attendant shut off the pump and acknowledged that it was malfunctioning. Mala began cleaning up; the attendant provided soap and water. Mala departed; the engine caught fire and exploded. Mala was thrown into the water and was severely burned. Mala sued, claiming negligent training and supervision and negligent maintenance. At the time Mala was imprisoned; he has filed at least 20 pro se lawsuits. The district court concluded that his history of filing frivolous lawsuits precluded in forma pauperis status, 28 U.S.C. 1915; rejected Mala’s jury demand; dismissed certain defendants; held a bench trial at which Mala represented himself; and ruled in favor of Crown Bay, although an advisory jury returned a verdict of $460,000 for Mala. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court should have provided additional assistance, wrongfully denied a jury trial, and improperly ruled on post-trial motions. View "Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, the M/V Akili, its owner, and manager, appealed from the district court's judgment holding that it was liable in rem for damage to cargo shipped aboard the vessel. Ferrostaal cross-appealed from the holding that the owner and manager were not liable in personam under a bailment theory. At issue was whether (1) an in rem proceeding rendering the Akili liable for damage to, or loss of, cargo was unavailable in this matter because a vessel was not a "carrier" within the meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and (ii) the free-in-and-out provision in the Voyage Charter Party purportedly absolving the Akili of in rem liability was enforceable. The court held that the first issue was essentially irrelevant because a vessel's in rem liability for damage to cargo existed under maritime common law, not COGSA, for a violation of a carrier's contractual or statutory obligations. The court resolved the second issue against enforcement of the free-in-and-out provision so far as it might be construed to prevent in rem liability of the vessel. In doing so, the court did not decide whether COGSA applied as a matter of law to this voyage because, even if it did not, the Voyage Charter Party's Clause Paramount contractually incorporated the Hague-Visby rules prohibiting a carrier from contracting for a waiver of its obligations regarding damage to cargo. The court also held that there was no in personam liability for the owner and manager where the carriers remained responsible for delivery of the goods and maintained exclusive control and custody over the cargos through agents they hired directly. View "Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for conspiracy to carry a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, in violation of 49 U.S.C. 46505(e), and for aiding and abetting the carrying of a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2 and 49 U.S.C. 46505(b)(1). At issue was whether 49 U.S.C. 46505 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, an airport employee, who sneaks a pocketknife past a security checkpoint and then gives it to a passenger who takes it aboard an airplane. The court concluded that 49 U.S.C. 46505 gave adequate notice to defendant that a pocketknife with a blade of slightly less than two-and-a-half inches was prohibited aboard an aircraft. Accordingly, the court held that the statute was not constitutionally vague as applied and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico where an explosion killed 11 workers, caused the drilling platform to sink, and resulted in a major uncontrolled release of oil. At Presidential direction, those events prompted the Department of the Interior to prohibit all new and existing oil and gas drilling operations on the Outer Continental Shelf for six months. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the moratorium. At issue on appeal was whether the Interior's subsequent actions violated a specific provision of the court's injunction, justifying a finding of civil contempt. The court held that even though the Interior immediately took steps to avoid the effect of the injunction, the court concluded that none of those actions violated the court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Hornbeck Offshore Services, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned the MSA's indemnification provision and the insurance agreements supporting M-I's indemnification obligations. At issue was whether, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a), Louisiana law governed the indemnity provisions. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, finding that the OCSLA applied to the parties' contractual dispute, and thus, pursuant to the OCSLA choice of law provision, Louisiana law applied, under which the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. 9:2780(B), invalidated the indemnity provisions. View "Ace American Ins. Co. v. M-I, L.L.C." on Justia Law