Justia Admiralty & Maritime Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, MDS purchased a vessel and executed a note in favor of FirstBank, secured by a preferred ship mortgage, under an agreement that required that they maintain insurance. In 2009, Customs and Border Protection seized the vessel as part of a drug enforcement action. The search and seizure damaged the vessel, significantly decreasing its value. Customs notified FirstBank, which initiated an administrative forfeiture proceeding, intervened in the criminal case, obtained voluntary dismissal of the indictment against the vessel, then submitted an insurance claim for "loss of the vessel including, without limitation, the value of the Bank's collateral, legal fees incurred in attempting to secure its release, as well as any applicable costs and interests." The insurer denied the claim. The district court granted FirstBank partial summary judgment and awarded $74,512.50 in attorneys' fees for costs and expenses incurred in securing release of the vessel and defending the validity of the policy. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no genuine issues of material fact.View "Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Santiago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of the Philippines, brought suit against defendants for damages arising from severe injuries he sustained aboard the M/V Asian Spirit in the Chesapeake Bay near Baltimore. Plaintiff's complaint alleged multiple clams against defendants, including unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, breach of contract, violation of the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313(i), and negligence under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Arbitration Clause at issue was enforceable and that plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against defendants in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the court vacated the dismissal of the case and remanded for reinstatement thereof, for assessment of the injunction request, for entry of a stay pending arbitration to ensure that plaintiff would have an opportunity at the award-enforcement stage for judicial review of his public policy defense based on the prospective waiver doctrine, and for such other and further proceedings. View "Aggarao, Jr. v. Mol Ship Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

This issue on appeal in this case involved a maritime claim for maintenance and cure and whether, under federal maritime law, a judge, instead of a jury, awards attorney fees following the jury award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of an injured seaman against the employer for willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. Respondent Dana Clausen worked on board Appellant Icicle Seafoods' Bering Star as second engineer when he sustained injuries. Respondent encountered persistent difficulties in getting Icicle and its adjuster Spartan, to meet its obligation to pay him maintenance and cure during his recovery. Icicle paid Respondent $20 per day to cover lodging, utilities, and meals. Respondent resorted to living in a recreational vehicle with a leaking roof and with no heat, air conditioning, running water, or toilet facilities. Additionally, Icicle delayed or refused to pay for treatment that Respondent's doctors recommended. In a report to Icicle, Spartan confirmed that Respondent's injuries were likely career-ending. Icicle filed suit in federal court against Respondent to terminate Respondent's right to maintenance and cure. Respondent filed the present action and Icicle's suit in federal court was dismissed. Respondent sought damages for Icicle's negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 30104), unseaworthiness of the Bering Star, and wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure. The jury found Icicle negligent under the Jones Act, and that Icicle was callous or willful and wanton in its failure to pay maintenance and cure. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under federal maritime law, the trial court calculates an attorney fee award related to a maintenance and cure action, and the punitive damages award as determined by the jury here, based on the callous or willful and wanton withholding of maintenance and cure, was proper. View "Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

The owners of each of the three vessels involved in the collision at issue appealed the district court's allocation of liability. In addition, the owners of the M/V Clary contended that they were entitled to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 30505, and the manager of that vessel asserted that the district court erred in finding it liable for the collision under common law. The court found no error in the district court's allocation of liability. The court found, however, clear error in the district court's determination that the Clary Owners were not entitled to limit their liability. The court declined to address the Clary manager's argument that liability was limited because the argument was not raised. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Otal Investments, Ltd. v. M/V. Tricolor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's enforcement of the arbitration agreement in his employment contract with defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant on a single count of Jones Act negligence, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 30104, claiming that defendant breached its duty to supply him with a safe place to work. The court held that, given the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and governing Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent, the court must enforce the arbitration clause in plaintiff's employment contract, at least at this initial arbitration-enforcement stage. Therefore, after review and oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's Jones Act negligence claim.View "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), LTD" on Justia Law

Asian carp have migrated up the Mississippi River and are at the brink of the man-made Chicago-Area Waterway System path to the Great Lakes. The carp are dangerous to the eco-system, people, and property. States bordering the Lakes filed suit, alleging that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago manage the system in a manner that will allow carp to move into the Great Lakes, in violation of the federal common law of public nuisance. The district court denied a preliminary injunction that would have required additional physical barriers, new procedures to stop invasive carp, and an expedited study of how best to separate the Mississippi and Great Lakes permanently. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs presented enough evidence to establish a likelihood of harm, a non-trivial chance that carp will invade Lake Michigan in numbers great enough to constitute a public nuisance and that harm to the plaintiff states would be irreparable. The defendants have, however, mounted a full-scale effort to stop the carp and has promised that additional steps will be taken in the near future. This effort diminishes any role that equitable relief would otherwise play and an interim injunction would only get in the way. View "State of MI v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

This case arose when claimant served plaintiff with a complaint, alleging that his injuries were caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V St. Andrew and by the negligence of plaintiff and its employees. Claimant became entangled in a line and was pulled into a mooring bit, seriously injuring his left leg. Following a state court trial, claimant won a judgment in excess of $750,000 and plaintiff subsequently appealed. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of its limitation act as untimely. Because a challenge to the timeliness of a limitation action was a challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and because plaintiff had notice claimant was mounting such a challenge in his motion to dismiss, the district court did not err by construing plaintiff's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when claimant delivered his complaint to plaintiff on April 28, 2009, and that plaintiff's January 18, 2010 petition was untimely filed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it opted not to hold an evidentiary hearing on claimant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eckstein Marine Service L.L.C., et al. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The city filed a complaint in admiralty against defendant, a vessel, claiming that defendant committed the maritime tort of trespass because it remained at the city marina after the city explicitly revoked its consent, and seeking to foreclose its maritime lien for necessaries (unpaid dockage provided to defendant by the city). Claimant, owner of the vessel, appealed from the district court's entry of an order of summary judgment and an order of final judgment for the city in an in rem proceeding against defendant. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that it had federal admiralty jurisdiction over defendant where defendant was a "vessel" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction; the district court's factual findings regarding the amount claimant owed under the city's maritime lien for necessaries were not clearly erroneous; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the city on claimant's affirmative defense of retaliation; the district court correctly concluded that the city was not estopped from bringing its action in admiralty against defendant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply collateral estoppel because the issues at stake were significantly different from those in dispute in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the district court's orders were affirmed.View "City of Riviera Beach v. Lozman" on Justia Law

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order.View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America) Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues.View "Gabarick, et al. v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., et al." on Justia Law